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Abstract
The dissertation study examines the role of emotion and visual imagery in framing effects on judgments
and decision-making. More specifically, it asks whether emotion is the mechanism that accounts for the
link between framing of messages and the effects of those messages. Its broadest theoretical goal is to
illuminate how people aggregate and integrate information from various elements of a message in order
to form a policy preference. A series of experimental studies were conducted. The main experiment
systematically replicated a study (Levin and Chapman, 1993) that had added disease populations
characteristics (AIDS and leukemia patients) to Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) classic framing effects
study. By adding emotion-laden visual portrayals, the current study tried to influence previously
established patterns of preferences where people assigned the least popular option in each frame to the
undervalued disease population (AIDS patients). In addition, two rival mediator hypotheses were tested to
explain the mechanisms by which these patterns occurred: attributions of responsibility versus
compassionate response. The main experiment produced significant differences in preferences.
Participants who saw compassionate visual portrayals of AIDS patients were significantly less likely to
assign the worst option in each frame to them. Only limited support was found for the attributions of
responsibility mediating hypothesis, with AIDS responsibility ratings emerging as a potential weak
mediator. At the broadest level, this study suggests that framing, characteristics of the disease
population, and emotional consistency of visual portrayal are consequential for judgments. Preference
patterns for subjects who saw a compassionate visual portrayal significantly differed from those who
saw an uncompassionate portrayal or no image. Furthermore, when people are asked to make
comparative judgments between two disease populations, their previous evaluations of the populations
seem to influence preferences. Finally, visual characterizations of disease populations influence people’s
preferences, specifically the facial display of emotion in an image used to represent a disease population.
These findings have practical relevance for designing public health messages that seek to influence
judgments related to behaviors such as giving, volunteering, establishing public policy, and allocating
resources.
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ABSTRACT

EVALUATIONS AND EMOTION:
INFLUENCING PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY PREFERENCES VIA FACIAL AFFECT
Courtney Bennett
Dr. Joseph Cappella

The dissertation study examines the role o f emotion and visual imagery in
framing effects on judgments and decision-making. More specifically, it asks whether
emotion is the mechanism that accounts for the link between framing of messages and the
effects of those messages. Its broadest theoretical goal is to illuminate how people
aggregate and integrate information from various elements of a message in order to form
a policy preference.
A series of experimental studies were conducted. The main experiment
systematically replicated a study (Levin and Chapman, 1993) that had added disease
populations characteristics (AIDS and leukemia patients) to Tversky and Kahneman’s
(1981) classic framing effects study. By adding emotion-laden visual portrayals, the
current study tried to influence previously established patterns of preferences where
people assigned the least popular option in each frame to the undervalued disease
population (AIDS patients). In addition, two rival mediator hypotheses were tested to
explain the mechanisms by which these patterns occurred: attributions of responsibility
versus compassionate response.
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The main experiment produced significant differences in preferences. Participants
who saw compassionate visual portrayals o f AIDS patients were significantly less likely
to assign the worst option in each frame to them. Only limited support was found for the
attributions o f responsibility mediating hypothesis, with AIDS responsibility ratings
emerging as a potential weak mediator.
A t the broadest level, this study suggests that framing, characteristics o f the
disease population, and emotional consistency o f visual portrayal are consequential for
judgments. Preference patterns for subjects who saw a compassionate visual portrayal
significantly differed from those who saw an uncompassionate portrayal or no image.
Furthermore, when people are asked to make comparative judgments between two
disease populations, their previous evaluations of the populations seem to influence
preferences. Finally, visual characterizations o f disease populations influence people’s
preferences, specifically the facial display o f emotion in an image used to represent a
disease population.
These findings have practical relevance for designing public health messages that
seek to influence judgments related to behaviors such as giving, volunteering,
establishing public policy, and allocating resources.
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Introduction
This dissertation study examines the possible role of emotion and visual imagery
in framing effects on judgments and decision-making. More specifically, it asks whether
emotion can act as the mechanism that accounts for the link between framing o f messages
and the effects o f those messages. Although a substantial body of research in support o f
framing effects exists, the mechanisms that underlie these effects are only beginning to be
explored. Furthermore, existing work has focused on knowledge activation and verbal
content, while this study explores the role o f emotion and visual content.
A theoretical assumption drawn from framing research drives this study: how
people understand and respond to messages depends as much on the presentation or
framing o f messages as their content (see e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Cappella &
Jamieson, 1997). In this context, it tests three assumptions in an attempt to integrate
emotion and imagery into our understanding of the mechanisms underlying framing
effects. First, is a hypothesis offered by Damasio (1994) that emotion may be an
important mechanism underlying framing effects. In other words, it may be people’s
emotional response to messages that produces framing effects. Second, is whether the
modality o f the message (Le. visual versus non-visual) can determine the extent to which
emotions will be activated as a mechanism o f framing (McLuhan, 1964). There is some
evidence to suggest that visuals are more likely to elicit emotional responses (Chaudhuri
& Buck, 1995; Buck, 1988; Zilknan, 1991). Finally, it examines whether, compared to
the influence o f accompanying verbal content on preferences, visual content can exert at
least equal (Mitchell, 1986) and in some cases dominant or over-riding (Jamieson, 1988,
1992; Aust & Zillmann, 1997) influence.
1
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To illustrate and test these assumptions, the current study modifies Tversky and
Kahneman’s (1981) classic study of framing effects in the public health domain. They
found that two messages identical in content yet divergent in presentation (gains versus
loss frames) produced predictably patterned preference reversals of risk-seeking in the
loss frame and risk aversion in the gain frame. Referring to this result as presentation
effects, Kahneman and Tversky (1984) propose that people tend to evaluate options in
relation to the reference point that the statement o f the problem (Le. its frame) suggests or
implies. Levin and Chapman (1990, 1993) added another dimension to the study of
framing effects by investigating whether the characteristics o f the disease population
would influence preferences. They found that people tended to assign the less-valued
option (e.g. risk averse in the loss domain and risk seeking in the gain domain) to the less
valued social group (AIDS victims as opposed to leukemia victims).
To further extend this work, the dissertation study explores two questions related
to emotion and imagery. One is whether emotional responses to visual imagery can
function as a reference point from which judgments or inferences are made. Another is
whether emotion-laden imagery exerts equal or greater influence on preferences than
messages without images. To examine these questions, an experiment was conducted to
try to impact traditional preference reversals by using emotion-laden imagery to change
people’s preferences. To paraphrase Lasswell (1948), the general question the study
attempted to answer is: “what kind of text provokes what kind of emotional reaction with
what effect.” More specifically, it tested the hypothesis that visuals that elicit compassion
toward undervalued disease populations (e.g., AIDS victims) will undermine the patterns
o f preference found by Levin and Chapman (1990, 1993). In support of this approach,
2
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Zajonc and Markus (1982, 127) suggest that changing the influence o f people’s
previously held attitudes on preferences may “require an attack on the affective basis of
the preference.”
By exploring the extent to which compassionate visual portrayals influence
preferences, this study has both theoretical and practical implications. Theoretically, it
could extend framing research by offering insight into the mechanisms underlying
framing effects. It will also seek to clarify the components o f a compassionate emotional
response, and the impact o f that response on preferences. The study’s broadest theoretical
goal is to illuminate the ways that people aggregate and integrate information from
various elements o f a message in order to form a preference. The overall sequence o f
events that this paper proposes is: visual portrayals will create an emotional response —»
that gets integrated with the previous affective response to the target group —» that in turn
gets integrated with an affective response to the framing of the message —» all of which
combine to produce a policy preference outcome. The study seeks to contribute to our
understanding o f how each of the elements or levels of a message operates in activating
certain emotional states, as well as how these states work together to create an emotional
response.
Practically, it tests several message features thought to elicit a compassionate
emotional response, and the relative effectiveness of visual versus non-visual messages in
conveying emotional information. Insights in these areas could help inform message
design, particularly in the realm of public health and educational campaigns, and for what
Bagozzi & Moore, 1994 call “help-other PSAs.” As Slovic (1986) notes, message design
considerations have important consequences. People’s sensitivity to the presentation of
3
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information raises ethical and practical concerns for practitioners o f message design. For
example, the manner in which information is presented may encourage people to evaluate
a particular public health issue in terms o f “overall mortality, mortality due to diseases, or
the number of deaths associated with the particular disease under study” (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1984: 344). Tversky and Kahneman (1981, p. 458) go so far as to propose that
the consequences of preferences in the public health domain make the adoption of a
decision frame an ethically significant act.
A useful way to begin is with a review of the literature pertaining to each of the
message elements that the study will examine. First is an overview o f framing research
that includes definitions o f framing, evidence for framing effects, and explanations for
framing effects.
Framing Effects Research: An Overview
What is Framing?
A paradigm for approaching and understanding issues and messages, framing has
diverse roots that range from sociology (e.g. Goffman, 1974) to decision sciences (e.g.
Tversky & Kahneman, 1979) to linguistics (e.g. Tannen, 1990). The concept o f framing
offers a way to describe the power of messages by explaining how the presentation of
information can influence perception and judgment (Entman, 1992). A framing
hypothesis posits that the manner in which information is presented can affect how
people understand, evaluate, and ultimately act on that information.
In a definition highlighting the importance of selection and salience in framing,
frames are seen to

4
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select some aspects o f perceived reality and make them more salient in a
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem, definition,
causal interpretation, moral evaluation (Entman, 1992, p. 52).

Equally important is framing’s ability to define public issues by omitting or
minimizing information and restricting available information (Entman, 1992; Gamson,
1992; Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). Overall, whether through emphasis or omission
frames provide a way to think about events, and invite sense-making by providing a way
to understand issues or events (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997, 45-46, emphasis in original).
They

define problems - determine what a causal agent is doing with what costs and
benefits, usually measured in terms o f common cultural values; diagnose causes —
identify the forces creating the problem; make moral judgments —evaluate causal
agents and their effects; and suggest remedies —offer and justify treatments for
the problems and predict their likely effects (Entman, 1992).

Scholars diverge in their descriptions o f how frames invite sense-making. Some
say that frames can act as organizing themes in the stories people tell about social and
political events (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). Using “thematic structures” people make
arguments for a particular take on an issue or event, such as claiming that the accident at
Three Mile Island was “human failure rather than technology run amok” (Cappella &
Jamieson, 1997, 46). Others describe frames as providing a reference point implied by the
statement o f the problem from which information can be understood and evaluated
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1984). To simplify and focus the discussion, the notion of
frames serving as reference points will provide the working definition o f framing for this
dissertation study.

5
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Entman (1992) locates frames in four points in the communicative process: the
communicator, the text, the receiver, and the culture. Communicators use frames
(unconsciously or consciously) to organize their personal belief systems (also called
schemas). These frames are manifested in communicative texts or acts through such
features as word selection, information sources, thematic clusters, and cue words. On the
receiving end, audiences bring their own frames and schemas1 to the text, which may not
coincide with the frames produced by communicators or texts. Cultural or social contexts
also provide a stock of “commonly invoked frames” which people in social groups
exhibit in communication and discourse (Entman, 1992, p. 53). Some scholars have
suggested that if audiences consistently receive one type of frame over another they will
tend to recall and use the reference point suggested by that dominant frame in decisionmaking (Iyengar, 1991; Gamson, 1992). Taking this idea to its extreme, Entman (1992)
proposes that when a term becomes widely accepted, communicators trying to use
another risk losing credibility with audiences or failing to be understood. In this scenario,
“the power o f a frame can be as great as that o f language itself’ (Entman, 1992, p. 55).
Highlighting the struggle and competition that occurs over framing in public
discourse, Entman (1992, p. 55) describes dominant frames as imprints of power that
register “the identity of actors or interests.” Sponsors of different, and at times
competing, frames understand the importance of ensuring that their interpretation of
events is accepted as the dominant view. Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes and Sasson (1992,
385) refer to the competition over frames in media discourse as symbolic contests, where
success and failure are measured by the prominence o f preferred meanings and
interpretations in various media arenas. Frames can also exert great social power when a
6
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particular reference point gets encoded in a term o r label like “affirmative action”
(Gamson, 1992; Entman, 1992). According to Gamson (1992, p. 9) the positive
connotation of this label evokes a ‘remedial action’ frame that calls for continued redress
against more subtle forms of racial discrimination in modem society. In a study of
alternative question wording, Kinder and Sanders (1990) found that people expressed
more resentment and prejudice when affirmative action was described as an “unfair
advantage” for some groups versus when it was described as a case of “reverse
discrimination.” The importance of this example in terms of the current study is the idea
that frames can activate ideas and feelings (i.e. resentment) that may lead to support for
one position over another.
Scholars also tend to agree that audiences play an active role in this process by
evaluating public issues in the context of their own experience, values, and information
(Iyengar, 1991; Gamson, 1992; Price & Tewksbury, 1991). Audiences themselves may
also hold competing values. When one value is framed over another, a seeming
disjunction of acts and attitudes may result even though preferences are in fact
cognitively consistent. For example, surveys show that people care about both public
health and civil liberties (Sniderman et aL, 1991). When mandatory testing for AIDS
victims is framed in terms of civil liberties most people support the rights of people with
AIDS. When mandatory testing is framed in terms o f public health considerations,
however, most people support mandatory testing (Sniderman et aL, 1991, 52). General
agreement exists that interpretation occurs through the interaction o f frames located in
messages and frames that receivers bring to texts (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Entman,
1992). Therefore, another aim of the dissertation study is to explore this interaction by
7

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

looking at the interaction between frames that audiences bring to messages and frames
within messages. Using imagery, the study attempts to reframe people’s images of, and
feelings toward with people with AIDS and leukemia.
One criticism leveled against framing is that the concept has been over-used and
over-generalized. Cappella and Jamieson (1997) suggest a useful set of criteria to
distinguish frames th at deserve merit: frames that are conceptually definable, reliably
identifiable and sufficiently generalizable (Le. persistent and widespread). Examples o f
frames that fit these criteria include: gains and losses (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981);
episodic and thematic (Iyengar, 1991); reverse discrimination and unfair advantage
(Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Gamson, 1992); and strategy and issue (Jamieson, 1992;
Cappella & Jamieson, 1992).
Cappella and Jamieson (1997) also take care to distinguish framing from two
important and indirectly related media effects, agenda setting and priming, a point that is
worth reiterating here. Agenda setting research has demonstrated a consistent correlation
between the frequency o f a topic covered by the news media and its ranking in public
opinion polls (e.g., McCombs & Shaw, 1972). This approach, however, focuses on the
frequency which a topic appears without considering how that topic is treated (Cappella
and Jamieson, 1997). F o r example, when agenda-setting researchers analyze mass media
coverage o f the topic o f health care reform their focus is the frequency or presence of
health care reform in media coverage, not whether that coverage discusses health care
reform in terms o f “universal coverage as necessary to the plan’s functioning or universal
coverage as appealing to the president’s constituency in the lower and middle classes”
(Cappella & Jamieson, 1997, p. 51). Similarly, priming research primarily focuses on the
8
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relative frequency with which specific topics appear in media coverage.2 Unlike agenda
setting, however, priming posits that frequent media coverage o f a topic influences
audiences both in terms of ranking the issue as important and using it as a criteria for
judgment. During an election, for example, frequent coverage o f the possibility of nuclear
war may lead audiences to rank reducing the risk of nuclear war as important, and to
judge candidates on their success in, or proposals for, reducing the risk of war (Iyengar
and Kinder, 1987, 63). Framing offers a natural extension o f both agenda-setting and
priming because it suggests that the way that these frequently discussed issues are framed
may affect how people think about them.
Framing Techniques
In terms o f operationalization, studies of framing tend to hold information (the
message kernel) constant while manipulating some type o f formatting feature of the
message. Message features that have been manipulated to invoke framing effects include
word selection or phrasing (e.g. Sniderman et aL, 1991; Kinder & Sanders, 1996), word
placement or timing (e.g. Bodenhausen, 1988), and cue words (e.g. Gilovich, 1981;
Devine, 1989).
For example, Gilovich (1981) found that support for American involvement in a
hypothetical war varied as a function o f the information people read before making a
judgment. Subjects read one o f three descriptions of a hypothetical crisis in which only
six words or short phrases were manipulated to evoke associations to either World War II
(WWH), Vietnam, or neither event (neutral). For example, the room in which a
hypothetical briefing for the official took place was either Winston Churchill Hall
(WWH), Dean Rusk Hall (Vietnam), or Abraham Lincoln Hall (neutral). Subjects in the
9
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WWH condition tended to recommend significantly more interventionist strategies than
those in the Vietnam or neutral groups.
Bodenhausen (1992) found similar results in a mock juror decision-making task
that demonstrated the effects o f word placement or timing on judgments. Subjects
received identical evidence with two variations: the ethnicity o f the defendant’s name
(Hispanic: Carlos Ramirez o f Albuquerque, New Mexico, or Non-ethnic: Robert Johnson
of Dayton Ohio), and the timing o f the defendant’s name (introduced before or after
evidence was presented). Groups that received information about a Hispanic defendant
prior to receiving evidence tended to render stronger judgments o f guilt. These findings
suggest that frames can activate stereotypes that lead decision-makers to use selective
evidence-processing strategies (Bodenhausen, 1992).
Evidence for Framing Effects
Although the presence of frames does not necessarily lead to effects, studies have
provided strong support for the existence of framing effects on judgments, and decision
making (see Kiihberger, 1998 for a review). Still open for exploration, however, are the
potential mechanisms for these effects. Two areas o f framing effects research most
relevant to the focus o f the proposed study are health-related decisions (e.g. Tversky &
Kahneman, 1981; Rothman, Salovey, Antone, Keough, & Martin, 1993) and attributions
of both causal and treatment responsibility (Iyengar, 1991). Studies that have guided
dependent variable selection for the dissertation study will now be outlined.
Medical/Public Health Decision-Making
In the health domain, studies have generally taken two approaches. One group has
demonstrated framing effects on intentions and attitudes toward performing specific
10
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health behaviors (see Rothman & Salovey, 1997 for a review). The other has focused on
preferences for certain outcomes in individual medical (e.g. McNeil, Pauker, Sox, &
Tversky, 1982) or public health decision-making scenarios (e.g. Levin & Chapman, 1990,
1993). Because the proposed study will entail a hypothetical public health decision
problem that assigns preferences as a key dependent variable, particular attention will be
paid to examples o f the latter approach.
The classic application of framing effects in the domain of public health is
Tversky & Kahneman’s (1981, p. 453) well-known decision problem, (with the
percentage of respondents choosing each outcome indicated in brackets):

Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease,
which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the
disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimate of the
consequences of the programs are as follows:
Positive Frame:
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. [72%]
If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved,
and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved. [28%]
Which of the two programs would you prefer?
Negative Frame:
If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. [22%]
If Program D is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 2/3
probability that 600 people will die. [78%]
Which of the two programs would you prefer?

These results show that people become risk-seeking in the negative domain and
risk-averse in the positive domain. A risk averse choice occurs when respondents prefer a
certain outcome (e.g. 200 people will be saved) over an uncertain outcome (e.g. there is a
1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, and 2/3 probability that no people will be
saved) with an equal or greater expected value. In contrast, a risk seeking choice occurs
11
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when people prefer an uncertain outcome over a certain outcome with an equal or higher
expected value (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982: 160). The dissertation study uses a
modified version o f this decision task, and a full discussion of the model for the
psychological mechanisms underlying these effects occurs in a section on explanations
for framing effects. An alternative hypothesis for these results, however, that the
proposed study will explore is that frames evoke emotional reactions that influence
preferences for certain outcomes (Le., loss frames elicit feelings about death that produce
patterns of risk-seeking).
Demonstrating the same patterns in a study of individual health decision-making,
McNeil et aL (1982) presented a set of hypothetical treatment options to three groups,
patients, graduate students, and doctors. Each group was asked to choose between
surgery (greater short-term risk and long-term benefits) and radiation therapy (no short
term risk and lower long-term benefits) for treating lung cancer. All groups preferred
surgery over radiation when the problems were framed in terms of gains (Le., the
probability of living) rather than losses (Le., the probability of dying). Again, an
alternative explanation for these results is that people’s reaction to prospective death
results in preferences for risk-seeking options (Damasio, 1994).
Characteristics o f Disease Populations and Framing Effects
Another set o f studies in the public health domain that strongly influenced the
current study’s design were a series o f experiments by Levin and Chapman (1990, 1993)
testing whether framing effects vary as a function of the desirability of the disease
population.

12
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In an experiment manipulating the characteristics o f the target population to test
whether framing effects varied with the desirability3 o f the disease population, the
authors used a 3 (victim identification: homosexual/bisexual/intravenous drug user,
hemophiliac, unspecified) x 2 (information frame: positive, negative) factorial design
(Levin and Chapman, 1990). In each o f the framing conditions (positive and negative)
one group was told that the new AIDS strain would primarily affect homosexual and
bisexual men and intravenous drug users, while another group was told that it would
primarily affect hemophiliacs needing blood transfusions. In the hemophiliac and
unspecified conditions, traditional preference reversals were found. By contrast, the
homosexual/bisexual/drug user condition did not produce traditional preference reversal
patterns. Although the authors surmised that subjects’ attitudes toward undervalued
disease populations undermined the preference reversals effect, subjects’ written
explanation of their choices revealed “almost no overt references to victim
characteristics” (p. 426).4 Instead subjects justified their choice in terms of either a
preference for the sure saving of lives or the chance to save all lives.5 A possible
explanation for this finding comes from Zajonc (1980; see also Zajonc & Markus, 1982),
who suggests that affective reactions often occur automatically and are difficult to
verbalize.6
In a second experiment, the authors created a forced-choice version of the task in
Experiment 1. Subjects were given two options (riskless vs. risky) for dealing with an
AIDS outbreak, and asked to select one option for a group o f hemophiliacs and another
for a group o f intravenous drug users. As predicted, subjects were more likely to prefer
the risky option (more desirable option) for hemophiliacs in the negative than in the
13
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positive condition, and vice-versa for intravenous drug users. Applying their findings
within prospect theory (see e.g. Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, 1982), the authors proposed
that the difference occurs because the difference between the subjective value of saving
200 lives (Program A) and one-third the subjective value o f saving 600 lives (Program b)
is greater for hemophiliacs than for intravenous drug users.
Similarly, in a third experiment that applied the same forced-choice format to two
countries, the U.S. (representing the in-group) and Iran (representing the out-group),
subjects were more likely to prefer the risky option for the in-group in the negative
condition than in the positive condition and vice-versa for the out-group.
In a later set of experiments, Levin and Chapman (1993) the authors modified
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) Asian task disease for both leukemia and AIDS victims:

Assume that a research hospital has 60 leukemia [AIDS] patients. Two new
programs, Program A and Program B, have been developed to treat this disease.
Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the effects of the two programs are
as described below. Assume also that the effect o f treatment on any one patient
will be all-or-none: Either they will die, or they will be returned to the quality of
life they experienced before contracting the disease.
If Program A is adopted: There is a 1/3 probability that all 60 patients will be
saved [will not die] and a 2/3 probability that 0 will be saved [all 60 will die].
If Program B is adopted: 20 patients will be saved. [40 will die]
There is money to support only one of these programs. Which program would you
choose? Circle one: A
B

The preference reversal pattern found by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) was
replicated for each disease population: Whether the patient was described as having
AIDS or leukemia, people preferred the riskless option in the positively framed condition,
and risky option in the negatively framed condition.
14
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In a second experiment, Levin and Chapman constructed a forced-choice task that
crossed degree of riskiness with patient type to assess subjects’ response when they
directly compare outcomes for tw o different disease populations. The task was described
as:
Assume that a research hospital has 60 leukemia patients and 60 AIDS patients.
Two new programs, Program A and Program B, have been developed to treat
these diseases. Each of these programs will affect patients with both o f these
blood-related diseases. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the effects of
the two programs on the tw o patient groups are as described below. Assume also
that the effect of the treatment on any one patient will be all-or-none: Either they
will die, or they will be returned to the quality of life they experienced before
contracting the disease.

If program A is adopted:

If program B is adopted:

Leukemia patients
There is a 1/3 probability
that all 60 o f the leukemia
patients will be saved [will
not die] and a 2/3
probability that 0 will be
saved [all 60 will die].
20 leukemia patients will be
saved [will not die].

ATDS patients
20 AIDS patients will be
saved [will not die].

There is a 1/3 probability
that all 60 o f the AIDS
patients will be saved [will
not die] and a 2/3
probability that 0 will be
saved [all 60 will die].

A pattern emerged where subjects tended to prefer the leukemia-riskless, AIDSrisky option in the positively framed condition, and the leukemia-risky, AIDS-riskless
option in the negatively framed condition. In other words, they consistently assigned the
less desirable choice to the less desirable or undervalued disease population (AIDS
victims). The current study extended this work by incorporating emotion and imagery
into an analysis of the relationship between disease population characteristics and
framing effects. The visuals will be experimentally manipulated in an attempt to
15
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undermine (and strengthen) this effect using compassionate (and uncompassionate) visual
portrayals o f AIDS victims (an undervalued disease population). A psychological
mechanism that is relevant to this effect is attributions of responsibility.
Attributions o f Responsibility
In an influential study of television news formats, Iyengar (1991) demonstrated
that episodic and thematic frames could affect the way audiences attribute causal and
treatment responsibility for political issues. These attributions in turn influence
subsequent policy preferences, assessments o f presidential performance, and evaluations
o f public institutions. Episodic frames, which a number of studies have established as the
dominant frame in television news,7 present public issues in terms o f concrete instances
such as individual case studies or specific events (e.g., “the plight o f a homeless person or
a teenage drug user, the bombing of an airliner, or an attempted murder”) (Iyengar, 1991,
p. 14). By activating the fundamental attribution error and actor-observer bias (Ross,
1977), episodic frames tend to elicit individual rather than social attributions of
responsibility for both causal (creation o f problems) and treatment (solutions to
problems) responsibility. This presentation also seems to make viewers less likely to hold
public officials accountable for political issues. In contrast, thematic frames place public
issues within a historical or social context, taking the form of a report describing general
outcomes or conditions. Examples of thematic frames would be “reports on changes in
government welfare expenditures, congressional debates over the funding of employment
training programs, the social or political grievances of groups undertaking terrorist
activity, and the backlog in the criminal justice process.” (Iyengar, 1991, p. 14). Thematic
frames tend to elicit social attributions of responsibility. Iyengar’s analysis traces the
16
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dominance o f episodic frames in television news to the structural aspects of news
gathering and production processes. Iyengar argues that while individual factors and issue
familiarity may mediate framing effects, the general bias toward episodic framing o f
issues may create patterns biased toward individual attributions of responsibility.
Furthermore, the manner in which people attribute responsibility for political issues
impacts the way that they reward and punish politicians (even when controlling for party
affiliation and political ideology).
The current study extends Iyengar’s work, which focuses solely on the verbal
content of television news stories, by including visuals in an analysis of framing effects
on attributions o f responsibility. Iyengar (1991, p. 14) seems to suggest that visuals tend
to elicit or support episodic frames because they make “good pictures,” while thematic
frames rely on “talking heads.” The current study, however, explores alternative ideas
about the role o f visuals in the presentation o f information. First, it proposes that texts
may include more than one frame, and that these frames may even contrast or conflict
with each other. In the instance of contrasting frames, one frame may over-ride or
dominate the other. Research seems to suggest that the influence of visual content can
dominate or over-ride accompanying verbal information (e.g. Jamieson, 1992; Aust &
Zillmann, 1997). In this context, the study offers two alternative ideas about how visual
information may exert influence on preferences. First, in certain instances, visuals may
evoke emotions that may exert more influence than the episodic frame (where episodic is
defined as illustrative, concrete examples of an issue) of the visual itself. In other words,
a person’s emotional response to a picture of children with ADDS may over-ride the
episodic (Le., concrete, specific) frame of the picture by eliciting social attributions of
17
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responsibility. Another possibility is that the visuals themselves act as frames that
provide a point of reference from which to evaluate AIDS victims. For example, imagery
o f children of AIDS may elicit different attributions of responsibility than imagery o f gay
men (Le. social versus individual). Both scenarios may offer a plausible alternative
explanation for Iyengar’s failure to find expected results for every topic tested (e.g.
crime).
To test these ideas, the study includes attributions o f responsibility as a dependent
measure, and investigates whether manipulations of visual portrayals of disease
populations produce significant differences in attributions o f responsibility. For example,
some forms of episodic imagery may elicit compassion toward comparatively less-valued
disease populations (e.g., AIDS victims compared to leukemia victims) which in turn
may elicit social attributions of responsibility (e.g., by using visuals of children with
AIDS). In addition, baseline attributions of responsibility for specific diseases (e.g.
AIDS) were established through pre-testing, and compared across populations. Another
related possibility that the study explores directly is how different facial displays (Le.
positive and negative) may influence compassionate response toward disease victims.
Models for Framing Effects
Iyengar (1991) posits that framing influences judgments by making certain
information more accessible. Accessibility biases occur when “information that is more
accessible in memory is used disproportionately as a basis o f judgment” (Shrum, 1995).
Thus episodic frames may guide people’s thinking toward specific individual cases and
events while simultaneously excluding or minimizing information about social or
institutional influences. When audiences consistently view one dominant frame (e.g. in
18
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television news broadcasts) they will tend to remember and use information consistent
with this frame in decision-making. In this scenario, framing influences both real-time
decisions and decisions drawing on information and evaluations stored in memory,
producing both long term and immediate effects on evaluations (Iyengar, 1991).
Immediate effects occur at the time o f exposure (e.g. to a news story), while long-term
effects occur through later prompting or questioning (e.g. an opinion survey).
In their theoretical review o f agenda-setting, priming, and framing theories, Price
and Tewksbury (1997) offer a memory-based, psychological model for framing effects
that highlights the role o f applicability and accessibility. To differentiate accessibility
from availability, they define available constructs as the entire set o f constructs in a
person’s knowledge store, and accessible constructs as those that that are temporarily
excited or energized by activation (Le. framing). Through selection and salience, framing
produces applicability and accessibility biases. Both recency and frequency of activation
can contribute to a construct’s accessibility. In addition, constructs can be chronically
accessible if they are frequently o r consistently activated over time and become part of
memory, an idea consistent w ith Entman’s (1992) description o f the effects of a cultural
set o f commonly invoked frames appearing in public discourse. The notion of
applicability acknowledges audiences’ active engagement with and response to external
information or stimulL According to Price and Tewksbury (1997), the concept also
highlights an important distinction between activation o f knowledge and its selective,
context-dependent use in judgments or evaluations. In addition, the model recognizes that
external messages and stimuli (e.g. from the mass media) have to compete for attention
with both the audience’s own thoughts and other external messages.
19
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In an analysis o f framing in political news coverage, Cappella & Jamieson (1997)
offer a similar cognitive model that has one key extension. While Price and Tewksbury
(1997) have primarily emphasized retrieval-based processes, Cappella & Jamieson (1997)
argue that on-line processing also influences decision-making. In addition to memorybased retrieval processing, their model fully considers an on-line process whereby
information is evaluated and only evaluations are stored, while the facts and memorybased information are discarded (for a similar discussion, see Batson et aL, 1995; Zajonc,
1980; Zajonc & Markus, 1982). Central to this model are the concepts of cognitive
*
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Q

priming and spreading activation among knowledge nodes. Access to knowledge
depends on whether the constructs in which specific and related stored information are
activated. Frames prime mental associations by providing a context (Le. cuing certain
stores of knowledge and experience) that in turn activates prior knowledge and spreads to
related nodes. In other words, frames can serve as the catalyst for this process.
Furthermore, the particular experiences frames elicit may influence the way people think
about events and issues, and seem to encourage certain types of moral judgments and
attributions o f responsibility. Similar to the Price and Tewksbury’s (1997) model, both
recency and frequency influence activation and chronic accessibility.
Tversky and Kahneman’s prospect theory (1981, 1982, 1992; also Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979, 1982, 1984), the final model of framing effects reviewed in this proposal,
specifically seeks to explain the psychological processes underlying preference reversals.
As preference reversals represent a key dependent measure of the proposed dissertation
study, particular attention will be given to a summary and critique analysis of their
modeL
20
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Prospect Theory
Prospect theory offers an alternative theory o f risky choice.10 A descriptive11
model, it modifies expected utility theory to explain why people systematically violate
the requirements o f consistency and coherence, such as transitivity o f preferences.
According to Tversky and Kahneman (1992) a descriptive theory must address five major
phenomena o f choice that violate the standard model: framing effects, nonlinear
preferences, source dependence, risk seeking, and loss aversion.
Definitions and Key Assumptions
Prospect theory offers a tripartite definition o f a decision problem, that includes:
the acts or options among which people must choose, the consequences or outcomes of
these choices, and the contingencies or conditional probabilities linking outcomes and
choices (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981: 453). The decision frame includes both the
decision-maker’s understanding and representation of the options, and the outcomes and
contingencies associated with a specific choice. Elements that can influence the choice of
frame include the presentation of the problem, social norms, and the decision-maker’s
individual characteristics and habits.
Prospect theory distinguishes two sequential phases in the choice process: editing
or framing, and evaluation (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, 1992). In the editing/framing
phase, decision-makers analyze their options, often creating a more simple representation
o f them. Many anomalies of preference arise at this stage. For example, biases and
imperfections12 of human perception can reverse the relative size or salience of objects
and the relative desirability of options. And because people are limited in their ability to
understand and evaluate extreme probabilities (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), they often
21
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resort to heuristics to simplify the representation and evaluation of choices (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1992). Furthermore, depending on the context in which they appear, identical
options may be edited/framed differently. Decision makers may not even be aware o f the
potential effects of alternative frames. In the evaluation phase, decision-makers evaluate
edited options, and choose the option with the highest value.
Prospect theory makes several key assumptions involving valuing, weighting, and
locating decision problems. First, carriers o f value or utility are changes of wealth, rather
than final asset positions that include current wealth (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979: 273).
In other words, values are attached to changes rather than to final states. Values are
evaluated in two steps: first the asset position serves as a reference point, and then the
magnitude o f change (positive or negative) is evaluated from that point (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979). These assumptions fit with current knowledge about the basic principles
o f both sensory and perceptual perception, as well as their relation to judgment. For
example, people’s perceptions are attuned to respond to changes or differences rather
than to evaluate absolute magnitudes. Furthermore, people respond to attributes such as
brightness, loudness, or temperature, in the context of past and present experience.
Experience defines an adaptation level, or reference point, to which stimuli are perceived
by comparison.13 Thus an object at a given temperature may be experienced as hot or
cold to the touch depending on the temperature to which a person has adapted
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979: 277).
Second, in contrast to expected utility models where the utility of an uncertain
outcome is weighted by its probability, prospect theory proposes that the value o f each
outcome is multiplied by decision weights which are inferred from the available options.
22
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Decision weights measure the impact o f event on the desirability of options as well as the
perceived likelihood of those events. Decision weights, however, are not probabilities and
do not necessarily coincide with them. In fact, decision weights are usually lower than the
corresponding probabilities. They are also open to influence from other factors, such as
ambiguity or vagueness (Ellsberg, 1961 and Fellner, 1961 cited in Tversky & Kahneman,
1979 & 1981). The weighting function has several properties. First, people’s efforts to
reduce uncertainty by disregarding impossible events cause the function to misbehave
near its endpoints. Second, low probabilities are overweighted, moderate and high
probabilities are underweighted, and the latter effect is more pronounced than the former.
People’s tendency to overweight low probabilities helps to explain both the attractiveness
o f insurance and gambling. For example, as shown in Table 1 people exhibit preferences
for “what is in effect a lottery ticket over the expected value o f that ticket” (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979: 281):
Table 1:
An Example of Risk-Seeking Caused by Tendency to Overweight Low Probabilities
Amount of money
Probability of winning
Expected value
Percent choosing option

Option A
5,000
.001
5
72%

Option B
5
I
5
28%

In the scenario shown in Table 2, people prefer what is in effect the “payment o f
an insurance premium over a small probability o f a large loss” (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979: 281):
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Table 2:
An Example of Risk-Aversion Caused bv Tendency to Overweight Low Probabilities
Amount o f Loss
Probability o f Loss
Expected value
Percent choosing option

Option A (Large Loss)
-5,000
.001
-5
17%

Option B (Insurance Premium)
-5
I
-5
83%

Later work in prospect theory suggests that decision weights may also be sensitive to the
number, level, and spacing of outcomes.
A third assumption is that the frame o f reference for decision problems is a
critical factor in the analysis of options. Departing from the expected utility model,
prospect theory proposes a more limited view o f outcomes. Outcomes are perceived as
gains and losses (positive or negative deviations) rather than as final states o f wealth or
welfare. They are defined relative to a neutral reference point that has a subjective zero
value, or that represents the status quo (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Although the
reference point usually corresponds to what is actually received or paid, factors that can
affect its location include the presentation o f problems or options, the decision maker’s
expectations, adaptation to present state, and social norms. A key point is that variations
in the reference point can activate framing effects because people tend to evaluate options
in relation to the reference point that the statement of the problem suggests or implies
(Kahenman & Tversky, 1984). For the majority o f choice problems the reference point is
the status quo, or the decision-maker’s current assets. In other situations, the reference
point is a position a person had expected to attain, an expectation that may or may not be
realistic.
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Value Function
One o f prospect theory’s distinctive elements is an s-shaped value function that
has three main properties, it is: defined on deviations from the reference point; normally
concave downward for gains, and convex upward for losses; and generally steeper for
losses than gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The result is that risk aversion in the
positive domain accompanies risk seeking in the negative domain. In addition,
evaluations are made in different regions o f the function. For example, the advantage of a
large gain over a sure outcome gets evaluated in a shallow region of the value function,
where increments of money produce relatively small increments of value. In contrast, the
advantage of the certain outcome over no gain gets evaluated in the steepest region o f the
function where each dollar makes a greater difference (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982:
162).
Integrating Emotion and Imagery into Prospect Theory
Although preference reversals are a robustly pervasive, well-researched effect,
less clear at this point is the role that emotions and imagery may play in prospect theory’s
complex choice modeL Nonetheless, as will now be demonstrated, the model has the
flexibility to incorporate emotion and imagery as influences in the decision-making
process.
Emotion
Tversky and Kahneman have alluded to an important affective component to
decision-making involving risk and uncertainty, namely affective reactions to outcomes
such as regret, frustration and self-satisfaction. Yet their analysis of the role of affect of
this process at times seems contradictory. For example, they note a displeasure-pleasure
25
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imbalance where the affective reaction (displeasure) to losing a sum o f money is greater
than the affective reaction (pleasure) to winning the same amount. This more extreme
reaction to losses makes people reluctant to accept fair bets on a coin toss, for example.
Nonetheless, contrary to this paper’s position, they relegate emotional reactions to a
secondary outcome status (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). In other words, emotion is seen
as an outcome rather than a mechanism, and a secondary one at that. At the same time,
however, they seem to suggest that affective reactions may motivate certain preferences.
For example, they speculate that risk insurance is bought to protect against or reduce
worry as well as risk, leading people to prefer insurance that is described as providing
complete protection against specified risks rather than reducing overall risk (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1981, p. 456). The psychological principles underlying preference reversals
also seem to offer a sort o f buffer for affective reactions to negative outcomes,
specifically regret. Kahneman & Tversky (1982, p. 170) define regret as a “special form
of frustration in which the event one would change is an action one has either taken or
failed to take.” One form o f psychological protection, for example, is that decisions to
maintain the status quo elicit less regret than decisions to take action that lead to negative
outcomes.14 This built-in protection results from a combination o f adaptation and loss
aversion that “provides limited protection against regret and envy by reducing the
attractiveness o f foregone alternatives and other’s endowments” (Kahneman & Tversky,
1984, p. 348). Framing can also attenuate emotional response to occasional loss. For
example, framing outcomes in terms of overall wealth or welfare rather than specific
gains or losses, or as a cost incurred to achieve some benefit rather than as a
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uncompensated loss, can mitigate feelings of regret (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p.
458).
Less well considered is the idea that emotion can play a role in the valuing or
weighting process. In the valuing and weighting phase, for example, changes in
emotional state from a neutral or status quo position could serve as carriers of value. For
example, Batson et aL (1995) propose that people use their emotional response to others
to determine the extent to which they value that other person. The possible role of
emotional response in valuing of targets in decision problems will be explored more fully
in a later section that reviews studies of the influence o f empathy on behavior.
Furthermore, people may respond to emotional information in the context o f both past
and present emotional experience. Drawing on spreading activation theories, emotional
information could activate past emotional experiences and spread to related emotional
categories in memory constituting compassion (see e.g. Omdahl, 1995; Bagozzi &
Moore, 1994). Finally, also relevant is Zajonc’s (1980, 175) idea that affect makes the
self the reference point in decision problems. Zajonc (1980, p. 157) argues that while
cognitive evaluations describe qualities o f the stimulus (e.g. “this cat is black”), affective
judgments identify the “state o f the judge in relation to the object o f judgment” (e.g. “I
dislike this black cat”). This orientation fits with theoretical definitions of compassion
that stress the importance o f a belief in similar possibilities and perspective taking (i.e.
the decision maker feeling that he or she could share the victim’s circumstances, or
putting him or herself in the victim’s place).
The specific psychological principles also offer an avenue for emotional
influence. For example, a plausible alternative explanation for the certainty, pseudo27
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certainty, and dead-loss effects is that people’s emotional response to loss and the threat
o f loss influences their preferences, resulting in these choice patterns. The principles
relevant to the dissertation study will be outlined.
Psychological Principles
Overall, the interaction of two set o f factors cause inconsistencies in preferences:
“variations in the framing of acts, contingencies, and outcomes, and the characteristic
nonlinearities o f values and decision weights” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 457).
The psychological principles underlying these shifts will now be detailed.
Certainty effect
The certainty effect refers to people’s tendency to underweight probable outcomes
relative to certain outcomes, and overweight certain outcomes relative to uncertain
outcomes. The consequence of this effect is that people become risk-averse when their
options involve sure gains, and risk seeking when their options involve sure losses. In the
positive domain, people prefer a sure gain over a larger gain that is merely probable
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 268). In the negative domain, people prefer a loss that is
merely probable over a smaller, certain loss as shown in the set of decision problems
displayed in Table 3 (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 457).
Table 3
Examples of Risk-Seeking in the Negative, and Risk-Aversion in the Positive D o m a in s
Positive Domain
Choose between:
A. a sure gain of $240 [84%]
B. 25% chance to gain $1,000, and
75% chance to gain nothing [16 %]

Negative domain
Choose between:
A. a sure loss of $750 [13%]
B. 75% chance to lose $1,000, and 25% chance to
lose nothing [87%]
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Another effect in the negative domain is that certainty exaggerates the
aversiveness of losses that are certain relative to losses that are merely probable. For
example when people respond to questions about how to deal with an epidemic, most
people find a “sure loss of 75 lives” more aversive than “80% chance to lose 100 lives”
but preferred “10% chance to lose 75 lives” over “8% chance to lose 100 lives” (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1981, p. 455).
Isolation effect
A common tactic people use to simplify decisions is to ignore what the options
have in common, and instead focus on their differences (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p.
271). The consequence is that pairs of prospects can be summarized or analyzed in
different ways, leading to different preferences. Therefore, people’s preferences become
inconsistent and contingent on the form in which objectively identical choices are
presented. To illustrate, compare responses to these two separate, two-outcome choice
problems (p. 273), where the common bonus was ignored in the decision-making
process, and traditional preference reversal patterns resulted:
Table 4
Examples o f Inconsistencies Caused by the Isolation Effect
Decision Problem: In addition to whatever you own, you have been given 1,000. You are now asked to
choose between:
Option B
Option A
500
Amount
1,000
Probability
1
.5
Expected value
500
500
Percent choosing option
84%
16%
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Decision Problem: Da addition to whatever you own, you have been given 1,000. You are now asked to
choose between:
Option B
Option A
Amount
-500
-1,000
Probability
I
.5
Expected value
-500
-500
Percent choosing option
31%
69%

Furthermore, contrary to the basic supposition o f decision-theoretical analysis that
the probabilities o f final states determine choices between outcomes, the extent to which
events depend on each other can affect people’s preferences. Thus people’s preferences
may reverse when two acts or outcomes are presented sequentially rather than
independently.
Pseudocertaintv effect
In this scenario, people weight events that are actually uncertain (i.e. with
moderate or high probability) as if they were certain (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984).
People also tend to overvalue eliminating a portion o f risk and undervalue reducing the
overall probability o f a loss (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). The consequence of this
effect is that, contrary to rational choice’s invariance criterion, preferences depend on the
description or presentation o f decision problems. Thus people prefer protective action
(e.g. insurance) to be described in contingent rather than probabilistic, and unconditional
rather than conditional terms.
For example, a study found that people prefer a (hypothetical vaccine) that halves
(from .2 to .1) the probability o f getting a disease when the vaccine is described as fully
effective against one o f the two (exclusive and equiprobable) viruses that cause it rather
than if it is described as effective in half the cases (Slovic, Fischoff, & Lichtenstein,
unpublished, cited in Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Another example is that people prefer
30
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an insurance policy that covers fire but not flood when it is described as full protection
against the specific risk o f fire rather than as a reduction in the overall probability of
property loss.
Dead-loss effect
Framing negative outcomes or disadvantages in terms o f costs rather than losses
improves people’s subjective states by making outcomes and options more acceptable.
For example, Slovie, FischofF, and Lichtenstein (1982, cited in Kahneman & Tversky,
1984) found that when asked to choose between a sure loss of $50 and a 25% chance to
lose $200, 80% of subjects preferred the gamble over the sure loss. Yet only 35% of
subjects refused to pay $50 for insurance against a 25% risk o f losing $200.
Losses loom larger th an gains
Because values are attached to changes rather than final states, a salient
characteristic o f attitudes to changes is that losses loom larger than gains. Responses to
losses are therefore more extreme than responses to gains which biases decision-makers
in favor of retaining the status quo and preferring stability over change (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1984). A difference between options will loom larger when it is framed as a
disadvantage of one option rather than as an advantage of another option.
Exploiting this effect, representatives of the credit-card industry fought to have
the price difference labeled as a cash discount rather than a credit-card surcharge when
stores decided to shift some o f the costs associated with credit-card purchases to
consumers, (1981, p. 456). In addition, people generally find symmetric bets distinctly
unattractive because the same amount o f money will cause greater aggravation to the
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person who loses it than it will pleasure to the person who gains it. This reaction
generally increases with the size o f the gain/loss.
Psychological accounting
A possible mechanism for the impact of frames of reference or reference points is
psychological accounting. Although people generally evaluate outcomes using a minimal
account that only includes the direct consequences of the choice (e.g. accepting a
gamble), in more complex situations (e.g. when evaluating multi-attribute or compound
outcomes) people establish mental “accounts” specifying the advantages and
disadvantages of options relative to a multi-attribute reference point (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1981, 1984). These accounts include the set of outcomes that are evaluated at
one time and the manner in which they are combined with each other, and a neutral
reference point. The transaction gets evaluated overall as either positive, negative, or
neutral Sometimes the outcomes of an option get linked to an existing psychological
account that was established by a previous act. When the account balance for the
previous act is perceived as negative, or when the reference point is a position a person
had expected to attain, it can affect the account of the new act.
A “sunk-cost” effect arises when the decision is linked to an already existing
account, especially one which has a negative balance.
To illustrate, compare the differences in responses for this pair o f decision
problems (1981, p. 457):
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Table 5
Example of Psychological Accounting: the “Sunk Cost Effect”
Decision Problem
Scenario I: Imagine that you have decided to see a play where admission is
$10 per ticket. As you enter the theater you discover that you have lost a $10
bill. Would you still pay $10 for a ticket for a play?
Scenario 2: Imagine that you have decided to see a play and paid the
admission price of $10 per ticket. As you enter the theater you discover that
you have lost the ticket. The seat was not marked and the ticket cannot be
recovered. Would you pay $10 for another ticket?

Yes
88%

No
12%

46%

54%

In other words, respondents refuse to buy another ticket when the cost of the
ticket is linked to what could be described as an “already bought theater ticket” account,
but will pay for another ticket when its cost is linked to a “have not bought ticket yet”
account, even though the overall loss o f $10 is the same in both scenarios.
In other situations, the reference point is a position a person had expected to
attain. When a person does not attain an expected gain and cannot accept recent losses, he
or she may become risk-seeking, and accept otherwise unacceptable gambles. Best
illustrating this tendency is the well-known observation that, when bettors are down, bets
on long shots are most popular on the last race of the day.
Framing effects also occur when current acts are placed in a larger account. When
this happens, they seem like a incremental increase in a larger price and become more
attractive by comparison. For example, home buyers report little distress when they buy
furniture at the same time that they buy the house. But when they postpone furniture
purchases, these now separate expenses often appear extravagant. Overall, the
organization o f mental accounts (usually by topic) leads to large variations in the amount
o f money people are willing to pay for things (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984).
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Theories proposing that emotions can serve as reference points for decision
making provide a natural opportunity to integrate emotion into prospect theory, and will
be reviewed in the next section. Clearly direct experimental evidence for the role o f affect
in decision-making under risk and uncertainty is needed. The next section considers the
role o f imagery m this process.
Imagery

Another area for further research is the role o f imagery in prospect theory.
Imagery seems to have been indirectly considered in this model, as illustrated by
examples where reference points can be determined by events that are only imagined or
mentally visualized (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). Furthermore, such imaginings can
magnify people’s affective responses to outcomes, providing a natural link between affect
and imagery. Two hypothetical scenarios demonstrate this effect (Kahneman & Tversky,
(1982, p. 170):

Mr. Crane and Mr. Thomas were scheduled to leave the airport on different flights
at the same time. They traveled from town in the same limousine, were caught in
a traffic jam and arrived at the airport 30 minutes after the scheduled departure of
their flights. Mr. Crane is told that his flight left on time. Mr. Thomas is told that
his flight is delayed and just left five minutes ago. Who is the more upset?

Although their objective situations are identical, almost all respondents agreed that Mr.
Thomas is the more upset. Kahneman & Tversky (1982) speculate that frustration
increases with an unsatisfactory outcome when a person can easily imagine a more
desirable outcome.15 A similar scenario produces similar results:

The winning number in a lottery was 865304. Three individuals compare the
ticket they hold to the winning number. John holds 361204; Mary holds 965304;
Peter holds 865305. How upset are they respectively?
34
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People generally agree that Peter would be devastated, Mary would be severely, and John
would be mildly, upset. Again, the ranking seems to correspond to the degree to which
each person can be imagined as having ‘“come close’ to winning the prize” (Kahneman
& Tversky, 1982). The act o f imagining helps establish the reference point for
comparison to reality. Further, the different levels of response seem to suggest that
imagination is governed by rules that control the alternatives produced for comparison
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). For example, research suggests that it is easier to mentally
delete an event from a chain o f events than to insert one into the chain. Thus the regret
associated with a failure to act is often less intense than the regret associated with a
failed action, for example in this scenario (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982, p. 173):

Paul owns shares in Company A. During the past year he considered switching to
stock in Company B, but he decided against it. He now finds that he would have
been better off by $12,000 if he had switched to the stock of Company B. George
owned shares in Company B. During the past year he switched to stock in
Company A. He now finds that he would have been better off by $12,000 if he
had kept his stock in Company B. Who feels more regret?

Respondents generally agree that George is more upset than Paul. According to
Kahneman & Tversky (1982), this difference occurs because it is easier for George to
imagine not taking action than it is for Paul to imagine taking action. To explain the
tenacity of framing effects, Kahneman and Tversky (1984: 343) refer to their visual
quality: “In their stubborn appeal, framing effects resemble perceptual illusions more
than computational errors.” An approach for further research might be to devise images
designed to counteract o r undermine the perceptual illusions created by framing in a
controlled experiment. Such a study would increase our understanding of the role of
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evocative imagery in the constructive and contingent process o f everyday decision
making.
For example, visual images could be used to expand the available options from
which decision weights are inferred. For instance, if the majority o f people hold certain
representations of AIDS victims (e.g. as gay men), then alternative images could be used
to accompany decision problems (e.g. children or women). Furthermore, using images
that diverge from commonly-held representations of the disease population may provide
a way to exploit people’s natural tendency to respond to changes or differences (Le. the
change from their mental representation, and their affective response to that
representation, compared to the visual portrayal and their affective response to that
portrayal).
In addition, emotional imagery could exploit both the isolation and effect and
psychological accounting. It could undermine the isolation effect by emphasizing
similarities between the disease population and the decision maker, or between disease
populations (e.g. portraying both AIDS and leukemia victim as children). Again, as will
be discussed in detail in a later section, some scholars argue that one of the key elements
of compassionate response is the belief that the decision maker’s possibilities are similar
to those o f the disease population (e.g. Nussbaum, 1996). In addition, emotional imagery
may invite certain inferences about the disease population that can affect the reference
point for the decision. For example, compassionate visual portrayals of children with
AIDS may shift the reference point for a decision about to how allocate resources to
AIDS victims in general Similarly, it could influence psychological accounting by
eliciting a different representation or exemplar (a concept that will be discussed later) for
36
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the disease population (e.g. children with AIDS rather than intravenous drug users with
AIDS).
In sum, a direct test o f the notion that evocative visual portrayals may elicit
affective reactions that impact people’s preferences for specific outcomes could add
another element to theories o f decision-making. We will now turn our attention to a
theory that will provide the framework for exploring whether emotions can serve as
reference points; for decision-making. Damasio (1994) extends current models of
decision-making by considering the role o f emotional evaluations in decision-making.
The Somatic-Marker Hypothesis
Damasio (1994) derived the somatic marker hypothesis from research on brain
damaged patients with injuries in the ventromedial frontal cortices. While these injuries
did not impair basic intelligence, memory, or capacity for logical thought, they did impair
patients’ abilities to associate affective feelings and emotions with the anticipated
outcomes of theor actions. A consistent pattern emerged where an absence o f somatic
markers seems tw reduce the accuracy and efficiency of the decision process. For
example, patients have difficulty sorting and prioritizing even mundane options, as an
interaction between Damasio and a patient with ventromedial prefontal lobe damage
illustrates (in the: course of scheduling a follow-up appointment):

I [Damasdo] suggested two alternative dates, both in the coming month and just a
few days apart from each other. The patient pulled out his appointment book and
began consulting the calendar. The behavior that ensued, which was witnessed by
several investigators, was remarkable. For the better part o f a half-hour, the
patient enumerated reasons for and against each of the two dates: previous
engagements, proximity to other engagements, possible meteorological
conditions, virtually anything that one could reasonably think about concerning a
simple daae... walking us through a tiresome cost-benefit analysis, an endless
outlining and fruitless comparison o f options and possible consequences, (p. 193)
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Meanwhile, some patients do not exhibit physiological responses associated with
emotion, as Damasio and his colleagues demonstrated in several studies monitoring
autonomic nervous system responses through skin conductance measures. In one study,
for example, respondents with front-lobal damage exhibited normal skin conductance
responses to startling noises and other non-social stimuli, but did not respond
physiologically to slides o f disturbing images. Furthermore, one subject reported that he
realized he should have felt disturbed by the content of the images, even though he did
not. Even when patients do exhibit physiological responses, however, there is a
disconnect between these reactions and decision-making. For example, another decision
making study used a gambling task to explore how people learn to avoid negative
outcomes. Subjects were told to choose between four sets o f cards, each of which had
some combination of stacked gains and losses. In contrast to subjects without brain
damage or with lesions outside the prefrontal sectors, subjects with frontal lobe damage
never learned to avoid decks with large attractive payoffs accompanied by occasional
catastrophic losses, and therefore lost large sums of money. Although skin conductance
responses for these subjects were normal as they experienced the gains and losses (as
measured immediately after an outcome), they did not learn to anticipate future
outcomes. That is, skin conductance tests did not show an affective response when
subjects were contemplating a future choice from a dangerous deck, even after numerous
chances to learn the proper anticipatory responses. Damasio claims that their brains may
no longer be capable of using this emotional information diagnostically16 to develop a
prediction for a negative future outcome.
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On the basis o f results from these observations and experimental studies, Damasio
concluded that feelings and reasons are intertwined, making certain aspects o f emotion
and feeling indispensable for rational action, especially in the face of uncertain outcomes:

At their best, feelings point us in the proper direction, take us to the appropriate
place in a decision-making space, where we may put logic to good use. We are
faced by uncertainty when we have to make a moral judgment, decide on the
course o f a personal relationship, choose some means to prevent our being
penniless in old age, or plan for the life that lies ahead. Emotion and feeling,
along with the covert physiological machinery underlying them, assist us with the
daunting task of predicting an uncertain future and planning our actions
accordingly (p. XIII).

Damasio proposes that the mechanism by which emotions guide reasoning is "somatic
markers” (p. 173). Soma is Greek for “body,” and markers refer to the process whereby
body-based emotional reaction mark images associated with different stimuli. People
acquire somatic markers through experience, guided by an internal preference system and
influenced by external circumstances that include events, interactions with people, social
conventions and ethical rules (Damasio, 1994, p. 179). According to Damasio, this
process works as follows:

When the choice of option X, which leads to bad outcome Y, is followed by
punishment and thus painful body states, the somatic-marker system acquires the
hidden, dispositional representation o f this experience-driven, noninherited,
arbitrary connection. Re-exposure o f the organism to option X, or thoughts about
outcome Y, will now have the power to reenact the painful body state and thus
serve as an automated reminder of bad consequences to come (p. 180).

In other words, through a lifetime o f learning, images get “marked” by positive and
negative feelings that are linked directly or indirectly to “somatic” or bodily states. These
markers force attention to the possible outcome o f a given action, thereby reducing the
39
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number of viable options in the decision process. Although somatic markers “do not
deliberate for us,” they “assist deliberation by highlighting some options” as either
favorable or unfavorable (Damasio, 1994, p. 174). Overall, somatic markers impose order
on the jumble of information from multiple images relevant to a decision, highlighting
good or bad outcomes. Formally stated, the somatic marker hypothesis proposes that:

a somatic state, negative or positive, caused by the appearance of a given
representation, operates not only as a marker fo r the value o f what is represented,
but also as a booster fo r continued working memory and attention (emphasis in
original, pp. 197-198).

To summarize, the three supporting players in the reasoning process are
“automated somatic states, with their biasing mechanisms; working memory; and
attention” (emphasis in original, p. 198); making this approach compatible with both
models of on-line and memory-based processing, and enhancing them by elaborating the
role of emotion in this process. Somatic markers could also be incorporated into prospect
theory’s valuing and weighting process by marking the value of representations.
According to Damasio, the critical neural system for somatic-marker acquisition
lies in the prefrontal cortices, where it largely coexists with the system critical for
secondary emotions. Thus, somatic markers are a “special instance of feelings generated
from secondary emotions” that have been connected to predicted future outcomes of
certain scenarios through learning (p. 174). Although the critical somatic pairings are
probably acquired in childhood and adolescence, this learning process continually occurs
over a person’s lifetime. A person’s internal preference system consists of “mostly innate
regulatory dispositions” geared toward ensuring survival (p. 179). This system is
inherently biased toward pain-avoidance and pleasure-seeking, and is “probably pre40
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tuned” to achieve these goals in social contexts (p. 179). This bias offers an alternative
explanation for the phenomenon of losses looming larger than gains that prospect theory
describes. An example cited previously is the study by McNeil et aL, (1982) showing that
subjects were more likely to prefer a treatment if told that 90 percent of those treated are
alive five year later, than if told that 10 percent are dead. Damasio proposes that this
“inconsistent and irrational” inference resulted from “feelings aroused by the idea o f
death” leads to the “rejection o f an option that would be endorsed in the other framing o f
the choice” (p. 53). In other words, these biases can produce what are seemingly errors in
judgment.
Imagery

Imagery clearly plays a critical role in Damasio’s model. Damasio proposes that
the first reaction to stimuli are images that “unfold in our minds instantly, sketchily and
virtually simultaneously” (p. 173). These images elicit a body-based emotional reaction,
for example an “unpleasant gut feeling,” that marks the image. Functioning as an
automatic alarm, the marker may immediately cause the decision-maker to reject that
option before reasoning toward a solution.17 This process is often unconscious, automatic,
and continuous, presenting a methodological challenge to investigators of the role of
affective imagery in decision making. As Damasio describes the continuous flow,
“Images corresponding to myriad options for action and myriad possible outcomes are
activated and keep being brought into focus” (p. 196).
In fact, Damasio believes that imagery is so critical to decision-making that an
inability to generate imagery may result in impaired reasoning. For example, patients
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with lesions in the ventromedial region o f the frontal lobe may no longer be able to
generate automatic predictions about the significance o f a future outcomes because:
.. .the images which constitute a future scenario are weak and unstable. The images
would be activated but somehow not held long enough in consciousness to play a role
in the appropriate reasoning strategy. In neuropsychological terms this is equivalent
to saying that working memory and/or attention are not functioning well, as far as
images about the future are concerned, (p. 218)

And for people without such injuries, emotion-laden imagery can also lead to
biases in reasoning. For example, Damasio offers his own version o f the availability
error, which “consists o f allowing the image of [an event, for example] a plane crash,
with its emotional drama, to dominate the landscape of our reasoning and to generate a
negative bias against the correct choice” (p. 192).
Next, a review o f the literature on sympathy, empathy, and compassion/pity will
serve to both clarify and define the elements of a compassionate response, and provide
insight into its potential impact on decision-making.
Sympathy. Empathy. Compassion/Pity
Scholars have pointed to biological, cognitive, social and developmental factors
that shape human emotions (e.g. Izard & Malatesta, 1987; Lazarus, 1966). Of particular
interest for a dissertation study in the domain of public health are the social factors that
may influence emotion. W ith one exception,18 lists of basic emotions developed by
emotion theorists do not include sympathy, empathy, or compassion/pity (see Batra &
Ray, 1986 for a review). Therefore a useful approach would be to view these emotions as
multidimensional processes rather than discrete, basic emotions.19 In addition, following
Luce (1998, p. 410), the focus o f this study will be on decision-task-related emotion, i.e.
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“relatively short-lived affective states directly resulting from and focused on a choice
with which one is currently engaged,” rather than mood induced by information
irrelevant to the decision task (e.g. Johnson & Tversky, 1983).
A literature review uncovered some emotional processes that may influence
public health preferences. O f particular interest were three emotions that are directed at
others in social contexts and interactions: sympathy, empathy, and compassion/pity. The
literature on these emotions will be reviewed in the context o f the goals of the proposed
study. To determine which emotion or emotions are most relevant to the current project,
conceptual and theoretical definitions will be outlined for each. Components of these
definitions will then be integrated to create a working definition that will guide the
operationalization o f the emotional component o f this study. Finally, studies of the
influence of these emotions on behavior will be reviewed in order to guide hypothesis
formation.
Compassion/Pitv
A relatively unexplored approach to conceptualizing the relationship between self
and other is compassion o r pity.20 In an essay analyzing the connection between emotion
and evaluative thinking, Nussbaum (1996) characterizes compassion as a sort of
reasoning that joins individuals and communities by linking self interest to the interest of
others. Drawing on Aristotle, Nussbaum (1996, p. 31) defines pity as a “a painful
emotion directed at another person’s misfortune or suffering,” and outlines three beliefs
necessary and jointly sufficient for eliciting pity: 1) the belief that the suffering is serious
rather than trivial; 2) the belief that the suffering was not caused primarily by the
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person’s own culpable actions; and 3) the belief that the viewer’s own possibilities are
similar to those o f the sufferer.
The belief that the suffering is serious involves recognizing that the situation
“matters deeply for the life in question,” Le. that it has what Aristotle calls “size” (cited
in Nussbaum, 1996, p. 31). By making another person’s misfortune seem important, pity
elicits interest in the victim’s claim. According to Aristotle, piteous events include death,
bodily assault or 31-treatment, illness, physical weakness, disfigurement, reversals to
expectations, or a lack o f good prospects. Pity does not require, however, that the viewer
share the victim’s perspective o r evaluation of his or her suffering. Adam Smith (1976
cited in Nussbaum, 1996, pp. 32-33) illustrates this proposition with an example o f a
person who has lost the use o f reason:

“of all the calamities to which the condition of mortality exposes mankind.. .by
far the most dreadful.” It will be an object o f pity to anyone who has “the least
spark of humanity.” The person affected does not judge that his condition is bad,
however —that, indeed, is a large part of what is so terrible about it.

In the context of framing, the belief of fault relates directly to the influence of
attributions of responsibility on judgments (e.g., Iyengar, 1991). According to Aristotle,
pity sees its object as undeserving of suffering (cited in Nussbaum, 1996, p. 33). But
when victims are seen as responsible for their own suffering, blame and reproach are
elicited rather than pity. In this framework, social or other-directed attributions are a
necessary condition for pity. Combining seriousness and fault, pity requires “the belief
that there are serious bad things that may happen to people through no fault of their own
or beyond their fault” (p. 33). Two examples of what Nussbaum describes as the “usual
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occasions” for pity are the death o f children and the disruption of functioning by age and
disease (p. 33).
The third belief is a judgment o f similar possibilities: misfortunes which a person
might expect to suffer, either personally or through a loved one. This requirement has
generated a lot of debate, philosophically, theoretically and methodologically. Some
scholars have proposed that identification with the victim involves the pitier thinking, for
a time, that he or she is the sufferer (e.g. Adam Smith, 1976 cited in Nussbaum, 1996); or
imagining that his or her personal responses are “fused in some mysterious way” with the
victim (e.g. Schopenhauer cited in Nussbaum, 1996, italics in the original). Nussbaum
argues for a different approach based on the estimation o f “size” under the seriousness
belief. In estimating seriousness or size, pity involves empathic identification as one
component, however it is important but not sufficient for the pitier/viewer21 to make the
same assessment of the situation as the victim. Even in the temporary act of
identification, the viewer maintains constant awareness of his or her separation from the
sufferer, and that he or she does not share the victim’s fortune. The viewer therefore feels
for the other and not his or herself. Nussbaum also proposes that the viewer must
recognize his or her own “qualitative difference” from the victim, for example that the
victim has hemophilia or no health insurance while the opposite holds true for the viewer
(p. 35). At the same time that the viewer acknowledges his or her separateness from the
victim, however, the viewer acknowledges sharing similar possibilities and
vulnerabilities with the victim. The viewer makes sense of the other’s suffering by
recognizing that he or she might personally encounter such a misfortune and estimates its
meaning in part by what it would mean to experience the suffering. In other words, the
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viewer sees him or herself as a person to whom such things might happen, a process
Nussbaum caDs “compassionate imagination’’ (p. 52). Through this process, pity has been
linked with fear since the days o f Aristotle and Rosseau. The debate over identification is
significant because it influences the extent to which subjects in the proposed study might
be expected to report feeling the primary emotions that Nussbaum identifies as associated
with pity (e.g. sadness, interest) as a result o f exposure to compassionate visual portrayals
of under-valued disease populations. Furthermore, the judgment o f similar possibilities
bridges concern and altruism, a link that has implications for the allocation of social
goods and resources central to many public health decisions. As Nussbaum describes it,
the recognition that victim’s lot could befall the viewer turns the viewer’s thought
processes outward from the viewer’s “own current comfortable situation to the structure
of society’s allocation of goods and resources”(p. 36). Together, the imaginative exercise
and the emotion provide information for decisions about allocation.
In Nussbaum’s framework, people need at some point to do the cognitive work
that makes the suffering of others part o f their cognitive repertory. The welfare of others
has no meaning in the abstract. In order to elicit pity, people must be connected to victims
by highly concrete instances that help them imagine what it would be like to share the
victim’s misfortune. The suffering o f others has to be brought into relation to what people
already understand such as “the intense love o f a parent” or the “passionate need for
comfort and security” (p. 48). Once people have imagined suffering vividly to themselves
and suffered the pain of pity, then their compassionate imagination “will contain the
thoughts o f pity with all their evaluative material” (p. 38). These evaluations become
motivation for action, whether or not the person experiences the actual “bodily feeling”
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o f pity (p. 38). This description echoes Damasio’s (1996) somatic marker hypothesis
whereby emotional evaluations are made, stored, and activated during decision-making.
Sympathy and Empathy
In an essay intended to clarify and differentiate the concepts of sympathy and
empathy, Wispe (1986) traces the development and application of each term in the social
sciences.
An Historical Overview
Historically, pity and sympathy appear to share the same lineage with regard to
their development and application in the social sciences. Adam Smith’s (1976) classic
description of sympathy as “a way o f feeling for others by putting ourselves in their
situations,” has remained remarkably consistent over time (cited in Wispe, 1986, p. 314),
with later scholars arguing for sympathy’s social importance and incorporating the
concept into their theoretical work. In a discussion of the evolution of morality, Darwin
(1871) referred to sympathy as an “all important emotion” (p. 478 cited in Wispe, 1986,
p. 314). McDougal (1908/1912) refined the concept by distinguishing primitive and
active sympathy. Primitive sympathy refers to a direct response to the feelings and
emotions of others and functioned as a “kind of perceptual explanation for emotional
contagion” (cited in Wispe, 1986, p. 315). Active sympathy involves a “self-conscious
desire for emotional harmony” and is motivated by the “gregarious instinct” (i.e. people
seek each other’s company when excited by certain instincts or emotions) to promote
cooperation and compassion (Wispe, 1986, p. 315). Allport (1924, p. 238), who described
sympathy as “one of the most vital forces in society,” applied a conditioning framework
to McDougal’s work, emphasizing the “instigating conditions and past experiences with
47
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emotional expressions in others (cited in Wispe, 1986, p. 315). In this framework
sympathy was seen a s “an emotional habit evoked as a conditioned element common to
both the original and present situation” (cited in Wispe, 1986, p. 315). For example, a
person reacts sympatBietically to fear expressions in others because of a genuine fear
response based on learned experience that when people display fear they are usually
reacting to some real threat.
Despite its lorag history and scholarly agreement about its conceptual importance,
the term “sympathy” *was eventually replaced in social psychology by “empathy.”
Conceptually, empatlky grew out of the notion o f “EinfhUlung” (German for “one
feeling”), which L ipps (1903) described as a tendency for “perceivers to project
themselves into the objects of perception” (Wispe, 1986, 316; see also Homblow, 1980;
Omdahl, 1995). Titcluenor (1909) is credited with creating the term “empathy,” and
offering a two-part definition: “A way of knowing another’s affect and a kind o f socialcognitive bonding” (W ispe, 1986, 316). Clinical and social psychologists took up the
concept, and empathy became the term of choice. As the concept developed, empathy
was influenced by a related research tradition, person perception (e.g. Heider, 1958 cited
in Wispe, 1986). Methiodologies to measure empathy were also developed and refined.
Researchers have tendied to use four different approaches to investigate empathy: a)
vicarious conditionings where a person’s vicarious emotional response is “conditioned to
the inference” that anosther person is experiencing some kind o f emotional reaction after
the onset o f some stimiulus (e.g. a buzzer); b) differential attributions, where studies
attempted to shift subjects’ perspectives from observers to actors by giving instructions to
“empathize;” c) empaUhic helping, where helping behavior was made the dependent
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variable in experiments that sought to get subjects emotionally involved; and d) empathic
capacity (scales) and helping, where helping behaviors were related to some kind of
empathy scale (Wispe, 1986, p. 316),.
Nonetheless, empathy is thought to resist experimental demonstration for three
reasons: “a) the ambiguity o f the term empathy, b) the indefinite and inconsistent way
empathy has been operationally defined, and c) whether a given operationalization really
measures a given psychological state.” In other words, scholars disagree about both the
construct and process of empathy, creating a lack o f construct validity (see also
Homblow, 1980; Eisenberg & Lemon, 1983).
Defining Sympathy and Empathy
Seeking to redress the conceptual confusion and ambiguity, Wispe offers
definitions for sympathy and empathy. Sympathy is defined in terms o f negative
emotions as the “psychological process [Le. heightened, painful awareness] of someone
else’s affliction as something to be relieved” (p. 318). This definition includes two
aspects, increased sensitivity to the emotions of others and an urge to help. Even when
the viewer unable to help, however, a feeling o f compassion and urge to help can still
arise. Wispe does not clearly differentiate compassion and sympathy, describing
compassion as a generalized phenomenon and sympathy as a process. The relationship, if
any, between the two concepts is also left ambiguous. In addition, the negative emotions
that sympathy arouses (e.g. fear, sadness) are not specified.
Empathy is defined as an “attempt by one self-aware self to comprehend
unjudgmentally the positive and negative experiences of another self’ (Wispe, 1986, p.
318). An effortful process, empathy requires both imaginal and mimetic capacities.
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Further differences between sympathy and empathy include the role o f self. In empathy,
the self maintains its own identity as a vehicle for understanding another’s feelings. The
self in sympathy on the other hand, is “concerned with communion rather than accuracy,”
resulting in a reduction in self-awareness. As Wispe (1986, p. 318) describes it

In empathy, the empathizer “reaches out” for the other person. In sympathy, the
sympathizer is “moved by” the other person. In empathy, we substitute ourselves
for the others. In sympathy we substitute others for ourselves. To know what it
would be like if / were the other person is empathy to know what it would be like
to be the other person is sympathy. In empathy I act “as if’ (Rogers, 1975, p. 3) I
were the other person. In sympathy I am the other person (Macfie, 1959, p. 213).
The object o f empathy is to “understand” the other person. The object of
sympathy is the other person’s “well-being.” The most important problem for
empathy is the problem o f empathic accuracy. [...] The most important problem
for sympathy is a conceptual one: How does one open oneself to the immediate
reality of another’s subjective experiences?

In sum, empathy is a way o f “knowing” and sympathy is a way of “relating” (p. 318).
Operationalizing and Testing Emotional Response
In terms of operationalizing and testing these concepts, Wispe (1986) advises that
potential outcomes for sympathy would be the act or inclination to help others (e.g. to
donate, intervene), making the concept particularly useful for studies o f altruism or pro
social behavior. Compared to empathy, sympathy: involves less concern with “internal
costs” to the sympathizer, occurs more rapidly because accuracy is not important, and
does not have a trial and comparative labeling process (Wispe, 1986, p. 319). In addition,
sympathy involves approval of the victim, while empathy does not. Lastly, because it
does not necessarily involve accuracy and precludes objectivity, sympathy can lead to
emotional distortions and errors.
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Rather than offering testable hypotheses for empathy, however, Wispe offers
suggestions for further research, including the possible impact of proximity, similarity,
and time on empathy; and the relationship between hostility and empathy.
Other Approaches to Empathy
Other scholars have tackled empathy’s conceptual ambiguity (e.g. Homblow,
1980; Eisenberg & Lemon, 1983; Eisenberg, 1986; Omdahl, 1995). Defining empathy as
sharing the emotional state o f another (see also Omdahl, 1995), Eisenberg (1986)
delineates several processes often termed “empathy” by researchers. These processes
include cognitive role taking, affective role taking, sympathy (defined as responding to
another’s emotion with a congruent, yet not necessarily identical emotion), and personal
distress (Le. self-oriented anxiety over another’s emotion). Further refining the concept,
Toi and Batson (1982) propose that empathy has two separate components, both in
response to seeing another’s distress: personal distress, a viewer’s feelings of being upset,
worried, and disturbed; and empathic concern, a viewer’s feelings of sympathy,
compassion, and warmth (see also Batson, Fultz & Schoenrade, 1987). In this framework,
empathic concern encompasses both sympathy and compassion, although the differences
and similarities between these concepts are undefined. In addition, some scholars argue
that distress evokes egoistic prosocial motivation to reduce personal distress, while
empathy evokes altruistic motivation to reduce the other’s distress (see e.g. Batson, et aL,
1987; Batson, et aL, 1983). Finally, Eisenberg et aL (1994) distinguish sympathy (which
involves an orientation toward others’ needs), personal distress (which is associated with
the self-oriented motive of alleviating one’s own distress), empathy (which may lead to
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sympathy, personal distress or neither, and the motivation associated with each), and
perspective taking (a cognitive process that can facilitate empathy and sympathy).
In an analysis o f various conceptual approaches to empathy, Zillmann (1991)
offers one o f the more detailed conceptual models for empathy. Describing previous
accounts o f empathy as too restrictive because they limit the concept to affective
responses to emotional expressions of others, Zillm ann argues that in order to predict the
extent of empathy, models must recognize both apparent causes o f another’s affective
response (Le. the context) and the affective expressions o f others. In a four-part
definition, Z illm ann describes empathy as a response

a) to information about circumstances presumed to cause acute emotions in
another individual and/or b) to the facial and bodily expression o f emotional
experiences o f another individual and/or c) to another individual’s behaviors
presumed to be precipitated by acute emotional experiences, that d) is associated
with an appreciable increase in excitation, and that e) respondents construe as
feeling with or feeling for another individual (p. 141).
Although this definition highlights the importance o f an appreciable increase in the
respondent’s excitation level, the nature of this excitation (e.g. physical, emotional)
remains unclear. In addition, while the current study views emotion as a potential
mediating factor, Zilhnann’s model views emotional response as an outcome rather than
a mechanism.
Zillmann (1991, 142) continues by grouping theories o f empathy into three
categories, those that posit that empathy is a) reflexive and innate; b) learned, but without
involving deliberate cognitive operations; and c) deliberate, with habitual cognitive
operations as crucial moderators. Reflexive theories derive from McDougal’s (1908)
description of primitive sympathy (as discussed earlier in the overview of Wispe, 1986);
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and include motor and facial mimicry, and emotional contagion (see e.g. Hatfield,
Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994) and the “facial efference” hypothesis (e.g. Adelman &
Zajonc, 1989; see also Laird, 1974). Learning or conditioning theories propose that
people unconsciously acquire empathic reactions through synchronized affective
interaction with others (e.g. Zillmann, 1991 cites Lanzetta & Orr, 1981; Orr & Lanzetta,
1980; Englis, Vaughan, and Lanzetta, 1982). Experiential theories view empathic
response as the result o f “generating ideational stimuli related to past experiences o f self’
(p. 146). Zillmann cites the work of Stotland and colleagues (e.g. Matthews & Stotland,
1973; Stotland, 1969; Stotland, et aL, 1978) as having “firmly established that
imagination produces and enhances empathy,” both its subjective experience and
physiological responses (p. 145).
To integrate these theories, Zillmann (1991) offers a three-factor theory
(dispositionaL excitatory, and experiential). The dispositional content refers to direct
skeletal-motor responses to emotion-inducing stimulL The excitatory component refers to
heightened activity in the sympathetic nervous system that prepares a person for some
action (e.g. flight or fight). The experiential component refers to a person’s conscious
experience o f the dispositional and/or excitatory reactions and appraisal of the situation.
At this point in the process, people can deliberately alter or control emotional response
and experience. Claiming that the three-factor model can make sense of mixed affective
reactions, Zillmann cites an example of a student privately and from a distance
witnessing an injurious bicycle accident involving an “oppressive and resented professor”
(p. 151). Although the student may first cringe on seeing the fall, he or she may then
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smile or even laugh. Because the dominant affective experience may be one of delight the
student will probably not interpret the response as empathy.
This scenario leads to another influence on empathy which Zillmann does not
include in the three-part model, affective disposition toward a person (Le. whether the
viewer likes or dislikes a person). Although the distinction is not made clear, Zillmann
seems to be differentiating between negative affect toward a person that creates readiness
for counter-empathy and negative affective displays by the victim that elicit empathic
responses from viewers. Zillmann speculates that people learn over time to associate
dislike with people who are “undeserving of good fortune and deserving of misfortune”
(p. 153). In other words, dislike gets linked to outcomes concerning “bad guys” and
“villains,” making it a predictor o f anti-empathy. The notion that empathy depends on
pertinent experience fits with Damasio’s (1994) somatic marker hypothesis in which
affect gets associated with various outcomes through experience. In an experiment testing
the relationship between discordant affect and judgment, Zillmann and Cantor (1976)
found that discordant affect generates a mediating moral-judgment effect on judgments of
how much the protagonist o f a film deserved a particular outcome. The direct
implications of this study will be discussed in more detail in a later section reviewing
research on empathy and behavior.
First, however, a working definition for the emotion component of the proposed
project will be outlined and justified.
Defining Emotional Terms for the Dissertation Study
For the dissertation study, Nussbaum’s (1996) definition o f compassion offers the
most clear and complete explanation of the process by which an emotional response to
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another’s plight occurs. Wispe’s definitions, while useful in suggesting possible
distinctions, do not offer the theoretical specificity and clarity of Nussbaum and
ZQlmann’s (1991) models. Wispe’s approach is one-dimensional in the sense that further
explanations only go toward justifying each basic definition rather than delineating the
different components o f the process involved in the response. In contrast, Zillmann and
Nussbaum’s models both view compassion and empathy as a set o f clearly distinct
constructs related to each other in a process by which viewers respond to different aspects
o f a victim’s situation. As mentioned previously, however, the key difference with regard
to Zillmann *s (1991) model is that it relegates emotional response as an outcome of
exposure to another’s plight At the same time, the strength of Zillmann’s model is that it
identifies several aspects o f the victim’s experience to which a viewer might respond.
This multifaceted view o f the victim’s situation fits well with Nussbaum’s viewercentered description of compassion as a multidimensional construct. Most importantly,
Nussbaum’s model allows for the operationalization and investigation of all key elements
of the study: emotion (compassion/pity), attributions of responsibility, and similar
possibilities (compassionate imagination or emotional imagery). Finally, as Zillmann’s
theory suggests, aspects o f the victim’s situation and response can be incorporated into
the modeL O f particular interest is the suggestion that that the emotional facial display of
the visually portrayed victim may influence the viewer’s judgments. This notion seems
consistent with previous research in nonverbal communication suggesting that people are
probably inherently predisposed to react empathically to other people’s facial displays of
emotion (see Cappella, 1993 for a review).

55

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

In sum, a theoretical review o f definitions for these concepts suggests elements of
compassionate response that need to be explored in pre-testing in order to create a
“package” that elicits compassion, including the perceptions of: similarity to self,
attributions of responsibility, and seriousness o f suffering. Specifically, messages that
elicit high ratings of similarity to self and seriousness o f suffering, and low ratings o f
individual attributions of responsibility, are expected to elicit higher compassion ratings.
Another potentially crucial component is the portrayed person’s facial display o f
emotion.
Empathy’s Impact on Attitudes and Behavior
Although no direct research o f the influence o f compassion on behavior exists, the
literature on the influence o f empathy on behavior and attitudes will now be reviewed in
order to generate hypotheses for the possible influence o f compassion on preferences. A
search o f the social science literature22 revealed no current studies of the effect of
sympathy on behavior,23 confirming that empathy has become the term of choice. In
addition, with the exception of a few studies (e.g. Batson, et aL, 1995; Zillmann &
Cantor, 1977), the existing literature does not address the potential impact o f these
emotions on decision-making or judgments. Nonetheless, elements of this research may
also offer insight into the influence of compassion on decision-making.
Antecedents to Empathy
A key antecedent to empathy identified in several studies (e.g. Houston, 1990;
Krebs, 1975; Batson, Turk, Shaw, and Klein, 1995) is perceived similarity to the target.
For example, Krebs (1975) found that subjects in a high-similar condition (i.e. where
subjects reported perceiving the target as highly similar to themselves), behaved most
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altruistically toward a target, even when helping jeopardized their own welfare. These
studies suggest that perceived similarity to target is an important factor to incorporate
into potential images for pre-testing, reinforcing Nussbaum's (1996) argument for the
importance o f a belief in similar possibilities.
Altruism/Helping Behavior/Prosocial Behavior
Several studies demonstrate a link between empathy and altruism24 and other
prosocial,25 helping behaviors (e.g. volunteering) (e.g. Batson, et aL, 1981; Hoffman,
1981; Toi and Batson, 1982). Studies have also shown that increased empathic emotion
increases the likelihood o f helping (e.g. Coke, Batson, & McDavis, 1978). These findings
have indirect relevance for a study o f preferences where people must choose how to
allocate resources to two victim populations. They suggest that compassionate portrayals
may eliminate the inequities demonstrated by Levin and Chapman (1990, 1993) (Le. in
allocating the less desirable option to undervalued disease populations) by motivating
viewers to help the undervalued disease population.
Perspective Taking
Ample evidence exists that instructions to imagine increase empathy (see e.g.
Stotland, 1969; Cialdini, et aL, 1987; Coke, Batson & Davis, 1978; Toi & Batson, 1982;
Batson, et aL, 1995). For example, in a study o f helping behavior subjects were placed in
one of two conditions: observe-set, where they were instructed to merely observe the
situation o f another (low empathy); and the imagine-set, where they were instructed to
imagine the victim’s feelings (high empathy). As predicted, subjects in the high empathy
condition displayed higher rates of helping, even when they had an option to easily avoid
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taking action. These findings suggest that instructions to imagine may play an important
role in the elicitation o f compassion.
Zillmann (1991) offers another view on perspective-taking, arguing that iconic
portrayals eliminate the need for people to engage in perspective-taking because they
naturally and automatically respond emotionally to these images. This argument, and
supporting views, will be discussed in more detail in a later section on message modality.
This study, however, adopts Zillmann’s suggestion by using visuals as a means of
eliciting a direct affective response rather than providing respondents with instructions to
imagine.
Like/Dislike Toward A Target
Further support for the experimental goals of the study comes from studies
suggesting that affect toward a target may influence judgments (for a different
perspective, see Toi & Batson, 1982, 286). Zillmann and his colleagues have found
evidence for a “moral-judgment mediator of discordant affect” toward a target, leading
them to argue for the following chain of events: perception (observation) —» moral
judgment (approbation/friend, disapprobation/foe) —» disposition formation (positive
affect, negative affect) —> expectation apprehension (hoping for positive
outcomes/fearing negative outcomes, fearing positive outcomes/hoping for negative
outcomes) —» response to emotion (empathy, counterempathy) —> moral judgment
(approbation, disapprobation) (Zillmann, 1991, 155). In a study of grade school
children’s affective reactions to and perceptions of protagonists in specially created films
were assessed (Zillmann & Cantor, 1977). The peer protagonist o f the films was
portrayed either as pleasant and helpful or obnoxious and hostile. In line with the
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manipulation, the children reported perceiving the protagonist as either good or bad, and
liked or disliked. The films also featured ‘different endings, with either happy or sad
outcomes for the protagonist. Both boys and girls only exhibited empathy toward the
good, liked protagonist for both bad and good outcomes. For bad, disliked protagonists,
the children reported counter-empathy. Zillmann and Cantor interpret these results as a
judgment by the subjects as to how deserving a protagonist was o f a particular outcome.
They argue that this result supports the proposal that subjects judged the protagonist’s
behavior in terms of approval or disapproval and then formed affective dispositions
toward that person on the basis of those judgm ents. Following Damasio (1994), however,
this paper proposes that affective reactioms toward the protagonist’s behavior precede
judgments. In this context, Zillmann and C a n to r’s proposal that observations of a
previously unknown person (Le. film protagonist) first elicit judgments o f “friend” or
“foe” followed by affective responses to tEhat person, seems problematic. Other studies
have suggested that exposure to a stim ulus generates feelings that in turn influence
processing and judgments (e.g., Edell & B urke, 1987; Damasio, 1994; Peters &
Slovic,1996; Zajonc, 1980). For example, Zajonc (1980), Damasio (1994), and Slovic
(1997) argue for the automaticity and prim acy of affect in reaction to stimuli, where
affective reactions to stimuli often happen first, without “extensive perceptual and
cognitive encoding” (Slovic, 1997). A ccording to Zajonc (1980: 154), all perceptions
contain affective elements: “We do not jusst see ‘a house:’ We see a handsome house, an
ugly house, or a pretentious house” (cited in Slovic, 1997). These automatic affective
reactions guide subsequent information processing and judgments. At the same time,
Zajonc (1980) argues that people often maake decisions based on how much they ‘like’
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something (Le. have a positive affective reaction or response to it), and then justify their
choice later. Although these findings suggest that affect toward a target can influence
judgments, Toi and Batson (1982, 286) found no evidence that liking toward a target
influences emotional response o r helping behavior.
Despite the differences in the proposed study’s approach and Zillmann’s model,
the idea that affect toward a target may influence judgments supports the general intent of
the study: the experiment manipulates portrayals of two disease populations so that the
targets will be viewed compassionately o r uncompassionately (Le. liked or disliked), and
seen as responsible or not responsible for their plights.
Summary
To summarize, a review of the emotion literature suggests several elements to
compassionate response that will need to be incorporated into pre-test measures,
including perceived similarity to target, and affective response (like and dislike) toward
the target.
In addition, the review provided insight for one element of the messages (i.e.
compassionate response) that the study will manipulate. Again, the overall argument of
the paper is that visual portrayals will create an emotional response that will be integrated
with both the prior affective response to the target group, and the affective response to the
message frame, resulting in a policy preference outcome.
The discussion will now turn to evidence for differences in emotional response as
a function o f the modality of the message (Le. verbal vs. visual).
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Message Modalities and Their Relative Influence: Verbal and Visual Components
The introduction referred to studies suggesting a differential impact o f visual
elements o f messages and visual modes of message presentation on emotional activation
and involvement. Evidence for those claims will now be presented in the context of the
current study.
Message Modality
First, with regard to message modality, Chaudhuri and Buck (1995) investigated
the effects of different media on different cognitions (Le. analytical or sequential
processing vs. syncretic or holistic processing) and responses. Their analysis o f 240
magazine and television advertisements revealed that electronic media engenders
emotional and affective involvement, while print media engenders rational and analytic
involvement (even when controlling for a host o f other advertising variables like product
category, product use, verbal and nonverbal elements, and familiarity with the ad). To
explain the link between people’s automatic affective response and electronic media, the
authors draw on Buck’s (1989) claim that electronic media can exploit people’s
biological ability to receive and directly understand the meanings of certain facial
displays o f emotion (see also Cappella, 1993).26 This ability gives audiences direct visual
access to the feelings and desires of people displayed via electronic media, which in turn
can elicit emotional reactions from audiences (see e.g. McHugo, Lanzetta, Sullivan,
Masters, &Englis, 1985). Furthermore, Buck (1989) argues that spontaneous emotional
communication via the electronic media has created “a system o f electronic emotional
communication that is capable of sharing feelings and thus influencing the emotional
education o f vast numbers o f people” (Chaudhuri and Buck, 1995, p. 122). In a related
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approach, Zflbnann (1991, p. 160) argues that today’s “high-fidelity iconic
representations” obviate the need for people to engage in perspective-taking or to try to
imagine what the other person feels; in other words, nothing needs to be “transformed or
filled in.” In addition, affective reactions to these iconic portrayals may be doubly
powerful because the affect they elicit combines both affect from the memories they
trigger as well as the affective response to the representations themselves. Similarly,
Messaris (1997) suggests that the more visuals can reproduce real-world experiences, the
more they can exploit the response tendencies (e.g. affective responses) associated with
them. Finally, Reeves and Nass (1996) argue that people process pictures of faces as if
they were “actual interpersonal encounters,” with social cues in the images influencing
their response.
The Relative Influence of Verbal and Visual Elements
In a study of the relative influence of visual and verbal elements of
advertisements on brand attitudes and attitude toward the ad, Mitchell (1986) found
several effects. For example, affect-laden pictures in advertisements (that also had copy)
had a separate influence on brand attitudes. Negatively evaluated visuals also elicited less
favorable attitudes than positive or neutral visuals (previous work by Mitchell & Olson,
1981 had demonstrated that positively evaluated visuals elicited more positive attitudes
than neutral visuals). Mitchell proposes two ways that visual components of advertising
may affect brand attitudes (see also Mitchell & Olson, 1981). First, visual information
may invite inferences about the advertised brand that result in the creation of or change in
beliefs about the product. For example, Mitchell & Olson (1981) found that a picture o f a
sunset in an advertisement for facial tissues created the belief that the brand came in more
62

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

attractive colors. Second, operating through attitudes toward the ad, positive or negative
evaluations of visual elements may affect brand attitudes.
Similarly, in the political arena, Jamieson (1988, 1992) argues that visuals in
political advertising invite inferences that go beyond verbal content. In an analysis of the
infamous "Wfllie Horton" ad that aired during the 1988 presidential election, Jamieson
(1992) argues that a careful juxtaposition of visuals and words implied that thenGovemor Dukakis had paroled 268 prisoners who then “jumped furlough to rape and
kidnap” (see pp. 20-21 for a complete analysis). The power o f visual information also has
implications for applied research o f political advertising. For example, efforts to monitor
political advertising have faced a potential boomerang effect where full-screen ad
watches inadvertently enhance the influence of targeted spots. As Jamieson (1992, p.
103) describes it, "In the contest between evocative pictures and spoken words, pictures
usually win." In a pioneering effort to devise standard media ad watch formats, Jamieson
and her colleagues at the Annenberg school developed a visual grammar27 to counteract
the problems associated with airing a full-screen ad during an ad watch, such as
additional exposure and contextual credibility (see e.g. Pfau & Louden, 1994). According
to Jamieson (1988, 1992) part o f this problem stems from the fact that “because pictures
are processed faster and at a deeper levels than words, they are able to ‘drown out’ the
verbal statements of reporters who are showing the controversial ad as they debunk its
claims” (1992, p. 147).
Finally, analyses of the effects of emotion-laden visuals in television news
formats by Zillmann and his colleagues (e.g. Aust & Zillmann, 1996; Zillmann, Gibson,
Sundar, & Perkins, 1996) have shown that visual exemplification in news stories
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influences people’s perception of the social issues discussed in these stories. For
example, in a study of the effects o f victim exemplification in television news on viewer
perception o f social issues discussed in those stories, Aust and Zilmmann (1997) created
three versions o f two broadcast new stories: without victim exemplification, with
exemplification by unemotional victims, and with exemplification by highly emotional
victims. They found that emotion-laden testimonials by victims (compared to stories
without victim exemplification or exemplification with unemotional victims) increased
viewer perceptions of both problem severity, and risk to self, and also produced reports of
higher distress reactions. According to Zillmann, et aL (1996, p. 427), exemplars are
“case descriptions or specifications of singular incidents that fall within the realm o f a
particular social phenomenon and that exhibit the pertinent properties of this
phenomenon to some degree.” Furthermore, these exemplars are judged in terms of
“typicality rather than with quantified precision.” This definition is useful to the proposed
study, because it offers a possible explanation for how people make use o f the
information provided by visual portrayals o f certain populations (Le. victims). As stated
earlier, this paper proposes that an audience’s affective response to the portrayal o f a
disease population gets integrated with previously held affective response to that disease
population. In this context, perhaps visual portrayals may influence an audience’s
representation or exemplar o f a “typical” representative o f the disease population and the
emotions associated with that exemplar. Finally, these studies offer a different
perspective regarding the influence o f concrete, specific portrayals of a population (Le.
what Iyengar (1991) calls episodic) on judgments.
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Effects Studies o f Visual Elements
With its specific focus on the influence of positive or negative facial display on
compassionate response, the dissertation study also seeks to extend research on the
effects of visual elements. A variety of studies have focused on different elements of
visuals, such as image size, and their effects on behavior and attitudes.
For example, research has shown that people evaluate images of other people
more intensely when the images are close rather than far away (Reeves & Nass, 1996).
Recognition memory is also higher for close-up images, especially those “viewed from a
close distance and faces framed with a close shot” (p. 45). Similarly, larger pictures (e.g.
on larger screens) elicit “more arousal, stronger memories, and more positive evaluations
of the content they displayed” (p. 198).
Another series o f studies have tested the effects o f camera angles (see Messaris,
1997 for a review). Low angles (Le. shot from below) have been shown to convey a sense
of power and strength. Other studies suggest that a direct, face-to-face view invites
identification (Galan, 1986 cited in Messaris, 1997; see also Cappella, 1993).
Finally, research shows that people respond positively to juvenile facial gestures
and postures, making “pictures of children a reliable ingredient of commercial ads [...] as
well as non profit appeals for a variety of causes” (Messaris, 1997, p. 41).
These studies provide useful guidelines for stimuli selection of visual images.
They underscore the importance of matching images on the basis of characteristics such
as age, range (Le. close-up or far away), camera angle, and image size.
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Summary
Overall, these studies have guided both the hypotheses and design of the proposed
study. The theoretical arguments regarding the influence o f visuals and message modality
will be directly tested by including a condition with no visuals. This design allows direct
comparisons to studies by Levin and Chapman (1990, 1993). These studies also provide
the basis for the prediction that compassionate portrayals will exert an influence on
preferences. Finally, the experiment will be computer- administered, using an electronic
format that may help bridge previous research comparing visuals in print and television.
With a review o f the related theoretical and empirical literature complete, our
attention can now turn to developing hypotheses about the role of emotion and imagery in
framing effects on judgments.
Design. Measures and Hypotheses
The dissertation study systematically replicates28 Levin and Chapman’s (1993,
Experiment 2) design, an approach that offers several potential advantages. For instance,
it strengthens the claim that any effects found are caused by the manipulation (or vice
versa). A replication also allows an efficient test of additional message elements not
considered in the original design (Le. emotion-laden visuals). Overall, it enables a more
direct test o f how information from various elements or levels o f the message are
aggregated to produce an outcome (Le. a preference).
As outlined previously, Levin and Chapman (1993, Experiment 2) constructed a
forced-choice task that crossed degree of riskiness with victim type to assess subjects’
response when they directly compare outcomes for two different disease populations. The
authors found that people tended to assign the less desirable option in each framing
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condition (Le. risk-seeking in the positive and risk-averse in the negative) to the
undervalued disease population (AIDS victims), as Table 6 below illustrates (Levin and
Chapman, 1993, 113):
Table 6
Illustration of the Tendency to Assign the Least Desirable Option to AIDS Victims in Each Frame

Option
Information Frame
Positive
Negative

Leukemia-risky
AIDS-riskless
Frequency
%
74
41
103
55

Leukemia-riskless
AIDS risky
Frequency
%
108
59
84
45

Design
The current study adds two elements to the original design, emotions and
imagery, in an attempt to undermine the effect of assigning the less desirable option in
each framing condition to the undervalued disease population. Specifically, it
incorporates different visual portrayals o f the disease populations (AIDS and leukemia
patients), creating a randomized, between-subjects factorial29 design: 2 (framing:
positive, negative) x 3 (visual portrayal: compassionate, uncompassionate, no visual),
where patient population type (AIDS, leukemia) is crossed with degree o f riskiness (Le.
certain, uncertain). The independent variables are framing30 (positive, negative), disease
population type (leukemia: valued, AIDS: not valued), and visual portrayal of the disease
populations (compassionate, uncompassionate).
The design produces 6 conditions, four experimental and two control (the control
conditions are noted with an asterisk below):
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1. negative frame, no visual portrayal*
2. positive frame, no visual portrayal*
3. negative frame, compassionate portrayal o f AIDS victims/uncompassionate
portrayal of leukemia victims
4. negative frame, uncompassionate portrayal of AIDS victims/compassionate
portrayal o f leukemia victims
5. positive frame, compassionate portrayal o f AIDS victims/uncompassionate
portrayal o f leukemia victims
6. positive frame, uncompassionate portrayal of AIDS victims/compassionate
portrayal o f leukemia victims
Hypotheses
The hypotheses corresponding to these conditions are:
HI: In each framing condition (positive, negative), deviations from preference reversal effects
demonstrated by Levin and Chapman (1993) will result as a function of visual portrayal of disease
populations.
HIA: In each framing condition (positive, negative), compassionate portrayals of the
undervalued disease population (compared to uncompassionate portrayals of the valued
disease population) will undermine the tendency to assign less desirable options to the
undervalued group.
H1A1: In the positive frame, compassionate portrayals of undervalued disease
population (compared to uncompassionate portrayals of the valued disease
population) will undermine the tendency to assign the uncertain option to the
undervalued group.
H1A2: In the negative frame, compassionate portrayals of the undervalued
disease population (compared to uncompassionate portrayals of the valued
disease population) will undermine the tendency to assign the certain option to
the undervalued group.
H1B: In each framing condition (positive, negative), uncompassionate portrayals of the
undervalued disease population (compared to compassionate portrayals of the valued
disease population) will strengthen the tendency to assign less desirable options to the
undervalued group.
H1B1: In the positive frame, uncompassionate portrayals of the undervalued
disease population (compared to compassionate portrayals of the valued disease
population) will strengthen the tendency to assign the uncertain option to the
undervalued group.
H1B2: hi the negative frame, uncompassionate portrayals of the undervalued
disease population (compared to compassionate portrayals of the valued disease
population) will strengthen the tendency to assign the certain option to the
undervalued group.
H2: ha the conditions without visual portrayals, in each framing condition (positive, negative) the
preference patterns demonstrated by Levin and Chapman (1993) will be reproduced.
H2A: hi the positive frame, subjects will be more likely to assign die uncertain option to
the undervalued group (AIDS patients).
H2B: In the negative frame, subjects will be more likely to assign the certain option to
the undervalued group (AIDS patients).
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These hypotheses translate into paired comparisons that focus specifically on
predictions that pertain to different portrayals o f the disease population (Le. no visual
portrayal, and compassionate vs. uncompassionate visual portrayals). These planned
comparisons and the predicted results are portrayed graphically in Figures one through
three.
Key Outcome Measures. Dependent Variables
The key outcome measure is preferences for different outcomes. In each
condition, subjects choose between two options (Program A or Program B). Other
dependent measures include compassionate response, attributions of responsibility,
similarity to self, and seriousness of suffering.
Covariate checks
Other measures will be used to conduct covariate checks, including knowledge of,
and personal experience with, the diseases (using questions modified from Block and
Keller, 1995).
Planned Comparisons
Several planned comparisons and a priori predictions will guide the data analysis.
This section includes figures that illustrate the planned paired comparisons on the
outcome o f choosing the leukemia-riskless/AIDS risky option between frames. Figures
two and three compare the control condition (Figure one) to the predicted outcome
patterns.
Preferences
The first prediction is that the control conditions (conditions 1 & 2) will
reproduce the preference reversal pattern found by Levin and Chapman (1993) for the
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key dependent variable o f preference between options A and B. That is, in both framing
conditions (positive and negative), people will trend to assign the more desirable option to
the more valued group: the certain option in thee gain, and the uncertain in the loss, frame.
Specifically, condition two is expected to have 5 9 percent o f respondents choosing the
leukemia-riskless/AIDS-risky option in the positive frame; while condition one is
expected to have 45 percent choosing this optio»n in the negative frame, as Figure 1
shows:
Figure 1: Predicted Replication of Levin & Chapman C1993) Post-treatment Policy Preference Scores

C^ndhiftq I

Poaitve (Gain)

Negative (Loss)
■Percent Choosing Laukemin-RWdesa/AlDS-flisky

The next set o f predictions pertains to scenarios ’where the two populations are portrayed
differently. First, it is predicted that the preference reversal effect will be most
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diminished when the undervalued group is portrayed compassionately, while the valued
group is portrayed uncompassionately (conditions 3 & 5). In other words, subjects in both
framing conditions will be least likely to assign the less desirable option (uncertain in the
gain, and certain in the loss, frame) to AIDS victims. Thus, the tendency to choose the
leukemia-riskless, AIDS-risky will be greatly diminished in the positive frame, and
greatly increased in the negative frame. Predictions for conditions three and five in Figure
2 correspond to hypotheses H1A, H1A1 and H1A2:
Figure 2: Comparison between Control and Expected Post-treatment Policy Preference Scores:
Undervalued-Compassionate. Valued-Uncompassionate by Framing and by Population

% Ckooaing L«ak cm ia-R isk]ess/A ID S-R isky
Condition 2

Condition 5

Condition 3

Condition 1

Control conditions

Undervalued-Compassionata, Vaiued-Uncompassionate Portrayal
I Positive (Gain)

I Negative (Loss)

Note: values assigned to conditions 5 & 3 are hypothetical, and chosen only to demonstrate the expected pattern o f results.
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Finally, it is predicted that the pattern found by Levin and Chapman (1993) will be
accentuated when the undervalued group is portrayed uncompassionately, while the
valued group is portrayed compassionately (conditions 4 & 6). In other words, it will
strengthen the tendency to assign the less desirable option (uncertain in gain, certain in
loss, frame) to the undervalued group (AIDS) as shown in Figure 3. These predicted
patterns for conditions nine and seven correspond to hypotheses H1B, H1B1, and H1B2:
Figure 3: Comparison between Control and Expected Post-treatment Scores: UndervaluedUncompassionate. Valued-Compassionate
100
% Choosing Lcakanla-RlridcafAIDS-Risky

Condljon 1

Conuicn4

Control conditions

Undervalued-Uncom passionate, Valued-Compassionate Portrayals
I Positive (Gain)

I Negative (Loss)

Note: values assigned to conditions 6 Sc 4 are hypothetical, and chosen only to demonstrate the expected pattern o f results
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In addition to these a priori contrasts between and among patterns of preferences,
other dependent measures will include affective imagery, depth o f processing, valuing,
and attributions of responsibility.
Compassionate Response
The survey manipulation attempts to vary compassionate response toward the
disease populations. Compassionate response will in turn influence decision-making, as
Hypothesis 3 outlines:
H3: Differences in compassionate response will emerge as a function of visual portrayal.
H3A: Compassionate portrayals of undervalued disease populations will result in higher
compassion ratings than uncompassionate portrayals of undervalued disease populations
H3B: Conditions with no visual portrayals of undervalued disease populations will result
in lower compassion ratings than conditions with no visual portrayals of valued disease
populations.

Attributions of Responsibility
Compassionate response is also expected to influence attributions of
responsibility, as outlined in Hypothesis four:
H4: Differences in attributions of responsibility will emerge as a function of visual portrayal.
H4A: Compassionate portrayals of undervalued disease populations will result in lower
responsibility ratings than uncompassionate portrayals of undervalued disease
populations.
H4B: Conditions with no visual portrayals of undervalued disease populations will result
in higher responsibility ratings than conditions with no visual portrayals of valued disease
populations.

If the predicted patterns are found, they may offer an explanation for Iyengar’s (1991)
failure to find the expected results for all topics tested (e.g. crime). Although it does not
test this notion directly, this paper suggests an alternative hypothesis to Iyengar’s (1991)
claim that episodic (i.e. illustrative, concrete examples o f an issue) frames lead to
individual rather than social attributions of responsibility. The current study suggests that
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compassionate episodic visual portrayals (e.g. images o f individuals) can also elicit social
rather than individual attributions o f responsibility. For example an image o f a child with
AIDS may shift the locus o f blame from an individual to a social cause. This in turn will
lead to lower responsibility ratings
Rival Mediator Hypotheses
The dissertation directly tests two rival mediator hypotheses. Levin and Chapman
(1993) suggest that attributions o f responsibility may mediate the relationship between
framing and decision-making. In contrast, the current study proposes that compassion
mediates this relationship, and also influences attributions of responsibility. The
following hypotheses reflect these competing arguments, first for the attributions of
responsibility mediator hypothesis:
H5: Attributions of responsibility mediate the relationship between framing and decision-making.

And for the compassion mediator hypothesis:
H6: Compassionate response mediates the relationship between fram ing and decision-making.

The studies testing these hypotheses will now be described in detail.
1 Gam son et al. (1992, p. 384) describe frames and schemas as playing similar roles in the analysis of
media discourse (frames) and cognitive psychology (schemas): “a central organizing principle that holds
together and gives coherence and meaning to a diverse array of symbols.”
2 Which Cappella & Jamieson (1997) label “media priming” to distinguish it from “cognitive priming” (see
footnote 3).
3 The authors explored pre-existing attitudes and attributions of responsibility toward different disease
populations in pre-testing.
Respondents were asked to write an explanation on the back of the sheet of how they made their decision.
5 The content analytic techniques used to arrive at this conclusion were not specified.
6 In light of this argument, a methodological and theoretical challenge for the current study was to explore
perceptions and evaluations of different disease populations even if people may not be able to verbalize
these processes.
7 see Iyengar, 1991, p. 15 for details.
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8 Cognitive priming refers to the well-established finding that “activation of a construct stimulates
neighboring constructs so that subsequent recall of neighbors is easier than if no previous priming had
taken place” (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997, p. 61).
9 Following Cappella & Jamieson, (1997, p. 62), this paper argues that the “script or schema view of
knowledge organization is an unnecessary complication” to the model of associative networks governed by
spreading activation, and that only the latter will be discussed in this proposal.
1 Following Cappella & Jamieson, (1997, p. 62), this paper argues that the “script or schema view of
knowledge organization is an unnecessary complication” to the model of associative networks governed by
spreading activation, and that only the latter will be discussed in this proposal.
1 Descriptive analyses are “concerned with people’s beliefs and preferences as they are, not as they should
be” (Kahneman & Tverksy, 1984, p. 341).
12 Although Kahneman & Tverksy (1982, p. 173) suggest that perhaps the effects o f reference points,
framing, and affective reactions to outcomes should be accepted as “valid elements o f human experiences
rather than errors or biases.”
13 Similarly Damasio (1996) argues that emotional experience provides a reference point from which values
are assigned to different options.
14 See Luce (1998) for a demonstration in the domain of consumer behavior of this tendency for people to
prefer to maintain the status quo as a way to minimize the emotional cost o f losses.
5 In a study of the impact of the effects of the ease or difficulty of imagining contracting a disease on
beliefs that the disease would occur, Sherman, Cialdini, Schwartzman and Reynolds (198S) reported a
similar finding: subjects who rated the disease as easy to imagine judged it as more likely to occur and vice
versa.
16 See Fazio, 1995 for a similar discussion of the diagnostic function of emotions.
17 Similarly, Zajonc & Markus (1982, p. 129) propose that images may function as representations of
affective states. They also suggest that the somatic manifestations of affect (e.g. clenched muscles), get
stored along with emotional reactions in memory.
18 Schlinger (1979, pp. 41-42) includes empathy, broadly defined to include pleasurable associations,
emotional involvement, and wanting to be like or relate to portrayed people, places, actions, and objects.
19Lazarus (1991, p. 58) concurs, suggesting that empathy in particular should be “regarded as an emotional
capacity and a process.”
20 Nussbaum (1996, p. 29) uses pity and compassion interchangeably to refer to a single emotion. Pity is a
historical term, being the English translation of words from the writings of Greek (eleos) and French (pitid)
philosophers, hi the Victorian era, pity began to have negative connotations (i.e. condescension), leading
Nussbaum to prefer compassion for discussions of contemporary issues.
21 From this point onward, viewer will be substituted for pitier to acknowledge that the proposed study will
examine the effects of exposure to a visual communication message on preferences.
22 Using Dialog with the search term: (empath? or sympath? or compassion)/ti and emotion?).
23 An exception is a book chapter by Lenrow (1965), but the methodology and conclusions of the study
proved outdated and irrelevant to this discussion.
4 Krebs (1975, p. 134) defines altruism as helping behavior that is “not motivated by expectations of
reward.”
23 Eisenberg et al. (1994, p. 776) define prosocial as other-oriented.
26 Ekman and Friesen (1975) have identified six universally recognized facial displays of emotion:
happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise, and disgust.
27 The grammar includes distancing, disclaiming, and displacing (see e.g. Cappella & Jamieson, 1994).
28 Kazdin (1998) defines a systematic replication as repeating a previous experiment while purposely
allowing various components to vary; in this instance, visual portrayals of the disease populations are
added.
29 Factorial designs allow the simultaneous investigation of two or more variables in a single experiment
(Kazdin, 1998).
30 Scheufele (1999,106) notes that studies where frames serve as independent variables are interested in
framing effects, whereas studies where frames serve as dependent variables are interested in the role of
various factors in influencing the creation or modification of frames.
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Experiment One: Pretest One
The first pre-test had three goals: to determine whether people’s perceptions of
the relative attributions o f responsibility o f AIDS and leukemia victims have changed
since Levin and Chapman’s (1993) original study; to develop a reliable, valid compassion
scale for evaluation o f stimuli; and to identify message features that will or will not elicit
compassion.
Method
Participants
104 undergraduate students, twenty-nine from Widener University and seventyfive from the University of Pennsylvania, participated in the study. 39% of respondents
were male, and 60% were female.1 The mean age o f respondents was 20 (SD=1.97).
About 73% of respondents described themselves as “Caucasian or white,” 18% as “Asian
or Asian-American,” 5% as “Black or African-American,” 2% as “Hispanic,” and 2% as
“Other.” Students were recruited from a variety o f communication classes.
Procedure
Paper surveys were administered to all participants either as a group in the
classroom or by individual appointment in a meeting room at the Annenberg SchooL To
test for order effects o f the question sequence, two versions of each survey were created
by rotating the twenty-two item rating scale from first to last.
Measures
The measures for the study were perceptions of AIDS and leukemia victims,
particularly attributions of responsibility, and compassionate response.
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Attributions o f responsibility were tested in a variety of ways: a five-choice
question, where answers were coded from one to five for analysis (following Levin &
Chapman, 1993); ratings o f the statement, “In general, a person with AIDS [leukemia] is
personally responsible, through his or her behavior, for contracting the disease,” on a
Likert-type scale anchored by l= “agree strongly” and 7=“disagree strongly;” and coding
of open-ended responses to the question, “In your opinion, what are the most common
causes of leukemia [AIDS]? Please list as many causes as you can.”
For compassionate response, a compassion index was created based on theory and
factor analysis. The index was composed of four adjectives: “moved,” “sorrowful,”
“compassionate,” and “tender feelings toward the person.” The index had excellent to
acceptable reliability across the individual paragraphs for which it was tested (alpha =
.73-.96).
In stru m en t

A two-part paper survey was developed for the pre-test. The first section
primarily replicated questions from Levin and Chapman’s (1993) study comparing
people’s perceptions o f the two disease populations. The second section used a series of
paragraphs and stories to create a valid, reliable compassion scale.
Perceptions o f and Attitudes Toward the Disease Populations
AIDS has been described as a stigmatized, or particularly responsibility-laden
disease,2 both on its own and in comparison to other diseases. The questions in section
one examined whether these perceptions have remained consistent over time, in particular
that people still perceive AIDS patients as responsible for contracting their disease while
leukemia patients are not. Attributions of responsibility were tested both comparatively
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(Le. people with AIDS directly compared to people with leukemia) and separately for
each disease. As the current study assumes that AIDS patients are still viewed as more
responsibility-laden than leukemia patients, it was important to establish the
representational validity o f this claim.3
To test for potential differences in perceptions o f people with AIDS and leukemia,
Levin and Chapman’s (1988, 1990, 1993) questions examining perceptions of the disease
populations were used. These questions compared the two disease populations in seven
areas: number o f people infected with each disease in the U.S., ages of the victims, life
expectancy, quality o f Hfe, likelihood of infecting others, personal responsibility for
contracting the disease, and likelihood that a cure will be found in the next 25 years. Each
question used the following five-choice format (see Appendix A for the full survey):
Which do you think is more numerous in the United States, persons with AIDS or persons with
leukemia? (check one)
There are many more persons with AIDS than persons with leukemia
There are slightly more persons with AIDS than persons with leukemia
There are about the same number of persons with AIDS as persons with leukemia
There are slightly more persons with leukemia than persons with AIDS
There are many more persons with leukemia than persons with AIDS

A new question was added comparing people’s perceptions of similarity to self to AIDS
and leukemia victims:
How do persons who contract AIDS and leukemia compare in terms of their similarity to you'!
(check one)
Persons with AIDS are much more similar to me than persons with leukemia
Persons with AIDS are slightly more similar to me than persons with leukemia
Persons with AIDS and persons with leukemia are about equally similar to me
Persons with leukemia are slightly more similar to me than persons with AIDS
Persons with leukemia are much more similar to me than persons with AIDS
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This question was included because perception of similarity to self is one of the factors
thought to influence compassion (Nussbaum, 1996).
The survey also replicated an open-ended request for subjects to list the leading
causes o f each disease (“In your opinion, what are the most common causes of AIDS
[leukemia]? Please list as many causes as you can”). Subjects also rated their agreement
on a seven-point scale (l=agree strongly, 7=disagree strongly) with the statement: “In
general, a person with AIDS [leukemia] is personally responsible, through his or her
behavior, for contracting each disease.”
Results: Disease Comparisons
Manipulation Check: Attributions o f Responsibility
To analyze comparative evaluations o f the two disease populations, response
categories were numbered successively from one to five (Table one below lists the
categories, and expected direction), following Levin and Chapman (1993). Although the
standard error for the current data is presented in Table 1, Levin and Chapman did not
report the standard error or the standard deviation for the original data, preventing
statistical comparisons between the data sets (see Table 1, and Appendix B for detailed
results). Indicated in Table 1 are potential between-study differences in perceptions o f the
two diseases, using the current study’s standard error as an indicator of critical value:
ages of the victims (AIDS victims perceived as younger in the current study), life
expectancy o f victims (AIDS victims seen as having a longer life expectancy in current
study), and quality o f life (AIDS victims perceived as having a better quality of life in
current study).

79

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 1:
Perceptions of AIDS and Leukemia Victims
Categories. Direction

Means (categories numbered successively from 1-5)
Standard
Bennett
Levin & Chapman
(1999)*
Error
(1993)*
.149
3.03
3.11

Number of people infected:
_ l=many more AIDS than leukemia victims,
3=AIDS and leukemia victims about the same,
5= many more leukemia than AIDS victims
.104**
3.72
3.33
Ages of victims:
1=AIDS victims much younger,
3=AIDS and leukemia victims about the same,
S=leukemia victims much younger
.109**
3.37
3.04
Life expectancy o f victims:
1=AIDS victims have longer life expectancy,
3=AIDS and leukemia victims about the same,
5=leukemia victims have longer life expectancy
.086**
3.18
2.95
Quality o f life:
1=AIDS victims have much better quality of life,
3=AIDS and leukemia victims about the same.
5=leukemia victims have much better quality o f life
.034
1.09
1.10
Likelihood of infecting others:
1=AIDS victims have much greater likelihood o f infecting
others, 3=AIDS and leukemia victims have about the same
likelihood, 5=leukemia victims have much greater
likelihood of infecting others
.098
1.38
Personal responsibility for disease contraction:
1.18
1=AIDS victims bear much greater responsibility for
disease contraction, 3=AIDS and leukemia victims bear
about the same, 5=leukemia victims bear much greater
responsibility for disease contraction
.098
3.03
2.96
Likelihood of cure in next 25 years:
l=greater chance o f cure for AIDS,
3=AIDS and leukemia victims about equal chance,
5=greater chance of cure for leukemia
.079
3.30
Similarity to self***
l=AIDS victims much more similar to me.
3=AIDS and leukemia victims about equally similar,
5=leukemia victims much more similar to me
* Levin and Chapman: n=93; Bennett: n=l04.
** Indicates possible differences between current and original studies, taking the standard error into consideration.
*** Not included in the original study, this question was added to test the role of similarity of self in compassionate
response (Nussbaum, 1996).

With advances in AIDS treatment such as protease inhibitors that have extended the lives
of people with AIDS, some o f the differences in perception between the original and
current study (e.g. higher quality of life and longer life expectancy ratings) make sense.
Nonetheless, the substantive patterns remain the same: AIDS and leukemia victims are
perceived as roughly the same in all categories except threat of infection and
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responsibility. In those categories, people still perceive ADDS victims as more likely to
infect others, and as bearing a greater personal responsibility for their disease. The latter
was especially important to establish for the present study’s purposes.
A nother manipulation check for attributions of responsibility was a bipolar rating
scale of th e extent to which a person is personally responsible, through his or her
behavior, fo r contracting the disease (Levin & Chapman, 1990, 1993). On a 7-point scale
(where 1 = agree strongly, and 7 = disagree strongly), subjects were asked to rate their
agreement Avith the statement: “In general, a person with AIDS [leukemia] is personally
responsible, through his or her behavior, for contracting the disease.” As Table 2
illustrates, a paired-sample t-test showed subjects rating AIDS victims as significantly
more responsible for their condition than leukemia victims, t (103) = -22.65, pc.001.
Table 2
Personal Responsibility Ratinps: AIDS vs. Leukemia Victims

AIDS victim's level o f personality responsibility
Leukemia victim's level of personal responsibility

Mean
2.99
6.40

N
104
104

SD
1.30
.854

Overall, results from these manipulation checks suggest that people’s perceptions of the
victims have remained approximately consistent since Levin and Chapman’s studies
(1988,1990*, 1993), with people still perceiving ADDS patients as bearing more personal
responsibility for their affliction than leukemia patients. Establishing representational
validity for th is argument enabled the use o f the two disease populations for the
dissertation study.
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Perceptions o f the Disease Populations
The first section also replicated an open-ended question asking respondents to list
leading causes o f each disease: ‘In your opinion, what are the most common causes o f
leukemia? Please list as many causes as you can.” In general, these results were more
instructive in terms o f developing stimuli for the main dissertation study rather than
determining whether attributions of responsibility have remained consistent over time.
Fifteen content categories developed by Levin and Chapman (1993, 115) were
modified for the present analyses, as shown in Table 3. Modifications to AIDS categories
included the addition of “bodily fluids”4 to “blood contact,” “hospitals” to “doctor,” and
an “other” category. Modifications to leukemia categories included the addition o f “don’t
know” to “cause unknown,” “environmental cause”5 to “exposure to toxic agent,” and an
“other” category. Examples of answers coded as “other” for AIDS were “governmental
genocide,” and “diet for leukemia.” Responses in “other” were also coded for attribution
of responsibility. Because coding choices are not always specified in published studies,
differences may exist. For example, in the “homosexual” and “heterosexual intercourse”
categories for AIDS, this author was unwilling to make the assumption that responses
such as oral or anal sex could be classified as homosexual intercourse. This choice may
have resulted in lower response rates for those categories. Nonetheless, a rank order
correlation showed a strong (Cohen & Cohen, 1983) correlation of Spearman’s rho = .91
between the current study and Levin and Chapman’s.6
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Table 3:
Rank Order o f Leading Causes for Leukemia and AIDS
AIDS
I*
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

!♦♦
Sex/unprotected sex/unsafe sex/sex with many partners
2
Intravenous drugs/needles
3
Blood transfusions
6
Homosexual intercourse
5
Blood contact/bodily fluid contact^^/cuts
4
Mother to unborn child
8
Heterosexual intercourse
Doctor/dentist/hospital***
9
7
O th e r^
Leukeumia
!♦♦
I*
Genetic/hereditary/bom with it
3
3
White cell deficiency/cancer of the blood
4
2
Don’t know ^^/cause unknown/no specific cause
5
5
Radiation
6
3
Exposure to toxic agent/environmental caused ♦♦
7
8
Smoking
2
7
No response
5
O th e r^ ^
♦Rank order comes from Levin and Chapman (1993, p. 115)
♦♦Rank order is from the present study.
♦♦♦The current study added these content categories to the original framework.

%
93.3
84.6
53.8
9.6
30.8
32.7
6.7
3.8
6.8
64.4
13.5
32.7
12.5
13.5
0
8.7
12.5

A comparison o f the rank orders of response categories shows the top three
categories for AIDS remaining the same. “Mother to unborn child” moved from 6 to 4 in
the present study, while “homosexual intercourse” dropped from 4 to 6, “heterosexual
intercourse” from 7 to 8, and “doctor” from 8 to 9. No respondents listed “heterosexual
intercourse.” For leukemia, the first content category remained the same. In the present
study, “don’t know/cause unknown/no specific cause” was the second highest category,
compared to “no response” in the previous study. “No response” ranked third in the
present study, compared to “white cell deficiency/cancer of the blood” for the previous
one. No respondents listed “smoking.”
To examine perceptions of attribution of responsibility for each disease, content
categories were re-coded on the basis of whether the victim was seen as responsible for
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contracting the disease. AIDS categories designated as holding the victim personally
responsible for his or her condition were: “sex/unprotected sex/unsafe sex/sex with many
partners,” “intravenous drugs/needles,” “homosexual intercourse,” and some responses in
the “other” category. For leukemia, two responses in the “other” category were recoded
as holding the victim personally responsible. In both cases, respondents mentioned “diet”
as a possible cause. Overall, the analysis revealed that 45 percent o f total responses for
perceived causes of AIDS held the victim personally responsible for disease contraction,
compared to 1 percent for leukemia victims.
Compassion Scale Development
Stimuli Development
To test the compassion scale, story paragraphs were developed. Prior to the first
pretest, six stories were written, each featuring a different disease or physical condition:
AIDS, herpes, paralysis, cancer, genital warts (HPV), and leukemia. The topic of diseases
was chosen because the main experiment focuses on behavior and attitudes toward two
disease populations, AIDS and leukemia victims.
Following Nussbaum’s (1996) suggestion that the elicitation o f compassion arises
from three outcome factors —seriousness of suffering, perceived similarity, and
attribution of personal responsibility —each story varied these factors. The resulting four
versions for each story were labeled ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, and ‘D.’ Version A featured a
protagonist similar to the target population of college students, portrayed as not
responsible for his or her condition (high similarity, low responsibility). For example:
Tom, a personable 23-year-old, had always had an active social life. In general, he liked to meet
new people, and made friends easily. He also preferred to date one woman exclusively, rather than
several people casually. One winter, Tom came down with a flu-like illness that included a fever
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and swollen glands. At the same time, Tom noticed that he had several blister-like lesions on his
inner thigh. He mentioned the lesions in passing to his doctor during his next physical, and was
told that he had probably contracted herpes. Tom learned that herpes could be spread by skin-toskin contact, including kissing ch*touching an infected person with an open sore, and having
sexual intercourse with an infected person. Hie also learned that herpes sets up a lifelong presence
in the body, and that he could expect to have outbreaks of the disease at least once a year. An
itching, tingling or painful feeling in the area where the lesions tend to recur often precedes these
outbreaks.

Version B featured a protagonist similar to the target population o f college students,
portrayed as responsible for his or her condition (high similarity, high responsibility). For
example:

Tom, a personable 23-year-old, had always had an active social life. In general, he liked to meet
new people, and made friends easily. He also preferred to date several women casually, rather than
one person exclusively. One winter, Tom came down with a flu-like illness that included a fever
and swollen glands. At the same time, Tom noticed that he had several blister-like lesions on his
inner thigh. He mentioned the lesions in passing to his doctor during his next physical, and was
told that he had probably contracted herpes. Tom learned that herpes could be spread by skin-toskin contact, including kissing or touching an infected person with an open sore, and having
sexual intercourse with an infected person. He also learned that herpes sets up a lifelong presence
in the body, and that he could expect to have outbreaks of the disease at least once a year. An
itching, tingling or painful feeling in the area where the lesions tend to recur often precedes these
outbreaks.

Version C featured a protagonist dissimilar to the target population of college students,
portrayed as not responsible for his or her condition (low similarity, low responsibility).
For example:
Tom, a personable 37-year-old, had always had an active social life. In general, he liked to meet
new people, and made friends easily. He also preferred to date one woman exclusively, rather than
several people casually. One winter, Tom came down with a flu-like illness that included a fever
and swollen glands. At the same time, Tom noticed that he had several blister-like lesions on his
inner thigh. He mentioned the lesions in passing to his doctor during his next physical, and was
told that he had probably contracted herpes. Tom learned that herpes could be spread by skin-toskin contact, including kissing or touching an infected person with an open sore, and having
sexual intercourse with an infected person. He also learned that herpes sets up a lifelong presence
in the body, and that he could expect to have outbreaks of the disease at least once a year. An
itching, tingling or painful feeling in the area where the lesions tend to recur often precedes these
outbreaks.

85

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Finally, version D featured a protagonist dissimilar to the target population o f
college students portrayed as responsible for his or her condition (low similarity, high
responsibility). For example:
Tom, a personable 37-year-old, had always had an active social life. In general, he liked to meet
new people, and made Mends easily. He also preferred to date several women casually, rather than
one person exclusively. One winter, Tom came down with a flu-like illness that included a fever
and swollen glands. At the same time, Tom noticed that he had several blister-like lesions on his
inner thigh. He mentioned the lesions in passing to his doctor during his next physical, and was
told that he had probably contracted herpes. Tom learned that herpes could be spread by skin-toskin contact, including kissing or touching an infected person with an open sore, and having
sexual intercourse with an infected person. He also learned that herpes sets up a lifelong presence
in the body, and that he could expect to have outbreaks of the disease at least once a year. An
itching, tingling or painful feeling in the area where the lesions tend to recur often precedes these
outbreaks.

Seriousness o f suffering was not manipulated because little variation was
expected in the perception o f the seriousness of suffering of people with these diseases or
conditions, especially the two (AIDS and leukemia) used in the dissertation study. These
manipulations resulted in pairs o f low (A-C) and high (B-D) responsibility conditions,
and pairs of low (C-D) and high (A-B) similarity conditions. Furthermore, responsibility
was crossed with similarity in each pair o f scenarios (A-B; C-D). See Appendix C for a
complete summary o f the stories used in this test.
A first round o f testing was conducted with an unsystematically chosen group o f
fourteen graduate students.7 To test the manipulations, respondents rated each story on
three items: similarity to self, where respondents were asked to rate the stories from the
perspective o f an undergraduate (l= N ot at all similar to me, 7=Very similar to me),
extent of main character’s personal responsibility for disease contraction (l= N o t at all
responsible, 7=Very responsible), and realism of the story (l=Not at all realistic, 7=Very
realistic).
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Results o f Stimuli Development
As expected, the means of the similarity of self ratings across subjects were
higher for the high similarity conditions (A, B) than the means for the low similarity
conditions (C, D). Using one-tailed, paired-sample t-tests the high and low similarity
conditions were matched with their respective high and low responsibility conditions to
test for expected differences in similarity ratings (Le. higher ratings in the high and lower
ratings in the low similarity conditions). With two exceptions, the similarity manipulation
seemed successful Table 4 below summarizes these findings:
Table 4
Similarity Manipulation: Comparison of High and Low Similarity Conditions
Pairing:
Mean, SD***
Similarity conditions, low responsibility
1A (high similarity) 1A: 3.29, 1.90
1C (low similarity)
2A (high similarity) 2A: 3.29, 1.82
2C (lo w similarity)
3A (high similarity) 3A: 3.93, 2.23
3C (lo w similarity)
4A (high similarity) 4A: 4.00, 1.52
4C (low similarity)
5A (high similarity) 5A: 3.29, 1.77
5C (low similarity)
6A (high similarity) —
6A: 4.30, 2.11
6C (low similarity)***
Similarity conditions, high responsibility
IB (high similarity) —
IB: 2.86, 1.35
ID (low similarity)
2B (high similarity) —
2B: 3.29, 1.98
2D (lo w similarity)
3B (high similarity) 3B: 2.57, 1.65
3D flow similarity)
4B (high similarity) 4B: 3.00, 1.66
4D flow similarity)
5B (high similarity) 5B: 3.29, 1.86
5D flow similarity)
6B (high similarity) —
6B: 2.70, 1.70
6D flow similarity)***
* Expected direction toward 1
** Expected direction toward 7
*** n=10 for scenario 6, n = l4 for all others.

Mean, SD*

t-coefficient

1C: 2.14, 1.51

t (2.39), p<.05

2C: 2.29, 1.27

t (2.03), p<.05

3C: 2.43, 1.65

t (2.77), p<.05

4C: 2.36, 1.15

t (4.10), p<.001

5C: 1.86, .95

t (4.16), p<.001

6C: 2.90, 1.66

t (3.50), p<.01

ID: 1.57, 1.09

t (3.35), p<.01

2D: 2.00, 1.18

t (2.78), p<.0l

3D: 1.93, 1.27

t (1.39), p=.09

4D: 1.93, .10

t (3.32), p<.01

5D: 1.86, .95

t (4.16), p<.001

6D: 2.10, 1.37

t (1.26), p=.12
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A similar analysis was conducted for the responsibility manipulations. As expected, the
means for the high responsibility conditions (B, D) were significantly higher than the
means for the low responsibility conditions (A, C). Table 5 below summarizes these
results:
Table 5:
Responsibility Manipulation: Comparison of High and Low Responsibility Conditions
Pairing:
Mean, SD*
Responsibility conditions
1A (high responsibility) 1A: 2.50, 1.51
1C (low responsibility)
2A (high responsibility) —
2A: 2.50, 1.51
2C (lo w responsibility)
3A (high responsibility) 3A: 1.07, .27
3C Cow responsibility)
4A (high responsibility) —
4A: 3.57, 1.45
4C (low responsibility)
5A (high responsibility) 5A: 1.93, 1.14
5C (lo w responsibility)
6A (high responsibility) 6A: 1.50, .71
6C flow responsibility)***
Responsibility conditions
IB: 1.79, 1.42
IB (high responsibility) ID flow responsibility)
2B (high responsibility) —
2B: 2.93, 1.81
2D flow responsibility)
3B (high responsibility) 3B: 1.21, .58
3D flow responsibility)
4B (high responsibility) —
4B: 3.53, 1.70
4D flow responsibility)
5B (high responsibility) —
5B: 1.93, 1.20
5D flow responsibility)
6B(high responsibility) —
6B: 1.9, 1.10
6D flow responsibility)***
* Expected direction toward 1
** Expected direction toward 7
*** n=10 for scenario 6, n=14 for all others.

Mean, SD**

t-test, one-tailed

1C: 5.79, 1.19

t (-6.22), p<.001

2C: 5.50, 1.95

t (-6.40), p<.001

3C: 5.14, 1.35

t (-11.00), p<.001

4C: 5.00, 1.47

t (-4.91), p<.001

5C: 5.14, 1.66

t (-6.66), pc.OOl

6C: 4.90, 1.45

t(-7.14),pc.00l

ID: 5.57, 1.60

t (-6.00), p<.001

2D: 5.36, 1.95

t (-5.67), p<.001

3D: 5.86, 1.17

t (-13.60), p<.001

4D: 5.14, 1.70

t (-5.79), p<.00l

5D: 5.14, 1.61

t (-6.83), p<.001

6D: 5.20, 1.40

t(-7.36),p<.001

Finally, the realism means for the stories were calculated and ranked, as shown in Table
6.
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Table 6:
R ealism ratings: m ean rank cyders

Rank order
4
2
5
1
2
6

Story
1: AIDS
2: Genital Warts
3: Lung cancer
4: Herpes
5: Paralysis
6: Leukemia

Mean
4.95
5.38
4.66
5.75
5.38
3.83

Although the realism ratings provided the primary criterion for choosing stories for the
first pretest, story six (leukemia) was included despite its low score because the main
study will examine public health policy preferences for people with AIDS and leukemia.
In addition, the paralysis scenario was chosen to increase the generalizability of the
compassion scale by demonstrating its effectiveness for ratings o f physical conditions as
well as diseases. On the basis o f these decisions, the four scenarios chosen for the first
pretest were: AIDS, herpes, paralysis, and leukemia. These scenarios were used in the
second section o f the first pretest survey.
Instrument: Compassion Scale Development
For the main study, a paper survey was also administered using the compassion
scale and story paragraphs developed in the pretest.
A review o f the literature, as well as personal correspondence with scholars in this
area, showed that previous work has focused on measuring individual differences in
personal empathy (e.g. Tamborini, Salomonson, & Bahk, 1993; Davis, 1983; Coke et aL,
1978). For example, a survey by Tamborini and colleagues (1993) contains questions
e xam ining a person’s propensity toward emotional contagion and perspective taking. In

contrast, this study seeks to measure people’s emotional (Le. compassionate) response to
visual stimuli
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To construct an appropriate scale, synonyms for the term “compassion” were used
(Kipfer, 1999), as well as adjectives found to correlate with sympathy and empathy such
as “softhearted” and “concerned” (Eisenberg et aL, 1994, 782) and “moved” (Toi &
Batson, 1982, 284). In addition, basic emotions as outlined in the literature (see e.g. Batra
& Ray, 1986) were included. Items were also included that were not expected to correlate
with compassion (e.g. guilt and anger). In total, twenty-two items were tested.
The second section of the survey presented one version of each o f the four stories,
and two factual paragraphs describing how people with AIDS [leukemia] are affected by
the disease (e.g. symptoms and progression). In all, each subject rated six paragraphs
(two factual, four storks) using a separate 22-item scale for each.
Individual Differences: Perceptions o f Risk. Knowledge. Experience
The second section of the survey also included three questions (modified from
Block and Keller, 1995) measuring knowledge about disease (e.g. “I know a lot about
AIDS [leukemia];” “I know more than most about AIDS [leukemia];” “I am very familiar
with ways to prevent AIDS”), which subjects rated on a 7-point scale (where l=disagree,
and 7=agree). Subjects also responded to question about their experience (e.g. current
disease status; disease history; friends or family who have the disease), with each disease.
In addition, questions regarding perceptions o f risk were included because there is some
prior evidence that involvement and susceptibility may change ratings of texts (Keller &
Block, 1997). On a 7-point scale (where 1=1 am not at all at risk; 7=1 am very much at
risk), subjects rated the statement, “I consider myself at risk to get HTV/AIDS
[leukemia].” The knowledge, experience, and risk questions will serve as potential
covariates. The second section o f pretest one examined differences in compassionate
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response to the four versions of the four scenarios (AIDS, herpes, paralysis, and
leukemia). The four versions of each scenario varied the outcomes thought to influence
compassionate response: attributions o f responsibility and similarity to self. The survey’s
purpose was to test the influence of these outcomes on compassionate response.
Procedure: Instrument
As a design factor to help minimize the possibility o f order effects, two versions
o f each survey were created (for 8 total) by rotating the twenty-two item rating scales
from first to last to test for order effects of the question sequence (Sudman, Bradbum &
Schwartz, 1996). In addition, the order o f the story versions was rotated as follows: 1)
AIDS high similarity, low responsibility (1 A)- Herpes, high similarity, high
responsibility (2B)- Paralysis low similarity, low responsibility (3C)-Leukemia low
similarity, high responsibility (4D); 2) AIDS high similarity, high responsibility (1B)Herpes low similarity, low responsibility (2C)- Paralysis low similarity, high
responsibility (3D)- Leukemia high similarity, low responsibility (4A); 3) AIDS low
similarity, low responsibility (1C)- Herpes low similarity, high responsibility (2D)Paralysis high similarity, low responsibility (3A)- Leukemia high similarity, high
responsibility (4B); and 4) AIDS low similarity, high responsibility (ID)- Herpes high
similarity, low responsibility (2A)- Paralysis high similarity, high responsibility (3B)Leukemia low similarity, low responsibility (4C). Featuring a between-subjects design,
each subject received one survey version containing one of these four story orders.
Analysis o f variance (ANOVA) was used to test for order effects before combining the
two survey versions for further analysis.
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Results: Compassion Scale
Manipulation Checks: Attributions o f Responsibility. Similarity to Self
Using one-tailed, paired t-tests, within-story manipulations on the three outcomes
(attributions of responsibility, similarity to self, and seriousness o f suffering) were tested
to see whether differences emerged as expected. One-tailed tests were used to test the
prediction that subjects *would rate both attributions and similarity to self lower in the low
and higher in the high conditions for each outcome.
To test the responsibility manipulation, respondents were asked to rate on a 7point scale (where 1 = p>erson is not at all responsible, and 7 = person is totally
responsible) the statement: ‘T o what extent do you feel the person in Story 1 is
responsible for his or h e r situation?” As shown in Table 7 and as predicted, the
manipulation produced a. consistent pattern o f respondents rating people depicted in the
low responsibility conditions (stories A and C) as significantly less responsible for their
condition than those in tine high responsibility conditions (stories B and D):
Table 7
Responsibility Manipulation Check: Low and High Scenario Conditions
Scenario pairings
High Similarity***
AIDS (Low responsibility) —
(High responsibility)
Herpes (Low responsibility) —
(High responsibility)
Paralysis (Low responsibility) —
(High responsibility)
Leukemia (Low responsibility) —
(High responsibility)
* Using one-tailed tests.

t-test coefficient*
t (-6.10), 2<-005**
t (-3.10), £<.001**
t (-5.65), p<.001
t (-4.31), £<.001

Scenario pairings
Low Similarity
AIDS (Low responsibility) —
(High responsibility)
Herpes (Low responsibility) —
(High responsibility)
Paralysis (Low responsibility) —
(High responsibility)
Leukemia (Low responsibility) —
(High responsibility)

t-test coefficient
t (-14.22), £<.001
t (-3.10), gcO l
t (-3.92), £<.001
t (-5.52), £<.001**

** A Levene’s test was significant, so the t-test score for equal variances not assumed was reported.
*** The tables also reflect th e fact that in each pair of scenarios (A & B; C & D), responsibility and
similarity were crossed.
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To test the similarity to self manipulation, respondents were asked to rate on a 7point scale (anchored by “very similar to me,” and “ not at all similar to me”) the
question: “How similar to you do you find the person in Story [2] 7 ’ The similarity-to-self
manipulation was unsuccessful, with no significant or consistent pattern of differences
emerging between the high (A & B) and low (C & D) similarity conditions.
Table 8
Differences Between Low and High Similarity Conditions
Scenario Pairings
Low Responsibility
AIDS (High similarity) - (Low similarity)
Herpes (High similarity) - (Low similarity)
Paralysis (High similarity) - (Low similarity)
Leukemia (High similarity) - (Low similarity)
High Responsibility
AIDS (High similarity) - (Low similarity)
Herpes (High similarity) - (Low similarity)
Paralysis (High similarity) - (Low similarity)
Leukemia (High similarity) - (Low similarity)

Means: A-C
5.44-4.95
3.61-3.97
5.41-5.71
4.66-4.81
Means: B-D
3.95-3.49
3.13-2.92
4.99-5.13
5.13-5.26

t-test results
Not significant
Not significant
Not significant
Not significant
Not significant
Not significant
Not significant
Not significant

Although the seriousness of suffering outcome was not deliberately varied, t-tests
did reveal some significant differences between ratings o f seriousness o f suffering by
condition (high and low similarity/responsibility). Using a 7-point scale (where 1 = not at
all serious, and 7 = very serious), subjects rated the question: “How serious do you
consider the suffering o f the person in Story [2]?’ In a comparison of the low and high
similarity conditions, subjects gave significantly higher seriousness of suffering ratings to
people in the high similarity condition for the herpes and paralysis stories. In a
comparison o f the low and high responsibility conditions, subjects gave significantly
higher seriousness o f suffering ratings to people in the low responsibility condition for
the herpes and leukemia stories. Table 9 summarizes these results.
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Table 9
Differences in Seriousness of Suffering Ratings
High vs. Low Similarity
Low vs. High Responsibility
Pair
Means and SD
Pair
t-test
Means and SD
1B5.92, SD=1.29;
t (-.219), £=.84 1C6.31, SD=.93;
1D
6, SD=1.23
1D
6, SD=1.23
2B4.96, S D s l.ll;
t (3.49),
2C5.08, SD=1.26,
2D
£><.001
2D
3.85, SD=1.19
3.85, SD=1.19
3B6.69, SD=.68;
t (1.73), £=.09 3C6.23, SD= 1.29;
3D
6.15, SD=1.43
3D
6.15,SD=1.43
4B5.81, SD=1.13;
t (.381), £=.72 4C6.31, SD=.97;
4D
4D
5.69, SD=1.05
5.69, SD=1.05
Note: I =AIDS, 2 =Herpes, 3 =Paralysis, 4=Leukemia

t-test
t (1.02), £=.32
t (3.62),
£<.001
t (.195), £=.84
t (-2.20), £<.05

Although seriousness of suffering was not manipulated, these results follow the
same pattern and logic as those for similarity to self and attributions o f responsibility:
subjects perceive as more serious the suffering of disease victims whom they view as
highly similar to themselves and not responsible for their condition.
Scale Construction
Using factor analytic techniques, the thirteen adjective items expected to comprise
or correlate with compassion were examined: sympathetic, moved, compassionate,
empathic, commiserated with the person, merciful, softhearted, sorrowful, pitying,
identified with the person, tender feelings toward the person, kindly and concerned.
Factor and reliability analyses were conducted for each of the paragraphs that the
adjective items were used to rate.
Factor Analysis
For the factor analysis, scores for each paragraph was first analyzed using
principal components, and then re-analyzed rotating factor scores using the varimax
method. The choice of the imaging factor technique was made on the basis of results
from Buley’s (1995) test o f seven initial-extraction techniques that found that imaging
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factor analysis consistently provided the “highest factor fidelity” (p. 490).8 Although use
o f the promax method reflects the belief that the underlying attribute characteristics for
the items tested are correlated, varimax was also used in this instance to maximize the
separation across factors. The three methods yielded substantively similar results. For
efficiency, only imaging factor analysis with varimax was used for subsequent analyses.
Factual Paragraphs: Factor Analyses
For the leukemia paragraph, an initial principal components analysis indicated a
3-factor solution, with the first three having eigenvalues of 5.69, 1.17 and 1.07. The data
were re-analyzed using imaging factor analysis, rotating factor scores using both the
promax and varimax methods. In the rotated factor matrix, some of the items that loaded
on factor one with a primary loading over .40 (Dillon & Goldstein, 1984) were:
“compassionate” (.81), “sympathetic” (.80), “moved” (.73), “liked the person” (.66),
“commiserated with the person” (.66), “softhearted” (.58), and “concerned” (.53).
For the AIDS paragraph, an initial principal components analysis indicated a 2factor solution, with the first two having eigenvalues of 7.80, and .939. In the rotated
factor matrix, some of the items loading on factor one were: “tender feelings toward the
person” (.76), “softhearted” (.79), “compassionate” (.69), “sympathetic” (.65), and
“kindly” (.62).
Story Paragraphs: Factor Analyses
For the story paragraphs, items loading on factor one over .40 in the rotated factor
matrix were noted (Dillon & Goldstein, 1984). This data was then analyzed to determine
the items that load consistently on factors one, two, and three across the paragraphs.
Table 10 shows the five items that loaded most consistently on factor one (which explains
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the highest percentage o f the variance) across the story paragraphs: sorrowful, moved,
compassionate, tender, and concerned:
Table 10
Analysis of Item Loadings on Factor One Across Sixteen Story Paragraphs
Commiserated
Sorrowful
Identified
Pitying
Moved
Sympathetic
Compassionate
Tender
Envathic
Kindly
Softhearted
Merciful
Sad
Interested
Afraid
Liked
Concerned

la
.58
.86
—
—
—

lb
.78
.90
.76
.84
.75

—
—
—
—
—
—
—

.75
.88
.70
.73
.77
.90

lc

Id

2a

2b

2c

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

.83

—

—

.72
.87

—

—

—

.90

—

.82

.75

—

2d
.94
.86

3a

3b

3c

3d

4a

4b

4c

4d

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

_

—

.76

—

.90

—

_

_

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

.85

—

.91
.80

.70
—

.80

—

—

—

—

.84
.70

—

.84

—

.81
.72

—

.84

—

—

—

_

—

—

.83
.80

.72
.75

.79
.87
.84
.89

—

—

—

—

—
—

—

_

_

_

.79

—

—

—

—

.87
.88
.88
.83

—

.66

—

.86

.89
.90

.89

—
_

—

—

—

.74

—

—

—

.90

—

—

.76

—

.84

.92

.97
.88
.74

.73

—

—

—

.85

.85

—

—

_

.88

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

.79

-

-

-

-

-

-

.67

—

-

.84

.75

.71

.76

-

.79

Total
3
6
3
3
8
4
8
8
1
3
4
4
2
2
2
3
7

Reliability Analysis
Next, a reliability analysis was conducted for these items. The five items were
then winnowed down according to internal reliability, theoretical expectations, and a
concern with subject fatigue.
4-Item Scale
In deciding between a 4 and a 5-item scale, two concerns were paramount:
maximizing internal reliability and reducing possible subject fatigue. Both scales have
acceptable to excellent alpha levels across the 16 story paragraphs and 2 factual
paragraphs (Nunnally, 1978; Spector, 1992). Although the alphas for the 5-item scale
were slightly higher overall (.73-.96 compared to .71-.96), the 4-item scale has the
possible advantage of reducing subject fatigue for respondents who will use it to rate a
series of fifty images in the second pre-test. The resulting 4-item scale contained the
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following items: “sorrowful,” “compassionate,” “moved,” and “tender feelings toward
the person.”
Compassion Scale Comparisons
Using the compassion scale, comparisons were made among the paragraphs to
check the results o f expected differences.
Factual Paragraph Ratings
Two factual paragraphs about AIDS and leukemia were included to examine
whether differences would also emerge in people’s emotional reactions to factual
descriptions o f AIDS and leukemia in addition to fictional story paragraphs that varied
the outcome measures o f attributions of responsibility and similarity to self. If differences
in compassion ratings for these two factual paragraphs were found, they would strengthen
the claim that people have different pre-existing perceptions about people with AIDS and
leukemia which may in turn affect their behavior and feelings toward them. Specifically,
it would provide further evidence that attributions o f responsibility play an important role
in compassionate response.
On 7-point scales (1 = not at all, and 7 = very much), subjects rated two factual
paragraphs describing causes and symptoms of the two diseases on twenty-two emotion
adjectives/statements in response to: “Using the seven-point scales below, please circle
the number that best describes how much each word captures the way you felt while
reading the paragraph about people with leukemia [AIDS].”
A paired t-test showed that subjects reported significantly more compassion for
leukemia (M = 4.93) than AIDS victims (M = 4.40) after reading factual descriptions of
the two diseases (t (103) = 4.06, £<.001).
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Story Paragraph Ratings
ANOVAs were used to test for differences within the stories for each disease by
version (e.g. high similarity, low responsibility). Significant differences in compassion
ratings for within-story manipulations of perceived responsibility for disease contraction
(Le. low versus high responsibility) were found for the AIDS stories, with low
responsibility conditions receiving higher compassion scores than high responsibility
conditions, F (3, 100) = 10.41, £<.001. Differences in compassion ratings for within-story
manipulations for herpes approached significance F (3, 100) = 2.56, £=.059. While the
versions for the paralysis and leukemia stories did not produce significant differences,
patterns for paralysis were in the predicted direction as shown in Table 11 (i.e. higher
compassion ratings for the low responsibility, and lower compassion ratings for the high
responsibility versions). Further analyses were conducted using means plots and t-tests.
As Figure 1 shows, the means plots revealed predicted patterns (Le. higher compassion
ratings for high similarity and low responsibility conditions) for AIDS, herpes, and
paralysis:
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Figure 1: Mean Compassion Ratines for AIDS Stories bv Responsibility and Similarity

low resp, high sim

high resp, high
sim

low resp, low sim high resp, low sim

One-tailed, paired t-tests were used to examine compassion ratings for high and
low responsibility pairs within each story. As shown in Table 11, significant differences
emerged between compassion ratings of paired low and high responsibility conditions for
AIDS, herpes, and paralysis, with respondents giving significantly higher compassion
ratings to victims in the low responsibility conditions. Unexpectedly, however, the
opposite pattern was not found for leukemia, and in fact the opposite pattern was found,
an unexpected result.
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Table 11
Compassion Rating Differences Between Low and High Responsibility Conditions
High Similarity
Low Similarity
Means:
Disease
Means:
t-test
t-test
Low-High
Low-High
AIDS
t (4.11), p <.001*
5.4 4 -3 .9 5
4 .9 5 -3 .4 9
AIDS
t (3.48), p <.001
Herpes
3 .6 1-3.13
t (1.08), p=.142**
Herpes
3 .9 7 -2 .9 2
t (2.67), p <.005
Paralysis
5.41-4.99
t (.938), p=.177**
5 .7 1 -5 .1 3
Paralysis
t (1.72), p <.05
Leukemia 4 .6 6 -5 .1 3
t (-1.09), p = . 140*** Leukemia
4 .8 1 -5 .2 6
t (-1.35), p =.092***
* Because a Levene’s test revealed significant differences, the t-test score for equal variances not assumed
was reported.
** Non-significant results, but in the predicted direction.
***Non-significant results that are also not in the predicted direction.
Disease

A larger sample may yield significant results for the non-significant findings that
are in the expected direction. A power analysis revealed that for the herpes and paralysis
scenarios with an effect size o f approximately d=.30, 26 subjects in each condition results
in a 28% chance of detecting significant difference (Cohen, 1977). To increase power to
40% would require 44 subjects in each condition.
With regard to leukemia, which did not produce the predicted pattern o f results, a
possible explanation was the difficulty in realistically manipulating attributions of
responsibility for a leukemia victim. In either scenario, subjects may not have held
leukemia victims responsible for their condition. Reinforcing this argument, the data
show that the leukemia stories received the lowest responsibility ratings o f the four
diseases (see Table 12). One-tailed t-tests demonstrate that, with the exception of
paralysis, this difference was significant.
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Table 12
Responsibility Ratings Across Diseases Portrayed in Stories
Disease
Mean, SD
AIDS
4.27,2.31
Herpes
4.79, 1.5
Paralysis
3.68, 2.08
Leukemia
3.25, 1.32
* One-tailed test.
** Significant at j><.01

Comparison with Leukemia*
t (102) =3.05**
t (102) =8.97**
t (102) =1.43, e =.08
—

In pre-testing, the leukemia scenario also received the lowest realism scores. Nonetheless
the scenario was included because leukemia is one of the diseases being tested in the
main study.
Individual Differences
The last portion o f section two had measures of potential individual differences.
Although subjects were randomly assigned to condition, obviating the need to test for
individual differences, analyses were conducted for these measures and are reported in
this section.
Perceptions o f Risk
Subjects rated their perceptions o f personal risk for each o f the diseases on 7point scales (1 = not at all to 7= very much at risk). Personal risk ratings were then
recoded into three levels: low (1-3), moderate (4-5), and high (6-7). Overall, subjects did
not feel that their personal risk for contracting each disease was high (2% for leukemia
and 4% for ADDS). More respondents, however, rated their personal risk as low for AIDS
(64%) than leukemia (46%). A greater proportion of subjects rated their personal risk as
moderate for leukemia (52%) than AIDS (32%). Table 12 displays the distribution of
personal risk ratings across subjects for each disease.
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Table 13
Distribution across subjects of personal risk ratines for AIDS and Leukemia
Disease Populations
AIDS
Leukemia
67 (64%)
48 (46%)
33 (32%)
54 (52%)
4(4% )
2 (2 %)

Risk Ratings
Low
Moderate
High

In addition, a paired t-test examining whether people were somewhat more likely to
perceive themselves as at risk for leukemia approached significance (M = 3.34) than
AIDS (M = 3.04), t (103) = -1.97, p=.052.
Prior Experience
Several questions examined subjects’ prior experience with AIDS and leukemia
(see Table 14 below for the full results). More respondents reported having “never known
anyone with AIDS,” than having “never known anyone with leukemia.”
Table 14
Respondents’ Reported Prior Experience with AIDS and Leukemia
Category
Category
%
%
Never known anyone
74%
Never known anyone
58.7%
with AIDS
with leukemia
Family member has
2.9
Family member has
9.6
AIDS
leukemia
Partner has AIDS
Partner has leukemia
0
0
Friend has AIDS
Friend has leukemia
1 0 .6
28.8
I have AIDS
I have leukemia
0
0
Other has AIDS
Other has leukemia
7.7
12.5
* Percentages do not sum to 100% both because subjects could check as many as apply, and because of missing
values.

O f those who reported knowing someone with leukemia, most (29%) cited the
more intimate category of “friend;” whereas 13% cited “other” for AIDS (e.g. friend of
friend or teacher).
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Knowledge
Respondents rated six knowledge questions on seven-point scales (from
2 =D isagree to 7=Agree): “I know a lot about AIDS [leukemia],” “I know more than most
about AIDS [leukemia],” “I am very familiar with ways to prevent AIDS [leukemia].”
Paired sample t-tests showed respondents consistently reporting significantly higher
knowledge levels for AIDS than leukemia:
T able 15
Paired .Samples Test for AIDS and Leukemia Knowledge Questions

P air 1
P air 2
P air 3

Know a lot about AIDS - Know a lot about leukemia
Know more than most about AIDS - Know more than
most about leukemia
Fam iliar with ways to prevent AIDS - Familiar with
ways to prevent leukemia

£(103)
17.00
13.36

.0 0 1

24.40

.0 0 1

E
.0 0 1

A knowledge scale for each disease was then constructed, combining responses
fo r the three statements. The alphas for both scales were acceptable to good, (alpha = .75
fo r the AIDS knowledge scale, and alpha =.78 for leukemia). Although removing the
thurd question (“I am very familiar with ways to prevent AIDS”) would increase the
leukemia knowledge scale to alpha = .84, direct comparisons could no longer made
between the two scales. Finally, a paired sample t-test also showed that subjects gave
significantly higher knowledge ratings (t (103) =22.56, £<.001) to AIDS (M = 4.82) than
leukemia (M = 1.97).
Conclusion
The first pre-test had three goals. The first was to establish that comparable
differences in attributions o f responsibility exist for AIDS and leukemia as reported by
Levin and Chapman (1993). Using several different measures and approaches, it was
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established that subjects perceive AIDS patients as more personal responsibility for their
condition than leukemia patients. Furthermore, the factual paragraphs that described
symptoms o f AIDS and leukemia without trying to elicit emotion also produced
differences in compassion ratings, adding another dimension to our understanding o f the
differences in pre-existing perceptions and feelings toward these two disease populations.
Second, this study sought to create a reliable, valid compassion scale. Variations
in responsibility levels produced predicted patterns o f significant differences in
compassion ratings for three out of four disease scenarios: AIDS, herpes and paralysis.
Two explanations were offered for the failure to produce expected differences in
compassion ratings for the leukemia stories, both o f which were supported by the data.
One is that, with the exception of paralysis, people rated leukemia victims as significantly
less responsible for their disease than other disease populations. This pre-existing
difference in attitudes may have made attributions o f responsibility difficult to
manipulate for people with leukemia. Another is that, in pre-testing, the leukemia stories
received the lowest realism scores. Despite these results, leukemia was included in pre
test one because it is one o f the two diseases studied in the main experiment.
The study’s third goal was to illuminate message features that will and will not
produce compassion. Although the literature suggests that three elements are important to
eliciting a compassionate response: similarity to self, attributions of responsibility, and
seriousness o f suffering (Nussbaum, 1996), this study seems to suggest that variations in
attributions o f responsibility may be most influential in producing differences in
compassion ratings. As predicted, the attributions o f responsibility manipulations in the
story paragraphs produced differences in the expected direction (higher compassion
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ratings for low responsibility conditions, and vice versa). In addition, although
seriousness of suffering was not manipulated, there was evidence that people perceive as
more serious the suffering of disease victims whom they view as highly similar to
themselves and not responsible for their condition.
A possible explanation for similarity to self’s relative lack of importance in
eliciting compassion comes from previous studies that show people wanting others to be
like them unless that similarity has negative implications. For example, studies have
demonstrated that people are less likely to see similarities between themselves and salient
others when they perceive the others as failures at important tasks (e.g. Krahe, 1983;
Sanbomatsu, Shavitt, Sherman and Roskos-Ewaldsen, 1987). The generally accepted
interpretation for this finding is that people are seeking to distance themselves from a
potential threat to their self-esteem. That explanation makes sense in the context of the
current study, where the people portrayed in the scenarios were all suffering from various
diseases or conditions, many of which (ADDS, herpes, genital warts) also carry a social
stigma. Thus respondents may have tried to distance themselves from the story
protagonists, whether those protagonists were viewed as responsible for their outcome or
not, making similarity to self ratings a relatively poor indicator of compassionate
response.
The compassion scale will now be used to choose stimuli (visual images) for the
main dissertation study.
One subject did not provide this information, and was coded as system missing.
As demonstrated by Chapman and Levin, 1988; and Levin and Chapman, 1993.
3 Representational validity checks examine the similarity between the “theoretician’s assumptions and a
naive audience’s perceptions” (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997, p. 89).
4 For example semen or saliva.
1

2
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5 Several respondents listed “environment” or “surroundings” as a cause.

A rank order correlation was also computed just for the original, unmodified content categories that
appear in both studies, which also resulted in a strong correlation (.77).
7 1 0 students rated the leukemia story.
8 In addition, similar results were found using principal components with a varimax rotation.
6
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Experiment Two: Pre-test Two
The purpose o f the second pre-test was to test and select stimuli (images) for the
main experiment. The study also sought to validate the compassion scale developed in the
first pre-test by examining whether differences in compassion ratings emerged as a
function of facial display o f emotion. Using the compassion scale, fifty images were
tested. Two image pairs (four images in total) were selected for the main study. The
image pairs were matched on the basis o f race, age, and gender, with one of the images in
the pair eliciting higher compassion ratings than the other.
Method
Participants
98 (40% male, 60% female) University of Pennsylvania undergraduates, recruited
from a variety o f communication and history courses, participated in the study. The mean
age for all respondents was twenty (SD=1.03).1 68 percent o f respondents identified
themselves as “White or Caucasian,” 19 percent as “Asian or Asian-American,” 6 percent
as “Black or African-American,” and 3 percent for each category o f “Hispanic or
Latino(a) and “Other.”
Apparatus
The study was administered on six Windows NT Pentium class IE machines with
standard “wintel” architecture.2 Using MediaLab (version 51) software,3 an electronic
survey was developed for the study.
Instrument
The electronic survey had the following components: I) fifty images, randomly
presented in a different order to each subject; 2) a 4-item compassion scale for each
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image4 (the four adjective items are: sorrowful, compassionate, moved, and tender
feelings toward the person), with each item presented in random order; 3) a randomized
12-item perspective-taking scale (modified from Stiff, et. al, 1998); 4) randomized,
separate ratings o f knowledge about each disease and perceptions o f personal risk for
each disease (modified from Block & Keller, 1995, 1997), and 5) demographics
questions. For a complete version o f the electronic survey for this study, please refer to
Appendix A.
Procedure
The electronic survey was administered in a computer lab at the Annenberg
School for Communication by individual appointment, although several students were
able to sign up for the same time slot (with seven machines available). The maximum
number o f students taking the survey together at any one time was seven, and the
minimum was one.
Stimulus Selection: Image Collection and Creation
Overall, two goals guided stimulus selection. One was to collect images that were
demographically varied in terms of age, race, and gender. Another was to collect images
that clearly portrayed both negative (e.g. anger, fear) and positive (e.g. happy) facial
displays of emotion.
Images were collected in two stages. First, they were found using the searchable
Associated Press (AP) Photo Archive database, which electronically stores images taken
by AP news photographers. Two separate preliminary searches using the key words
“AIDS” and “Leukemia” resulted in 27125 and 122 image hits respectively. After a
preliminary viewing, images that met the following criteria were downloaded: a clear
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portrayal o f the disease victims (e.g. only one subject in the frame, full or clear view of
the subject’s face); a lack o f physical cues about either disease (e.g. Kaposi’s sarcoma
sores for AIDS or chemotherapy-induced baldness for leukemia); and victims who were
not famous or well-known6 (for fear o f activating previously held attitudes toward that
person). These images were then further sorted to select those that had clear positive and
negative facial displays of emotion. A second search was conducted, using various
emotional key words such as “angry,” “frightened,” “scared,” and “happy.” After
viewing the images, those that met the previously established criteria were downloaded.
This stage o f image collection resulted in twenty-one images of people with AIDS, and
thirty-five images o f people with leukemia.
The second stage o f image collection sought to increase the diversity o f the
sample, and to match existing images on the basis of demographics and facial display of
emotion. First, efforts were made to match images from the AP database with each other
on the basis o f facial display (Le. positive and negative), gender, race, and age. The
matching process was important for the final goal of selecting a pair o f images from the
same demographic category, one o f which elicited higher ratings o f compassion than the
other. Second, efforts were made to collect images in demographic categories that were
not represented in the AP images. After obtaining their consent, photographs were taken
o f various people using a 35-millimeter camera with either black and white or color film.
Participants were prompted to display a variety o f facial emotions (e.g. “pretend that
someone has done something that makes you really angry”). These images were then
matched with the AP photos and among themselves to produce possibilities for testing in
each category. In addition to demographics, matching criteria included characteristics
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such as black-and-white or color film, image size, range (e.g. facial close-up versus fullbody shot), and camera angle. Fifty images in sixteen demographic categories7
represented the sample for the study. The categories were: white male infant;8 black male
child; black female child; white male child; black male teen; ethnic female teen; white
female teen/undergraduate; white male teen/undergraduate; black female undergraduate;
white female, thirties; white male, early-to-mid thirties; white female, middle-aged; white
male, middle-aged; black male, middle-aged; black male, elderly.
Disease Label Conditions
Two versions o f the survey were created to control for disease-specific
compassion ratings (e.g. where images labeled as “person with AIDS” consistently
receive lower compassion ratings than the identical pictures labeled as “person with
leukemia”), resulting in two disease label conditions. Images that were labeled as AIDS
in the first condition (survey version) were labeled as leukemia in the second, and vice
versa. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the two survey conditions (i.e. disease
labeling as either AIDS or leukemia). This process allowed each image to be tested with
two different disease labels to ensure that selected images elicited varying compassion
ratings because of the characteristics o f the images themselves, not their disease labels.
Measures
Compassionate response was measured by a 4-item index developed and
described in experiment one. Each of the four adjective items (sorrowful, compassionate,
moved, and tender feelings toward the person) were rated on a seven-point Likert-type
scale anchored by “not at all” and “very much.” Separate compassion scales were created
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for each image, based on the four-items used to rate that image. Reliabilities for each
scale were excellent, ranging from alpha = .89 to .94.
Results
Comparison o f Disease Label Conditions
To determine whether the disease label for the person portrayed influenced
ratings, independent sample t-tests9 (with condition, AIDS label vs. leukemia label, used
as a grouping variable) were used to test for differences in compassion ratings for each
image by condition. O f the fifty images rated, only three showed significant differences
in ratings between conditions: Image 8 (sad, black, male child), (leukemia, M = 5.23,
AIDS, M = 5.82, t (96) = -2.38, £ < 05); Image 17 (sad, white, male, teen/undergrad),
(AIDS, M = 4.28, leukemia, M = 4.86, t (96) = -2.04, £ <05); and Image 39 (sad, black,
female child), (leukemia, M = 5.14, AIDS, M = 5.69, t (96) = -2.16, £ < 05). In each
instance, the same image received significantly higher compassion ratings with an AIDS
versus a leukemia label. These findings are not greater than might occur by chance,
however, and data from the two disease label conditions were combined for all further
analyses.
Image Comparisons: Compassion Ratines
Compassion ratings for matched images in the sixteen demographic categories
were compared using paired t-tests. Most o f these comparisons produced significant
differences in compassion ratings. The tests also showed that differences in compassion
ratings emerged as function o f facial display o f emotion (Le. positive or negative). A full
exploration o f the nature o f these differences is beyond the scope o f this dissertation
study.10
Ill
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The results o f the paired comparisons were used to select pairs of matched
images, in which one o f the two elicited significantly higher compassion ratings than the
other. Possible image pairs that met this criterion were then matched as closely as
possible in terms of image characteristics (e.g. black and white or color film, close-up
versus full-body shot, facial display). Finally, seven o f these pairs were selected on the
basis of their t-test coefficients, as indicated in bold in Table 1 below.
Table 1:
Paired Image Comparisons by Demographic Category and Image Characteristics
Demographic
category
White, male infant
Black, male child

Black, female child

White, male child
Black, male teen
Ethnic, female teen
White, female
teen/undergrad

Images

+/- Facial
Display

Image 31, maxcryImage 32, maxsmile
Image 21, grimacingboyImage 7, boyposImage 8 , boysadImage 40, scaredboy

-

+
-

+
-

Image 39, sadyounggirlImage 19, girlonbenchImage 15, focusImage 16, frightenedgirl
Image 48, towelboyImage 6 , boyonbench
linage 13, fenceImage 27, maleteensad
Image 12, cryingteenImage 9, carewImage 33, michelle
Image 46, teenhorrorImage 2 2 , happyteenImage 1 0 , collegecostImage 2 0 , girlteencryImage 18, girlbear

-

+
+
-

+
-

+
+
-

+
+
-

Means

Matched images

t (97)

5.94
5.71
4.46
5.03
5.53
5.83

31-32

2.36*

5.42
5.03
4.64
5.58
5.28
5.04
4.09
3.79
5.08
4.11
5.88
4.61
3.90
3.59
5.09
4.39

7-21
8-21
21-40
7-8
7-40
8-40
19-39
15-39
16-39
16-19
15-19
15-16
6-48

-4.31***
-6.82***
-2.89**
-3.04**
-5.27***
1.72
4.39***
-3.46***
- 6 . 69 * * *
-1.85

13-27

2.36*

9-12
12-33
9-33
22-46
10-46
20-46
18-46

-6.71***
-7.46***
- 11. 33 * * *
_ 4 7 4 ***
-7.35***
4.36***
-1.76
-2.59*
8.80***
3.47**
- 11. 64 * * *
-6.69***
-5.65***
4 . 35 * * *

1 0 -2 2
2 0 -2 2

White, male
teen/undergrad

Image 17, gay attackImage 28, maleunder

-

+

4.57
3.83

18-22
10-20
10-18
18-20
17-28

112

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

3.54***
7 .5 6 * * *

-8.04***

Black, female
undergrad
White, female, thirties

Black, female, thirties
White, male, earlymid thirties

Image 1 1 , collegesoftImage 41, scaredwoman
Image 25, katrinanegImage 44, susanpos
Image 26, katrinaposhnage 43, susanneg

+
-

Image 34, michellenegImage 50, zambiaImage 5, blackwomansad
Image 4, babbontransImage 30, markneg
Image 14, markposImage 38, sadmanImage 35, nathannegImage 36, nathanpos

Image 37, patnegImage 49, woman cry
Image 47, tonyneg
Image 29, marijuana
Image 3, angryacelImage 2 , acelsadImage 24, inkypos
Image 1, acelposImage 23, inkyneg
Black, male, elderly
Image 42, scowlingmanImage 45, tanzania
* significant at the £ < .05 level
** significant at the £ < .01 level
*** significant at the £ < .001 level

White, female.
middle-aged
White, male, middleaged
Black, male, middleaged

-

+
+
-

+
neutral

+
+
+

3.28
5.17
3.49
3.51
3.70
3.83
3.47
5.60
3.82
3.82
3.31
3.41
3.89
3.25
3.56
3.62
4.03
3.13
3.31
3.59
3.99
3.59
3.68
3.52
3.85
4.14

11-41

- 12. 26 * * *

25-44

-.089

25-43
26-44
43-44
26-43

-3.34***
1.95
2.64**
-1.27

3 4 -5 0

-5 .4 8 * * *

5-34

2.61**

5 -5 0

- 11. 69 * * *

4-30

4.14***

14-38
14-35
14-36
35-38
36-38
37-49

-3.83***
1.31
-1.38
-5.52***
-2.47*
-3.48***

29-47

1.62

3-24
2-24

.023
3.28***

1-23

1.35

42-45

-2.37*

As shown in Table 1, the seven image pairs include the following demographic
categories and facial displays: black male child (Image 8, sad, negative facial display;
Image 21, angry grimace, negative facial display); black female child (Image 15, smiling,
positive facial display; Image 16, frightened, negative facial display); white, female teen/
undergrad (Image 10, smiling, positive facial display; Image 20: crying, negative facial
display); white, male teen/ undergrad (Image 17, sad, negative facial display; Image 28:
smiling, positive facial display); black female undergrad (Image 11: scowling, negative
facial display; Image 41: crying, frightened, negative facial display); black female,
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thirties (Image 34: negative facial display; Image 50: frightened, hurt, negative facial
display); black female, thirties (Image 5: smiling, positive facial display; Image 50:
frightened, hurt, negative facial display). These seven were then narrowed down to two
pairs (four images), both o f which were from the college-aged female demographic
category. One pair was ethnic, the other white.11 Finally, the college-aged white female
pair was chosen for the main experiment (Image 10: positive, smiling vs. Image 20:
negative, crying). Image 20 (M = 5.09) received significantly higher compassion ratings
than Image 10 (M = 3.59), t (97) = -11.64, p<001. (Appendix D shows the final pair of
images selected). A key factor in the choice of two images from the college-aged, white
female category was the need to include images that would resonate with the sample
population of college undergraduates. Furthermore, as Table 1 shows, compassion rating
comparisons for women and children had some of highest t-coe£ficients of all the
demographic categories tested.
Individual Differences: Perceptions o f Risk. Knowledge. Perspective-Taking
As with the first pre-test, this study examined individual differences in
perceptions of personal risk o f disease contraction, knowledge o f and experience with the
diseases. It also included measures testing for individual differences in perspectivetaking. The perspective-taking scale was modified from Stiff et al. (1988, 204), using
only the twelve perspective taking and empathic concern measures for which Davis
(1983) provides evidence of construct validity and structural quality. Prior to conducting
a reliability analysis for the perspective-taking scale, four o f the twelve items were
reverse-coded (see items marked with asterisks in the complete survey presented in
Appendix A). The alpha for this 12-item scale was .80.
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Although random assignment should control for individual differences, these
variables were included as a way to examine whether individual differences could explain
a potential non-significant result. Nonetheless, these measures and scales were not used
in the analysis because significant differences in compassion ratings emerged for the
images tested.
Conclusion
The main purpose o f this pre-test was to collect and test visual stimuli for the
main dissertation study. The main experiment’s format, which crosses disease population
(Le. AIDS and leukemia) with framing condition (Le. degree of riskiness), requires a pair
o f matched images to correspond with the two disease populations being tested. Based on
the results o f this study, two images, one o f which elicited significantly higher
compassion ratings than the other, were selected.12 The pair was matched as closely as
possible both in terms of demographics and image characteristics, in order to strengthen
the claim that the images themselves elicited differences in compassionate response. To
further support the claim that the images themselves produced differences in compassion,
they were tested in two separate conditions, once labeled as AIDS and once as leukemia.
The two images chosen were from the college-aged, white female category. This
choice was primarily driven by a need to use images that would resonate with the sample
population o f college undergraduates, which pre-testing suggests is predominantly
white/Caucasian. Furthermore, compassion rating comparisons for women and children
had some o f highest t-coefficients o f all the demographic categories tested.13
In addition, the study validated the compassion scale developed in Experiment
one by showing that differences in compassion ratings emerged as a function o f facial
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display o f emotion. For example, in the two finalist pairs for the main study, one image
had a positive facial display (e.g. smiling, happy) and the other had a negative facial
display (e.g. crying, hurt). This contrast produced significant differences in compassion
ratings (Images 9 & 33: t (97) = -11.33, £<.001; Images 10 & 20: t (97) = -1 1.64, £
<001), with subjects giving higher compassion ratings to the negative facial display o f
sadness. Informal debriefing interviews with subjects bolstered this finding, with subjects
reporting that they gave higher ratings to images o f people who were crying o r sadlooking, and lower compassion ratings to images of people who were angry o r scowling.
Subjects reported mixed compassion ratings for images of people with positive displays
o f emotion, such as smiling. Some rated these images higher, expressing admiration for
the person’s bravery or positive attitude. Others rated positive facial displays lower, with
some describing the facial display as an inappropriate response to the person’s
circumstances. While a full exploration o f these differences is beyond the scope o f this
dissertation study, these findings merit further exploration. A better understanding o f the
effects of facial display on compassionate response to visual images could have important
implications for message design.
One subject did not provide this information.
A regular mouse and keyboard were used.
3 This software is available at: http://www.empirisoft.com/. The author thanks software creator Blair Jarvis
for his invaluable assistance with the program.
4 Each subject saw each of the fifty image four times, with a separate screen and rating scale for each of the
four compassion scale items. This design reflects the constraints of the MediaLab program.
5 Unfortunately this number was inflated, because the search term also included variations on the word
aids, such as ‘aid’ and ‘aiding.’ The search was limited to the first 1,000 images (sorted by relevance).
6 E.g. Magic Johnson for AIDS; Tom Landry for leukemia.
7 Based on general perceptual groupings.
8 “Infant” was used rather than “child” because the image was of a newborn, less than two months old,
while the children pictured were roughly between three and ten.
9 Two-tailed t-tests were used for all analyses in this study.
1 0 These results yield some interesting possibilities for further research such as coding facial features along
with demographic information for a more fine-grained analysis of compassionate response to images.
1

2
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Each of the final four images selected was from the AP database.
Several other image pairs could have been used to test generalizability, but availability of subjects for a
full between-subjects design did not permit this option.
1 3 Which intuition suggests may be a result of lower attributions of responsibility, an idea that could be
tested in further research.
11

12
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Main Experiment
The dissertation experiment had four goals. One was to systematically replicate
Levin and Chapman’s (1993) finding that people are more likely to assign the worst
option in each frame to AIDS patients. The second was to influence the probability of
people assigning the least desirable choice in each framing scenario to AIDS patients by
manipulating the emotional consistency with which the disease populations were
portrayed visually. Another was to produce differences in ratings o f compassion and
attributions o f responsibility as a function of emotional consistency o f visual portrayal.
The fourth was to illuminate the process by which a shift in preferences occurred by
testing two rival mediating hypotheses, compassion versus attributions of responsibility.
Method
Participants
300 University of Pennsylvania undergraduates (32% male, and 68% female)
participated in the study. Participants were recruited from several communication and
statistics courses. 64 percent described themselves as “Caucasian or white,” 23 percent as
“Asian or Asian-American,” 6 percent as “Black or African-American,” and 5 percent as
“Other.” The mean age for all respondents was nineteen (SD = 1.10).
Apparatus
The study was administered on seven Windows NT Pentium class II machines
with standard “Wintel” architecture in a computer focus lab at the Annenberg School for
Communication.1 Using MediaLab (version 51) software,2 an electronic survey was
developed for the study.
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Procedure
The study employed a between-subjects, 2 (framing: positive, negative) x 3
(survey version: control, consistent, inconsistent) factorial design. It was administered in
the computer lab by individual appointment (although with seven machines available,
several students were able to sign up for the same time slot). The maximum number of
students taking the survey together at any time was seven, the minimum was one.
Aside from being administered via computer rather than paper-and-pencil, the
control version replicated Levin & Chapman (1993, experiment two) and served as the
basic design for the survey. It also served as a baseline from which to measure the
relative influence of emotion-laden images on decision making. The consistent condition
portrayed leukemia patients using images that elicited higher compassion ratings, while
images that elicited lower compassion ratings were used to portray AIDS patients.3 These
images are consistent with people’s predisposition to feel more compassionately toward
people with leukemia and less compassionately toward people with AIDS (as shown in
the first experiment). The inconsistent condition portrayed leukemia patients using
images that were found to elicit a less compassionate response, and AIDS patients with
images that elicited a more compassionate response. These images are inconsistent with
people’s pre-existing feelings toward AIDS and leukemia patients (as shown in the first
experiment), and should undermine the pattern found by Levin and Chapman (1993).
All survey versions also had two framing conditions: positive, where the outcome
was presented in terms of lives saved; and negative, where the outcome was presented in
terms of lives lost (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). By varying the emotional consistency
o f the visual portrayal of the disease populations, the three conditions (control,
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inconsistent, and consistent) tested whether compassion interacts with framing to
influence preferences.
Using MediaLab, several components of the survey were randomized. For
example, to control for order effects each o f the three conditions had four versions o f the
Program A- Program B choice, counterbalancing both the presentation of A and B and
the order o f disease presentation (as did Levin & Chapman, 1993). In addition, two
versions o f image pairs were created to counterbalance the appearance of each image on
the screen in conjunction with each disease description. Using a randomization feature on
MediaLab, one o f the four versions was randomly presented to subjects within each
survey. MediaLab tracked the questionnaire version each subject received by assigning a
value to it. A skip value then automatically took subjects to a screen where they were
asked to choose between Programs A and B. MediaLab also allowed for randomization of
the 4-item compassion scale used to rate each image, as well as the presentation o f
questions measuring attributions of responsibility, knowledge, perception o f risk, and
personal experience.
Instrument
The electronic survey had the following components: a decision problem (adapted
from Levin and Chapman, 1993), separate compassion ratings of people with each
disease, a perspective taking scale (modified from Stiff et. al, 1988), separate attribution
of responsibility ratings for each disease, separate ratings of knowledge and perceptions
of personal risk for each disease (modified from Block & Keller, 1995, 1997), and
demographics questions. For a complete version o f the electronic survey, please refer to
Appendix A.
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All survey versions used the decision problem from Levin and Chapman (1993,
experiment 2). This version served as the control and will now be described in detail.
Subjects were first told:
Assume that a research hospital has 60 leukemia patients and 60 AIDS patients. Two new
programs, Program A and Program B, have been developed to treat these diseases. Each of these
programs will affect patients with both of these blood-related diseases. Assume that exact
scientific estimates of the effects of the two programs on the patient groups are as described on the
next screen. Assume also that the effect of treatment on any one patient will be all-or-none: Either
they will die, or they will be returned to the quality o f life they experienced before contracting the
disease.

The next screen described the two options, Program A and Program B. These options
cross degree o f riskiness (Le. certain vs. probabilistic outcome) with the disease
population. In the positive framing condition, the choice was presented as:

If Program A
is adopted
If Program B
is adopted

Leukemia patients
AIDS patients
There is a 1/3 probability that all 60
20 AIDS patients will be saved,
of the leukemia patients will be saved
and a 2/3 probability that 0 will be saved.
20 leukemia patients will be saved.

There is a 1/3 probability that all
60 of the AIDS patients will be
saved and a 2/3 probability that 0
will be saved.

In the negative framing condition, “no leukemia [ADDS] patients will die” substituted for
“all 60 of the leukemia [AIDS] patients will be saved,” “all 60 will die” for “0 will be
saved,” and “40 leukemia [ADDS] patients will die” for “20 leukemia [ADDS] patients
will be saved.” Subjects were then asked to choose between Programs A and B:
Please indicate which program you would choose by clicking on the box next to program A
(choicel) or program B (choice2).

The consistent and inconsistent conditions added images (see Appendix D) to the screen
describing the two options, Program A and Program B:
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Consistent [Inconsistent] Image

Consistent [Inconsistent] Image

If Program A
is adopted

Leukemia patients
AIDS patients
There is a 1/3 probability that all 60
20 AIDS patients will be saved.
of the leukemia patients will be saved
and a 2/3 probability that 0 will be saved.

If Program B
is adopted

20 leukemia patients will be saved.

There is a 1/3 probability that all
60 o f the AIDS patients will be
saved and a 2/3 probability that 0
will be saved.

Aside from this screen, the format for the inconsistent and consistent conditions was
identical to the control.
Measures
The main outcome was a choice between two options, either Program A or
Program B. Respondents could only choose one program. Either choice would affect both
disease populations because the options crossed the degree of riskiness of the outcome
with the disease population. In other words, the options force people to decide which
disease population would receive the risky (probabilistic) or less risky (certain) outcome.
The desirability (Le. what the majority tended to choose) of these outcomes depended on
the context of the frame. In the positive frame, the best outcome is the certain option
(risk-averse), while in the negative frame the best outcome is the probabilistic option
(risk-seeking).
Compassionate response was a 4-item (“sorrowful,” “compassionate”, “moved,”
and “tender”) index that had been developed and validated in Experiments one and two.
Knowledge was measured via two separate indices (one for each disease) created from
three questions. The reliabilities for each were acceptable, for AIDS: alpha = .73, for
leukemia: alpha = .81. Perspective-taking was an index created from 12 items, four o f
which were reverse-coded. The reliability for this scale was good (alpha = .80).
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Four measures (attributions o f responsibility, similarity to self, seriousness of
suffering, and perceptions o f risk) were measured by ratings on a 7-point Likert-type
scale (anchored by 0 = “not at all” and 7 = “very”)- For responsibility, the question was:
‘T o what extent do you feel people with leukemia [AIDS] are responsible for their
condition?’ For perceptions of risk, it was: T consider myself to be at risk to get AIDS
[leukemia].” For similarity to self, respondents were asked: “How similar to you do you
find people with leukemia [AIDS]?’ For seriousness o f suffering, the question was:
“How serious do you consider the suffering o f people with leukemia [A ID S]?’
Notations for Planned Comparisons
Planned comparisons based on research hypotheses allowed for tests of a priori
predictions between frames (negative and positive frame) and across emotional
consistency o f visual portrayal (control, inconsistent, consistent) conditions. The notation
for these comparisons is summarized in Table 1:
Table 1:
Notation for 2 x 3 factorial design, where P = the proportion of subjects choosing AIDS-riskv/ Leukemiariskless option

Framing Condition
Positive Frame
Negative Frame

Emotional consistency of visual portrayal
Control
Inconsistent
Consistent
Pu
P 12
P 13
P 21

P 22

P23

Planned comparisons derived from the research hypotheses yielded the following
predictions for the proportion o f subjects choosing the AEDS-risky/Leukemia riskless
option (see Table 2):
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T a b le 2:
P red iction s fo r S u b jects C h o ice o f A ID S -risk y / L eu k em ia -risk less O ption b y C ond ition (F ram e) and
V ersio n (C on trol. In c o n siste n t C onsistent!

B etw een fra m es
B etw een su rv e y version ,
w ith in fram es
P o sitiv e Fram e:
N eg a tiv e F ram e:

Control

In con sisten t

C o n sisten t

P ll> P 2 I

P l2< P 22

C ontrol vs. In co n sisten t

C on trol vs. C onsistent

P l3>P 23
In co n sisten t v s.
C o n sisten t

P lI> P |2

P tl< P l3
P 21 > P 23

Pl2 < P[3
P 22 > P 23

P21<P22

Results
Scale Construction and Reliability Analyses
Several scales were constructed from the data set (all of which had been
developed and described in earlier pretests), including compassion, perspective-taking
(alpha = .80), and knowledge scales. Separate compassion scales were created for AIDS
(alpha = .87) and leukemia patients (alpha = .91). Similarly, separate knowledge scales
were created for AIDS (alpha =.73)4 and leukemia (alpha = .81).
Compassion and Responsibility Ratings: Manipulation Check
The three emotional consistency o f visual portrayal conditions sought to produce
differences in subjects’ compassion ratings toward the two disease populations, and
perceptions of responsibility for their condition. Tests were conducted to check the
effectiveness o f the manipulations.
Compassion Scale Ratings
Because each disease population had its own predicted order for compassion
ratings, ANOVA was used in two separate tests to examine whether the experimental
manipulation produced differences in compassion ratings for AIDS and leukemia patients
between survey version (emotional consistency o f visual portrayal),5 an intended effect,
or by frame, an unintended effect. Compassion scales were created from ratings of four
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randomized items (sorrowful, compassionate, moved, tender feelings toward the person)
on a 7-point scale (where 1 = “not at all,” 7 = “very much”) in response to the question:
“Please click on the number that best describes how much you feel the following emotion
toward people with AIDS [leukemia].
For people with AIDS, the predicted order for compassion ratings by version was:
Inconsistent > Control > Inconsistent In addition to an insignificant overall model (F =
.589, p = .71), no significant differences were detected for AIDS compassion ratings by
frame (F = .854, £ = .36) or emotional consistency o f visual portrayal (F = .383, g. = .68),
or the interaction between frame and emotional consistency (F = .663, j> = .52). The same
result was found for leukemia compassion ratings, where the predicted order was:
Consistent > Control > Consistent. No differences were found by frame (F = .063, j> =
.80) or emotional consistency of visual portrayal (F = 1.79, £ = . 17), or the interaction of
frame and emotional consistency (F = .308, j> = .74). The overall model was also
insignificant (F = .85, j> = 52). In other words, the compassion manipulation, designed to
elicit different levels o f compassion for AIDS and leukemia patients, was not successful.
An analysis o f the means for AIDS and leukemia compassion ratings by emotional
consistency o f visual portrayal (shown in Table 3) provides further detail:
Table 3
Means of AIDS and Leukemia Compassion Ratings by Emotional Consistency of Visual Portrayal
Disease
Population
AIDS
Leukemia

Predicted Order
In co n sisten t Control>
Consistent
C o n sisten t Control>
Inconsistent

Consistent

Control

Inconsistent

5.33, SD = 1.18

5.26. S D = 1.14

5.40. SD = 1.20

6.02, SD = 1.07

5.76, SD = 1.24

5.75, SD = 1.12
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Table 3 shows that with one exception (ADDS, control), ratings for AIDS followed the
expected pattern. All leukemia responsibility ratings followed the predicted order
(Consistent, 6.02 > Control, 5.76 > Inconsistent, 5.75), even though the differences across
conditions were not significant. When an ANOVA was conducted using contrasts to
compare the leukemia control and inconsistent to the consistent conditions, however,
significant differences in the expected direction were found: Compared to the control and
inconsistent conditions, people in the emotionally consistent condition gave higher
compassion ratings to leukemia patients as predicted (t (297) = 1.90, p<.05, one-tailed
test). A contrast comparing AIDS compassion ratings for control plus consistent versus
inconsistent was not significant.
Leukemia and AIDS compassion ratings across all conditions were also compared
using paired samples t-test. Overall, respondents gave significantly higher compassion
ratings to leukemia patients (M = 5.84 versus M = 5.33, t (299) = 8.76, p < .001),
demonstrating once again that people’s emotional evaluations o f these two disease
populations differ (the same pattern was also found in the first experiment). Finally, as
reported in Table 4, a frequency distribution revealed significant differences in the skew
o f the overall distribution o f AIDS and leukemia compassion ratings (KolomogrovSmimoff Z = 2.12, p<.001).
Table 4
Frequency Distribution of AIDS and f.eukemia Compassion Ratines
Rating Categories
Low (1-2)
Medium (2.25- 5)
High (5.25- 7)

AIDS
1%
40
59

Leukemia
1 %
23
76
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Only 1 percent o f respondents gave low compassion ratings to either AIDS or
leukemia patients. More subjects (40 percent) gave medium compassion ratings to ADDS
patients than people with leukemia (23 percent). The majority of subjects gave high
compassion ratings to both leukemia and AIDS patients, although the percentage was
higher for leukemia (76% versus 59 percent). For leukemia patients in particular, the
skew toward high compassion ratings may have made it difficult to move people’s
emotional evaluations (Le., to make them feel less compassionately toward people with
leukemia).
Overall, these analyses provided only limited support for Hypothesis 2: The
pattern of compassionate response as a function of the visual portrayal o f AIDS and
leukemia patients was as predicted. Furthermore, for leukemia patients, subjects in the
emotionally consistent condition gave significantly higher compassion ratings than those
in the control and inconsistent versions. Although not reliable, these patterns are
encouraging, and point to a need for further exploration. Furthermore, the manipulation
check in this study has cause for liberal interpretation because the separate, direct
manipulations conducted in the first and second study provided strong evidence that
differences in emotional evaluations (Le., compassion ratings) exist both as a function of
characteristics o f the disease population, and visual portrayal In the first study, people
gave significantly higher compassion ratings to leukemia than AIDS patients after
reading factual descriptions of the diseases. This result suggests that differences exist in
people’s pre-existing emotional evaluations o f the two disease populations. In the second
experiment, differences in facial display o f emotion produced significant differences in
compassion ratings, resulting in images that could be defined as compassionate and
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uncompassionate portrayals. The success of these two separate, direct manipulations
provided no reason to think that the two would not work in combination in this study to
produce differences in compassion ratings. Nonetheless, two possible reasons for the null
result are: 1) The compassion manipulation in this study was not a pure manipulation.
The results could have been confounded by the intervening decision problem and
question that diluted its effect (see Appendix A3); and 2) The decision task used in the
image selection process differed from the task in the main study. In the second
experiment, images received individual, not comparative, compassion ratings. Once
compassion ratings for individual images were established, another round of testing that
directly compared images to each other in the context o f the main study’s decision
problem (Le., requiring subjects to make comparative evaluations and choices between
the two disease populations) would have provided evidence that the images produce
differential compassion ratings in a decision context that requires comparative
evaluations.
Responsibility Ratings
Because each disease population had its own predicted order for responsibility
ratings, ANOVA was used in two separate tests to examine whether the experimental
manipulation produced differences in ratings o f responsibility for AIDS and leukemia
patients among the emotional consistency (intended effect) and framing (unintended
effect) conditions. Responsibility ratings were on a 7-point scale (where 1 = “not at all,”
7 = “very much”) for the question, ‘T o what extent do you feel people with leukemia
[AIDS] are responsible for their condition?’
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For AIDS patients, the predicted order for responsibility ratings was: Consistent >
Control > Inconsistent. As Table 5 below shows, an interaction between frame and
emotional consistency o f visual portrayal approached significance (F = 2.46, £ = .087).6
Table 5
Tests o f Between-Subjects Effects. Dependent Variable: AIDS Responsibility Ratines
Type HI Sum of
F
Source________ Squares________ d f________ Mean Square_______________ Sig.
Corrected Model
12.667a
5
2.533
1.876
.098
Intercept
1
4236.217
5720.333
5720.333
.0 0 0
Framing
1
2.613
2.613
1.935
.165
Emotional
Consistency
2
1.261
3.407
1.703
.285
FRAM E*
2.461
CONSISTENCY
2
3.323
.087
6.647
Error
294
1.350
397.000
Total
300
6130.000
Corrected Total
299
409.667
* R Squared = .031 (Adjusted R Squared = .014)

An analysis of mean responsibility ratings by frame across emotional consistency
conditions, confirm the possibility o f trend toward a frame by emotional consistency
interaction such that responsibility ratings were higher in the positive frame and lower in
the negative frame for the consistent and control conditions and vice versa in the
inconsistent condition (see Table 6).
Table 6
Mean AIDS Responsibility Ratings by Emotional Consistency o f Visual Portrayal and Frame

Emotional consistency o f visual portrayal
Consistent
Control
Inconsistent

Frame
Mean, SD'- Positive
Mean, SD: Negative
4.78, 1.02
4.20, 1.32
4.44, 1.25
4.32, 1.06
4.16, 1.09
4.30, 1.20

By contrast, an ANOVA for ratings of responsibility for leukemia patients by frame (F =
.239, p. = .63) and emotional consistency (F = 1.27, p = .28) did not approach significance
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(overall model: F = 1.27, £ = .28), nor did the interaction (F = 1.79, £ = . 17).7 The
predicted order o f responsibility ratings for leukemia patients was: Inconsistent > Control
> Consistent.
Table 7 presents the means for AIDS and leukemia responsibility ratings by
emotional consistency of visual portrayal.
Table 7
Means of AIDS and Leukemia Responsibility Ratings by Emotional Consistency of Visual Portrayal
Disease
Population
AIDS
Leukemia

Predicted Order
Consistent> Control>
Inconsistent
InconsistenO Control>
Consistent

Consistent

Control

Inconsistent

4.49, SD = 1.21

4.38. S D = 1.15

4.23, SD = 1.14

1.51, SD = .847

1.38. SD = .678

1.56, SD = .936

Although the differences were not significant, the AIDS responsibility ratings did
follow the expected pattern: Consistent (4.49) > Control (4.38) > Inconsistent (4.23).
Looking at leukemia, with one exception (leukemia, consistent), the responsibility ratings
were in the predicted direction. When an ANOVA was conducted using contrasts to
compare the AIDS responsibility ratings in the control and consistent to the inconsistent
conditions, the expected differences approached significance, with people in the
emotionally inconsistent condition giving comparatively lower responsibility ratings to
AIDS patients (t (297) = -1.43, £=.08, one-tailed test).8
A paired samples t-test comparing leukemia and AIDS responsibility ratings
across all respondents, showed that people gave significantly higher responsibility ratings
to AIDS patients overall (4.37 versus 1.48, t = 37.84, £ < .001). Once again, these results
are consistent with previous findings about these diseases: AIDS patients are perceived as
more personally responsible for their condition than leukemia patients. Finally, Table 8
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reports significant differences (Kolomogrov-Smirnoff Z = 9.27, £<.001) in the
distribution o f AIDS and leukemia responsibility ratings (where 1= not at all, and 7 =
very much).
Table 8
Frequency Distribution of AIDS and Leukemia Responsibility Ratines
Rating Categories
Low (1-3)
Medium (4- 5)
High (6 -7 )

AIDS
2 1 %
65
14

Leukemia
96%
3.3
.3

The leukemia distribution shows an extremely strong left skew, with the majority
of respondents (96%) gave a low responsibility rating to leukemia patients. The AIDS
distribution shows a strong (although less so for leukemia) right distribution, with 79
percent rating the responsibility of AIDS patients as medium to high.
Overall, these analyses do not indicate support for Hypothesis 3. Although the
predicted patterns of attributions of responsibility emerged as a function of visual
portrayal, they were not significant. Nonetheless, it was encouraging to find some
suggestions that experimental condition predicts AIDS responsibility judgments. For
instance, there seemed to be a trend toward a frame by emotional consistency interaction
such that responsibility ratings were higher in the positive frame and lower in the
negative frame for the consistent and control conditions and vice versa in the inconsistent
condition. This trend was strengthened slightly by controlling for covariates. In addition,
there was some evidence that AIDS responsibility ratings were lower in the emotionally
inconsistent compared to the consistent and control conditions.
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Replication: Comparison o f Original and Current Studies
The control condition replicated Levin and Chapman (1993, experiment two). As
shown in Table 9, the current study found the same pattern of assigning the worst (Le.
least popular) option in each frame (risk-seeking in the positive, and risk averse in the
negative) to AIDS patients. The difference between the two framing conditions, however,
«

was not significant (t (98) = 1.01, £ =.16, one-tailed test). Both the effect size found by
Levin and Chapman (14%), and the current study (10%) would be classified as small
(Cohen, 1977). These results suggest that while the magnitude and direction o f the
current study are in line with Levin and Chapman’s, the sample size o f the present study
may be insufficient to detect the observed effect9
Table 9
Com parison o f Proportion o f Subjects C hoosing ATDS-Riskv by Fram e

Frame
Positive Frame
Negative Frame

Bennett (2000). N=50*
23
(46%)
18
(36%)

Levin & Chapman (L993), N=187*
108
(59%)
84
(45%)

* In each framing condition.

To test for differences between framing conditions (positive, negative) within
each of the three survey versions, cross-tabulations were used to compare the choice of
AIDS-risky/ Leukemia-riskless (AIDRIS) by framing condition for each questionnaire
version, as shown in Table 10.
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Table 10
Crosstabulation Comparing Choice of AlDS-riskv by Frame and Emotional Consistency of Visual
Portrayal

Control
P ll> p 2 1
Inconsistent
Pl2 < P 2 2
Consistent
Pl3 > p23

Total

Total

Total

Positive
23
(46.0%)
50
19
(38.0%)
50
26
(52.0%)
50

Negative
18
(36.0%)
50
26
(52.0%)
50
2 0

(40.0%)
50

41
41.0%
1 0 0

45
45.0%
1 0 0

46
46.0%
1 0 0

Although the expected pattern of results was found, t-tests showed that none o f the
differences in the proportion of subjects choosing AIDS-risky/ Leukemia-riskless within
each framing condition (positive, negative) was conventionally significant (see Table 11).
Nonetheless, the inconsistent visual portrayal in particular did seem to reverse the trend
o f assigning the least desirable option to people with AIDS in each frame (t (98) = -1.41,
£ = .08).

Table 11
Proportion of Subjects Choosing AIDS-risky by Framing Condition (positive, negative)

Emotional consistency
Control: P u > P 2 i
Inconsistent: Pi2 <P 2 2
Consistent: Pi3 > P2 3
* one-tailed test

Positive
46%
38
52

Negative
36%
52
40

t
1 .0 1 , £ = .1 6 *
-1.41, £ = .08*
1 .2 0 , jj = . 1 2 *

To compare proportion o f subjects in the inconsistent condition choosing the
AIDS-risky option by frame to the control and consistent conditions, further analyses
using one-tailed t-tests were conducted. A comparison o f the control and inconsistent
versions showed that the differences approached significance (t (98) = -1.62, p = .055),
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with subjects in the inconsistent condition being less likely to assign the riskier choice to
people with AIDS in each framing condition. Differences in the proportion of subjects
choosing the AIDS-risky option by frame in the consistent and inconsistent versions was
also in the hypothesized direction but not significant (t (98) = -1.2, p = . 12). These results
suggest that the emotional consistency of visual portrayal manipulation may have
influenced the proportion o f subjects choosing the AIDS-risky option by frame in the
inconsistent condition compared to the consistent and control conditions. Specifically,
seeing a compassionate visual image of an AIDS victim tended to reduce the likelihood
of assigning an AIDS-risky choice in the positive framing, and increased the likelihood of
assigning an AIDS-risky choice in the negative framing condition.
Finally, logistic regression (Menard, 1995) was used to explore the possible
influence o f a frame by emotional consistency o f visual portrayal interaction on the
probability choosing the AIDS-risky option for the inconsistent versus consistent
conditions (see Table 12).
Table 12
Frame bv Emotional Consistency of Visual Portrayal Interaction on AIDS-risky Choice
Inconsistent vs. Consistent
Frame
Emotional Consistency
Frame * EC

Odds Ratio
.566
.615
2.87

95% C.I.
.26- 1.25
.28- 1.36
.93-8.83

B
.161
.230
.066

The results show that a frame by emotional consistency interaction approaches
significance (p = .066). Controlling for covariates (specifically respondent’s reported
knowledge about AIDS) slightly improved the model (to p = .055 from p = .066).
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Outcome Measure Recoding and Post Hoc Analyses
To strengthen the case that the emotional consistency o f visual portrayal
manipulation produced differences in people’s preferences, the outcome measure was
recoded (as a 0,1 variable) to increase the sample size and power for analyses. By
incorporating the framing condition (positive, negative) into the choice of AIDSrisky/leukemia riskless, the new variable (AIDSBAD) reflects respondent’s proclivity to
assign the least popular outcome in each framing condition to the AIDS patients (Le. risk
seeking in the positive frame, and risk averse in the negative frame). For example,
AIDSBAD = 1 both when subjects choose aids-risky in the positive frame, and when they
choose aids-riskless in the negative frame; and AIDSBAD = 0 both when subjects choose
aids-riskless in the positive frame, and aids-risky in the negative frame. The recoding also
reflects this study’s premise that people’s previous evaluations o f the disease population
get integrated with their reaction to the frame to produce an outcome. By incorporating
the frame into the judgment, the paper can more directly test the notion that framing (i.e.
the presentation of information) is consequential for judgments, and that frame and
emotional consistency of visual portrayal may interact to influence the outcome.
To test for differences between choice o f AIDSBAD by emotional consistency of
visual portrayal, a cross-tabulation was conducted (see Table 13 below). The results
suggest that, as predicted, being in the inconsistent condition lowers the probability of
choosing AIDSBAD. The differences approached significance at £=.062, x2 (2, N = 300).
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Table 13
Proportion of Respondents Choosing AIDSBAD by Emotional Consistency o f Visual Portrayal

AIDSBAD outcome
Not Choosing
Choosing
Total

Emotional Consistency o f Visual Portrayal
Control
Inconsistent
Consistent
45%
57%
44%
55%
43%
56%
1 0 0 %
1 0 0 %
1 0 0 %

Similar results (x2 (2, N = 300) = 3.37 £=.066) were found using an adjusted trend
analysis (Mantel, 1963 in Breslow & Day, 1980), which directly tested the hypothesis
that the proportion o f subjects choosing AIDSBAD in each condition followed a specific,
predicted order: Consistent (56) > Control (55) > Inconsistent (43).
Comparisons o f Inconsistent Emotional Portrayal to Consistent and Control
To explore differences between the conditions further, the emotionally
inconsistent condition was compared to the consistent and control conditions separately.
The inconsistent condition was chosen at the baseline because the inconsistency of
portraying AIDS patients compassionately seems to have important consequences for
judgments. In comparison to the control and consistent conditions, subjects in this
inconsistent seem less likely to assign the worst option in each frame to AIDS patients,
thereby undermining the pattern o f preferences demonstrated by Levin and Chapman
(1993).
First, a comparison o f the control and inconsistent visual portrayal versions (as
shown in Table 14) reveals significant differences in the proportion o f subjects choosing
AIDSBAD, with fewer subjects in the inconsistent version selecting this option (t (198) =
1.7, £<.05, one-tailed test).
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Table 14
Comparison o f Subjects Choosing ATDSRAD in Inconsistent and Control Conditions
AIDSBAD outcome
Not choosing
Choosing
Total

Consistent
45%
55%
1 0 0 %

Inconsistent
57%
43%
1 0 0 %

Similarly, as Table 15 shows, significant differences were found in the proportion
of subjects choosing AIDSBAD in a comparison of the emotionally inconsistent and
consistent visual portrayals, with fewer choosing AIDSBAD in the inconsistent condition
(t (198) = 1.85, p<.05).
Table 15
Comparison o f Subjects Choosing ATDSB A D in Inconsistent and Consistent Conditions
AIDSBAD outcome
Not choosing
Choosing
Total

Inconsistent
57%
43%
1 0 0 %

Consistent
44%
56%
1 0 0 %

A comparison of the control and consistent versions did not produce significant
differences in the proportion of subjects choosing AIDSBAD (t (198) = -.142, p=.44).
Thus partial support was found for Hypothesis 1, specifically H I A: compassionate
portrayals of the undervalued disease population (compared to uncompassionate
portrayals of the valued disease population) undermined the tendency to assign the least
desirable option to the undervalued group. As predicted, the emotionally inconsistent
visual portrayal produced significant deviations from the emotionally consistent and
control conditions.10 Despite these m ixed results, it is heartening that compassionate
visual portrayals of people with AIDS seem to reverse the option chosen by the majority.
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Individual Differences
The last portion of the survey included measures of individual differences. These
measures were also included in both pre-tests, and a detailed explanation for their
inclusion can be found in previous methods sections. Although subjects were randomly
assigned to condition, obviating the need to test for individual differences, these measures
provided data for exploration and more focused analyses. For instance, as potential
covariates, they may influence variation within cell.
Perceptions of Risk
Because some prior evidence suggests that involvement and susceptibility may
change ratings of texts (Keller & Block, 1997), subjects rated their perceptions of
personal risk for each of the diseases on 7-point scales (1 = not at all to 7= very much at
risk). Personal risk ratings were then recoded into three levels: low (1-3), moderate (4-5),
and high (6-7). Overall, subjects felt that their personal risk for contracting each disease
was low (63% for AIDS, and 62% for leukemia). As Table 16 shows, the distribution of
personal risk ratings across subjects for each disease was quite similar.11

Table 16
Distribution Across Subjects of Personal Risk Ratines for AIDS and Leukemia
Personal Risk Rating Categories
Low
Moderate
High

AIDS
190 (63%)
96 (32%)
14 (5%)

Leukemia
187 (62%)
105 (35%)
8(3%)

A paired t-test confirmed that people viewed their personal risk for contracting AIDS (M
= 3.02, SD=1.53) and leukemia (M = 2.99, SD=1.28) as roughly equal (t (299)= .272,
p=.786).
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Prior Experience
Several questions examined subjects’ prior experience with AIDS and leukemia
(see Table 17 below for the full results). The majority (over 50%) of respondents reported
no direct personal experience with either o f the disease populations, although more
respondents reported having “never known anyone with AIDS,” than having “never
known anyone with leukemia” (69% versus 53% respectively, t (299) = 4.21, pc.001).
Table 17
Respondents’ Reported Prior Experience with AIDS and Leukemia
Prior Experience with AIDS____________________

Prior Experience with Leukemia

Never known anyone with
AIDS
Family member has AIDS

Never known anyone with
69%
leukemia
53%
Family member has
2
leukemia
8
Partner has AIDS
0
Partner has leukemia
0
14
Friend has AIDS
Friend has leukemia
25
I have AIDS
0
I have leukemia
0
Other has AIDS
18
Other has leukemia
16
* Percentages do not sum to 100% both because subjects could select as many categories as apply.

O f those reporting direct experience with a person with leukemia, more (25%) cited the
more intimate category of “friend;” compared to 14% for AIDS (t (299) = -3.7, j><.001).
Similarly, significantly more respondents reported having a family member with
leukemia than AIDS ( 8% versus 2% respectively, t (299) = -2.96, p<.01).
Knowledge
Following Block and Keller (1995), respondents rated three knowledge questions
for each disease on seven-point scales (from l=Disagree to 7=Agree): “I know a lot about
AIDS Peukemia],” “I know more than most about AIDS Peukemia],” “I am very familiar
with ways to prevent AIDS Peukemia].” These questions were used to create a scale, as
described in the scale construction section.

139

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

A series o f paired sample t-tests showed respondents consistently reporting
significantly higher knowledge levels for AIDS than leukemia, for each o f the three
knowledge questions as reported in Table 18.
Table 18
AIDS and Leukemia Knowledge Ratings. Paired Samples t-test

P air 1
Pair 2
Pair 3

Knowledge Statement
Know a lot about AIDS [Leukemia]
Know more than most about AIDS [Leukemia]
Very familiar with ways to prevent AIDS [Leukemia]

AIDS Means
4.96
4.42
6.22

Leukemia Means
2.73
2.53
1.85

t
21.51*
17.26*
46.96*

♦Significant at j><.001

The same pattern o f significantly higher knowledge ratings for AIDS was found in a
comparison o f the overall knowledge scale (t (299) =33.48, £><.001) for AIDS (M = 5.20,
SD=1.11), and leukemia (M = 2.37, SD=1.22).
Table 19 shows significant differences (Kolmogorov-Smimov Z = 9.23, £><.001)
in the distribution o f AIDS and leukemia knowledge ratings (where 1= not at all, 7 = very
much).

Table 19
Frequency Distribution o f AIDS and Leukemia Knowledge Ratines
Rating Categories
Low (1- 3.67)
Medium (4- 5.67)
High ( 6 - 7)

AIDS
13%
59
28

Leukemia
8 8 %
1 0
2

The m ajority o f respondents (88%) gave a low knowledge rating to leukemia, while 28%
gave a high and 59 percent gave a medium to high knowledge rating to AIDS.
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Correlation Analyses
To further explore the potential relationships among the variables, preliminary
correlation analyses were conducted both between the outcome variable (AIDSBAD) and
the independent variables, and among the independent variables.
Potential Covariates
A series of correlation analyses were conducted to determine whether any of the
potential covariates - gender, perceptions of personal risk for disease contraction,
knowledge ratings for each disease, and a perspective-taking scale - were correlated with
the outcome measure (AIDSBAD). Correlated items could then be included in a logistic
regression model to control variance within cell. With regard to potential gender
differences, Table 20 shows that although men are more likely to choose AIDSBAD than
women, this difference is not significant (x2 (1, N = 300) = =2.77, £=.096). Even though
the results suggest that gender is not a strong covariate, it will be examined further in a
logistic regression analysis.

Table 20
Relationship Between Gender and Choice o f ATDSRAD
Respondent Gender
AIDSBAD

.0 0

1 .0 0

Total

male

female

40
41.7%
56
58.3%
96
1 0 0 .0 %

106
52.0%
98
48.0%
204
1 0 0 .0 %

Total
146
48.7%
154
51.3%
300
1 0 0 .0 %

As reported in Table 21, several covariates were significantly positively
correlated with each other:
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Table 21
Correlation Analyses for Predictor Variables and Outcome Measure
N=300
SCALPERS
AIDSBAD
AIDRISK
LEURISK
SCALKN1
SCALKN2
AIDSBAD
-.008
1.00
.089
.141*
.013
-.023
SCALPERS
1.00
.025
.057
.129*
.066
AIDRISK
1.00
.279**
-.006
.015
LEURISK
1.00
.006
-.015
SCALKN1
1.00
.216**
SCALKN2
—
—
—
1.00
Note: SCALPERS = perspective taking scale; LEURISK/AIDRISK = perceptions o f personal risk ratings;
SCALKN1 = AIDS knowledge scale; SCALKN2 = leukemia knowledge scale.
* Correlation is significant at £><.05 (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at £><.01 (2-tailed).
—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

-

—

—

O f particular interest for the purposes of this study is the positive correlation between
AIDS knowledge rating and the outcome measure, AIDSBAD (.141, £<.05). The AIDS
knowledge rating will be included as a potential covariate in a logistic analysis.
Mediators
Predicted mediators are personal responsibility ratings for people with AIDS or
leukemia, and compassion ratings for people with AIDS or leukemia. Table 22 shows the
results of a correlation analysis for the mediator variables and the choice of AIDSBAD:
Table 22
Correlation Analyses for Potential Mediator Variables and AIDSBAD
N= 300
AIDSBAD COMPAID
AIDSRES
COMPLEU
LEURES
AIDSBAD
.046
1.000
- .0 0 1
-.088
-.165**
COMPAID
1.000
-.329**
.620**
-.138*
COMPLEU
-.084
1.000
-.136*
AIDSRES
1.000
.162**
LEURES
1.000
Note: COMPAID = AIDS compassion scale; COMPLEU —leukemia compassion scale; AIDSRES = AIDS
responsibility ratings; LEURES = leukemia responsibility ratings.
* Correlation is significant at £ < .05 (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at £ < .01 (2-tailed).
—
—

—

—

—

—

-

-

Although several mediators are significantly correlated with each other,12only
leukemia responsibility ratings (LEURES) is significantly, negatively correlated with
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AIDSBAD (-.165, j><-001). This finding makes theoretical sense because the decision
problem crosses disease population with degree of riskiness. Therefore, a choice based on
an evaluation of one group necessarily affects the other: When leukemia patients are
perceived as less responsible, the chance of assigning AIDSBAD becomes greater, and
vice versa (i.e., the choice of AIDSBAD is equivalent to the choice of
LEUKEMIAGOOD). Furthermore, because separate predictions were made regarding the
influence o f AIDS and leukemia responsibility judgments, it is possible that the relative
influence o f these ratings may differ. For example judgments o f personal responsibility
for leukemia patients may exert a direct influence on decision-making, while AIDS
responsibility ratings may interact with frame and emotional consistency to influence
preferences. Thus, the influence of leukemia and AIDS responsibility ratings on
preferences will be examined separately.
Logistic Regression
To predict the probability that a respondent will choose AIDSBAD, a series of
logistic regression analyses were conducted. First, was a basic model, which includes the
outcome measure and emotional consistency of visual portrayal. In order to make direct
comparisons between the emotional consistency conditions, the conditions were recoded
as dummy variables control (0), inconsistent (-1) and consistent (1). Inconsistent was
chosen as the baseline because significant differences emerged in the probability of
choosing AIDSBAD in the inconsistent versus consistent, and the control versus
inconsistent comparisons, hi both cases, people in the emotionally inconsistent condition
were significantly less likely to choose AIDSBAD. Table 23 shows the results of this
logit model:
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Table 23
Probability o f Choosing AIDSBAD Bv Emotional Consistency o f Visual Portrayal
Comparisons
Inconsistent vs. Consistent
Inconsistent vs. Control
* one-tailed test.

Odds Ratio
1.69
1.62

90% C.I.
1.06-2.70
1.01- 2.59

E*

<.05
<-05

Confirming earlier results, two o f comparisons produced significant differences in
the proportion of subjects choosing AIDSBAD: the inconsistent and consistent versions,
and the proportion choosing AIDSBAD in the control and inconsistent conditions. In
both cases, as predicted, a smaller proportion o f respondents in the inconsistent version
chose AIDSBAD. Additional analyses considered potential covariates (e.g. AIDS and
leukemia knowledge ratings) that might reduce within-cell variance, but none produced
an appreciable change in the probability of choosing AIDSBAD by emotional
consistency of visual portrayals.1
Mediator Tests
To test the rival mediator hypotheses (compassion versus attributions of responsibility),
logistic regression models were used.
Compassion Mediator Hypothesis
First, the hypothesis that compassion mediates the choice of AIDSBAD (i.e. that
emotional consistency of visual portrayal produces differences in compassion ratings that
in turn influence the choice of AIDSBAD) was tested (see Table 24).
Table 24
Logistic Regression Analysis o f Compassion Mediator Hypothesis for Choice of AIDSBAD
Comparisons
Inconsistent vs. Consistent
Inconsistent vs. Control
Leukemia Compassion
Rating
AIDS Compassion Rating
’“one-tailed test.

Odds Ratio
1.77
1.67

90% C.I.
1.10-2.85
1.04- 2.67

E*
<.05
<.05

.89
1.18

.71-1.10
.95-1.46

.19
.1 1
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This analysis did not produce the expected result. Rather than making the differences in
probability of choosing AIDSBAD between survey versions no longer significant and the
mediators significant, the compassion variables remained insignificant and the
differences between the inconsistent and consistent and the control and inconsistent
conditions remained significant (p<.05). Thus the compassion m ediator hypothesis was
not supported.
Given that AIDS and leukemia compassion ratings were expected to have
different effects on the outcome measure (i.e. higher AIDS compassion ratings reduce the
probability of choosing AIDSBAD, but vice-versa for higher leukemia ratings), these
variables were also investigated separately. These separate tests, however, showed that
each variable produced results similar to the original model. There were some signs that
both leukemia and AIDS compassion ratings had an impact. W hile differences in the
proportion of subjects choosing AIDSBAD in both comparisons remained significant
(p<.05), their confidence intervals did narrow slightly, and the significance levels for
leukemia and AIDS compassion ratings changed Qeukemia: to p = .44 from p = .19,
AIDS: to .19 from .11). Finally, controlling for potential covariates such as knowledge
about AIDS and leukemia did not impact the model.14Thus, Hypothesis 5 that
scompassion mediates the relationship between framing and decision-making, was not
supported (although there was some suggestion of an indirect effect o f compassion on the
choice o f AIDSBAD).
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Attributions of Responsibility Mediator Hypothesis
Next, the hypothesis that attributions of responsibility mediate the choice of
AIDSBAD (i.e. that the survey versions produce differences in responsibility ratings that
in turn influence the choice of AIDSBAD) was tested (as Table 25 shows).
Table 25
Test o f Attributions of Responsibility Mediator Hypothesis for Choice o f AIDSBAD
Comparisons
Inconsistent vs. Consistent
Inconsistent vs. Control
Leukemia Responsibility Rating
AIDS Responsibility Rating
* one-tailed test

Odds Ratio
1.75
1.57
.6 8
.8 8

90% C.I.
1.08-2.83
.98- 2.53
.53-.88
.74-1.04

n*
<.05
.06
< .0 1
.1 0

The results of this analysis suggest that, rather than mediating experimental condition and
AIDSBAD, attributions of responsibility are exerting a separate, indirect influence on the
outcome. The differences in probability of choosing AIDSBAD between the inconsistent
and consistent versions remained significant (p=.05), while the difference between
control and inconsistent versions became insignificant (to £=.06 from pc.05). Meanwhile,
the leukemia responsibility rating was significant (pc.01).
Given this result, and that AIDS and leukemia responsibility ratings were
expected to have different effects on the outcome measure (i.e. higher AIDS
responsibility ratings increase the probability of choosing AIDSBAD, but vice-versa for
higher leukemia ratings), the responsibility rating variables were also investigated
separately. First, the influence of the AIDS responsibility was investigated, as shown in
Table 26:
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Table 26
T est o f Attributions o f Responsibility M ediator H ypothesis for Choice n f ATDSBAD AIDS CPnlv15

Comparisons
Inconsistent vs. Consistent
Inconsistent vs. Control
AIDS Responsibility Rating

Odds Ratio
1.77
1.67
.84

90% C.I.
1.10- 2.85
1.04- 2.68
.71-.99

E*
<.05
<.05
<.05

* one-tailed test.

The difference in probability of choosing AIDSBAD between the inconsistent: and the
consistent versions and the control and inconsistent versions remained significant at
£<.05. The AIDS responsibility rating also became significant (to £<.05 from n>=.10, in
Table 25). The substantive interpretation remains the same, however: no suppoort was
found for AIDS responsibility ratings as a mediator. Instead, additional su p p o rt was
found for a separate effect on preferences by AIDS responsibility ratings.
Similar results were found in a separate analysis of leukemia responsibility ratings
on the outcome measure (see Table 27). While the difference in probability of ►choosing
AIDSBAD between the inconsistent and the consistent versions remained significant, the
control and inconsistent comparison became borderline (£=.07), and the leuk em ia
responsibility ratings version was significant (£<.01).
Table 27
Test of Attributions of Responsibility Mediator Hypothesis for Choice nf AIDSBAD. Leukem ia Only
Condition Comparisons
Inconsistent vs. Consistent
Inconsistent vs. Control
Leukemia Responsibility Rating

Odds Ratio
1 .6 8

1.53
.6 6

90% C.I.
1.05- 2.71
.95-2.46
.51- .85

E*
<.05
.07
< .0 1

* one-tailed test.

This finding suggests that leukemia responsibility ratings are also having a sepaarate effect
on the choice o f AIDSBAD, which may be stronger than that of AIDS responsibility
ratings.
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Overall, Hypothesis 4 was not supported: attributions o f responsibility do not
solely mediate AIDSBAD: Evidence of a direct effect o f experimental condition on
preferences still exists. Instead it seems that, while attributions of responsibility are
consequential to judgments, other mediators (which are not understood) may be
mediating the relationship between frame and emotional consistency and preferences.
Discussion
The experiment had four goals. One was to systematically replicate Levin and
Chapman’s (1993) finding that people were significantly more likely to assign the worst
option in each frame to an undervalued disease population, AIDS patients. The second
goal was to influence the probability of choosing the worst option for AIDS patients by
manipulating the emotional consistency with which the disease populations were
portrayed visually. Another was to produce differences in ratings of compassion and
attributions of responsibility as a function of emotional consistency of visual portrayal.
The fourth was to illuminate the process by which a shift in preferences occurred by
testing two rival mediating hypotheses, compassion versus attributions o f responsibility.
These goals met with some success. The discussion section will first summarize the
results pertaining to each o f the three goals. It will then address the theoretical and
practical implications of these results for message design. Next, it will offer possible
explanations for the mixed findings. Finally, it will discuss an alternative hypothesis that
emerged from the data, and discuss directions for further research.
Replication
The replication of Levin and Chapman’s study (1993, experiment two) met with
partial success. Although the difference in preferences was not significant, the predicted
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pattern was found: People assigned the worst option in each frame to AIDS patients (46%
assigned the risky option in the positive, and 36% assigned the risk option in the
negative). Both the effect size found by Levin and Chapman (14%), and the current study
(10%) would be classified as small (Cohen, 1977). These results suggest that while the
magnitude and direction of the current study are in line with Levin and Chapman’s, the
sample size of the present study was probably insufficient to detect the observed effect.
Hypotheses. Manipulations, and Mediator Tests
Partial support was found for the dissertation study’s main hypothesis. In two out
of three cases, significant differences in the proportion o f subjects assigning the least
desirable option to people with AIDS emerged as a function of emotional consistency of
visual portrayal. Compared to the control and emotionally consistent conditions, people
in the emotionally inconsistent condition (where people with AIDS were portrayed more
compassionately than people with leukemia) were significantly less likely to assign the
less desirable option to people with AIDS.
The manipulations also produced mixed results. Although there were suggestions
that the manipulations of compassion and attributions o f responsibility produced
movement in the predicted direction, only some of the differences were conventionally
significant. With regard to compassion, subjects in the emotionally consistent condition
gave significantly higher compassion ratings to leukemia patients than those in the
control and inconsistent versions. With regard to attributions of responsibility, trends
emerged that suggested a possible influence of the experimental manipulation on AIDS
responsibility judgments. In post hoc tests, differences in responsibility ratings in the
control and consistent compared to the inconsistent conditions approached significance,
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with people in the emotionally inconsistent condition giving comparatively lower
responsibility ratings to AIDS patients, hi addition, there was a trend toward a frame by
emotional consistency interaction approached, such that responsibility ratings for AIDS
patients were higher in the positive frame and lower in the negative frame for the
consistent and control conditions (and vice versa in the inconsistent condition). This trend
was strengthened by controlling for covariates.
With regard to explaining the process by which this shift in preferences occurred,
the picture is less clear. Neither mediator hypothesis, for compassion or responsibility
judgments, was supported because a direct effect of emotional consistency of visual
portrayal on preferences remained. Instead there was evidence that responsibility ratings
exert an influence on the choice AIDSBAD, with leukemia responsibility ratings having a
stronger effect.
Looking at the results of the manipulation in combination with the logistic models
on the re-coded AIDSBAD outcome, the data suggest two main effects (emotional
consistency of visual portrayal influences the choice of AIDSBAD, and responsibility
ratings influences the choice of AIDSBAD), and an interaction: (frame and emotional
consistency interact to predict AIDS responsibility judgments). Because the manipulation
seems to produce differences in AIDS responsibility ratings, this variable may have
indirect and direct effect on preferences, and may be acting as a weak mediator. Clearly,
however, there are other mediators operating that were not understood in this analysis.
Implications for Message Design
The results point to several theoretical and practical implications for message
design. First is that emotionally inconsistent visual portrayals exert a direct influence on
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people’s preferences. When AIDS patients are portrayed more compassionately than
leukemia patients, this portrayal undermines people’s tendency to assign the worst option
in each frame (the risky option in the positive, and the risk-averse option in the negative),
to people with AIDS. When AIDS patients are portrayed uncompassionately, or without
visuals, the original patterns of preference emerge: people assign the w orst option in each
frame to AIDS patients.
Second, there’s also some evidence that emotional consistency interacts with
frame to influence disease-specific judgments of responsibility, such that AIDS
responsibility ratings were lower in the positive and higher in the negative frame for the
inconsistent condition and vice versa for the consistent and control conditions. Thus
when people see portrayals o f an undervalued disease population that are inconsistent
with their expectations, they may be less likely to blame the patients for their condition.
Third, the results suggest that differences in modality (i.e. visual portrayal versus
no visual portrayal) may exist. People who see an emotionally inconsistent portrayal are
significantly less likely to assign the worst option to AIDS patients than people who see
no visual characterization o f the population. Nonetheless, a similar effect was found
comparing the inconsistent and consistent conditions. Thus it seems that while the
modality of the message matters, the nature of the representation (i.e., emotionally
inconsistent versus consistent) matters as well.
Fourth, although no support was found for attributions of responsibility acting as
a sole mediator in the relationship between frames and decision-making, it is clear that
perceptions of responsibility matter. Separate logit models demonstrate that both
leukemia and AIDS responsibility ratings influence on preferences.
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Finally, compassion did not demonstrate the predicted influence on decision
making. Instead, compassion ratings seem to have a weak, indirect effect on preferences.
These results suggest that further work is needed to understand the mechanism by
which emotional consistency and frames influenced decision-making.
Explanations. Alternative Hypotheses and Areas for Further Research
Overall, there are several possibilities for the study’s mixed findings. The most
straightforward answer may be that the sample for this study was too small to detect
some effects (e.g. between the emotionally consistent visual portrayal and the control),
and to establish the success of the compassion and responsibility manipulations (the
majority of which were in the predicted direction). A power analysis showed that 130
subjects in each cell would only increase the probability of finding a small effect to 20%.
The original study detected an effect with 187 subjects in each cell. Additional rounds of
data collection may help to resolve this issue, however, the resources and time necessary
to accomplish this were beyond the scope of this dissertation study.
In addition, a review of the results of specific manipulations suggests that the
consistent manipulation in particular failed to produce differences compared to the
control condition in choice of AIDSBAD (as shown in Table 14). For both AIDS and
leukemia, most respondents reported compassion ratings of 5.25 or above (see Table 4),
which may have made it difficult to increase compassion levels as required for a
successful manipulation in the consistent condition (which sought to increase compassion
ratings for leukemia patients).
Another possibility for these mixed results is the public health context o f the
decision-making task used for this study. The dissertation study deliberately located the
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problem in the public health domain to explore its consequences for policy and public
health issues. Nonetheless, Damasio’s (1994) notion that emotion may be a mechanism
for framing effects specifically referred to a study by McNeil, Pauker, Sox, & Tversky
(1982) that examined the relationship between frames and decision-making in a private
health context, hi this study, subjects expressed their preference for one of two options
(surgery or chemotherapy) to treat their own hypothetical cancer. In contrast to a public
health study that asks subjects to make judgments about others, subjects in a private
health study make decisions relevant to self. This distinction may have crucial
consequences. Several lines of research have demonstrated what might be broadly termed
a “self-other” bias in judgments. For instance, studies asking people to predict the
likelihood of a bad outcome for themselves and others from negative events such as a
mugging, divorce, and disease have shown an “optimism bias:” people tend to predict
better outcomes for themselves than others (e.g. Perloff & Fetzer, 1986; Zakay, 1983).
Similarly, people predict more positive outcomes for themselves than others such as
longer life spans, larger incomes, and better health (e.g. Sternberg, 1969; Synder, 1978;
and Larwood, 1978). These studies suggest that important differences exist in people’s
judgments related to self and others, which may also have consequences for studies of the
role o f emotion in decision-making. For instance, it seems probable that emotion would
be easier to elicit and manipulate for decisions that are personally relevant to subjects
than judgments about others. This idea could be explored in future studies.
In addition, an intriguing alternative hypothesis emerged from these data:
Consistency may have played an important role in influencing preferences. Although it
was not measured in this study, subjects may have responded to the inconsistency of an
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emotional portrayal o f people with AIDS as more compassionate than people with
leukemia. The inconsistency would have arisen from a conflict between the emotional
visual portrayal and people’s pre-existing feelings or attitudes about people with AIDS
and leukemia, especially in a comparative evaluation of the two populations. A body of
evidence supports the notion that consistency is an important psychological element in
interpersonal and social contexts. The consistency-attraction principle states that people
prefer consistency because it lightens cognitive load and makes it easier to predict the
outcome of interactions with others (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Other scholars could
explore the extent to which consistency may mediate or influence decision-making.
Another area for future exploration is issues related to the use of visual versus
verbal elements. This study seems to suggest that both the modality of the elements and
the nature of the visual representation matter, yet the relationship between the two is not
clearly understood.
Future research could also improve on the current study’s design. For example, in
the image selection process described in the second experiment, images received
individual compassion ratings but not comparative compassion ratings. Once compassion
ratings for individual images were established, another round of testing that directly
compared images to each other would have more closely replicated the task required of
subjects in the main experiment: to make comparative evaluations and choices between
the two disease populations. In addition, another round of pre-testing could establish
responsibility ratings for each image selected to ensure varying levels o f attributions of
responsibility for each image. Finally, in the control condition, significant differences
were found for the responsibility and similarity of self manipulations, an unintended
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effect. These findings could be explored to determine whether fram ing also influences
these outcomes, and what implications it may have for future studies.
A standard mouse and keyboard were used.
This software is available at: http://www.empirisoft.com/.
3 For a complete description o f the process o f image selection, refer to the methods and results sections for
Experiment Two.
4 The alpha for AIDS knowledge scale increases to .80 when the third question (“I am very familiar with
ways to prevent AIDS”) is removed.
5 For the remainder of the chapter, emotional consistency of visual portrayal will be used rather than survey
version.
6 A series o f ANCOVAs were conducted, but did not substantively improve the fit o f the model
(controlling for perspective-taking slightly improved the overall fit o f the model: F = 2.4, £<.05, and the
interaction: F = 2.7, £>= .07).
7 A series o f ANCOVAs were conducted using a variety of possible controls, but the model was not
improved.
8 Although the ratings were not in the predicted direction, a contrast comparing leukemia responsibility
ratings for inconsistent plus consistent versus control also approached significance, with subjects in the
control condition giving lower r e s p o n s ib i li ty ratings to leukemia patients (t = -1.53 (297), p = .06, one
tailed test).
9 To determine the sample size needed to significantly capture a small effect size o f 10% (Cohen, 1977), a
power analysis was conducted. 50 respondents in each condition produces an 11% chance of finding a
small effect size (power of X 2 at a = .05, u = 1 ). To increase that likelihood to 15% requires 80 subjects in
each condition, increasing it to 20% requires approximately 130.
1 0 Similar results were found using logistic regression: Significant differences in the proportion of subjects
choosing AIDSBAD emerged in comparisons between the consistent and inconsistent versions (p<.05) and
the control and inconsistent versions (g<.05). As predicted in both comparisons, a smaller proportion of
respondents in the inconsistent version chose AIDSBAD.
11 A Kolomogrov-Smimoff test confirmed a lack of significant differences between the frequency
distributions.
1 2 For example, there’s a significant negative correlation between responsibility ratings for AIDS and
compassion ratings for AIDS (-.329, p<.01); and responsibility ratings for leukemia and compassion ratings
for leukemia (-.136, p<.05). These results make theoretical sense in light o f this paper’s argument that
attributions o f responsibility may play a role in compassionate response, with respondents feeling more
compassionately toward disease patients who are seen as less responsible for their plight (and vice versa).
1 3 Several covariates were tested, including gender, knowledge, perceptions o f risk, but the model did not
improve.
1 4 Nor does compassion seem to be a covariate. A compassion index was also created using scores for both
diseases, and tested in the basic logit model (see Table 22) without effect
1 5 A compassion index was created to test individual differences in compassion as a potential covariate in
the models tested in Tables 25 and 26. The results remained the same.
1

2
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Conclusion
The dissertation project considered emotion and imagery as possible influences on
decision-making in a public health context. More specifically, it examined the influence
o f emotional consistency of visual imagery on preferences by testing whether
compassionate portrayals of an undervalued disease population, AIDS patients, would
impact people’s patterns of behavior toward them. Its broadest theoretical goal was to
illuminate how people aggregate and integrate information from various elements of a
message in order to form a policy preference. These questions also have practical
relevance: Messages in the public health arena can affect judgments related to behaviors
such as giving or volunteering, establishing public policy, and allocating resources at a
local or national level.
This section will address the insights that this project has provided at the most
general level about decision-making regarding disease populations. It will also outline the
specific contributions of the three studies comprising the project.
Decision-making Regarding Disease Populations
At the broadest level, this study has shown that framing, characteristics of the
disease population, and emotional consistency of visual portrayal are consequential for
judgments.
The framing of information influences people’s response to that information.
Although the result was not conventionally significant, this study confirms a pattern
established in previous studies (e.g. Levin & Chapman, 1993, Tversky & Kahneman,
1981): When information is framed in terms of lives being saved, people become riskaverse, preferring a certain to a probabilistic outcome. W hen information is framed in
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terms of death, the pattern is reversed. People become risk-seeking, preferring a
probabilistic to a certain outcome.
The disease populations involved in the decision process are also consequential.
When people are asked to make comparative judgments between two disease populations,
their previous evaluations of the populations seem to influence preferences. In its
replication, this study provided some support for Levin and Chapman’s (1993) finding
that people assign the worst (i.e., least popular) option in each frame to the undervalued
disease population. Comparative judgments about how to allocate resources are common
practice in the public health arena because public health advocates must compete over
limited funding and resources (Levin & Chapman, 1993). Thus, these findings have
relevance for public health messages that attempt to focus attention on and attract funding
for specific disease populations. Furthermore, with regard to the two disease populations
evaluated in this study, the results confirmed that pre-existing evaluative differences exist
in people’s perceptions of them. AIDS patients are perceived as more personally
responsible for their condition, and they are viewed with less compassion than leukemia
patients.
Visual characterizations of disease populations also influence people’s
preferences. Specifically, the facial display of emotion in an image used to represent a
disease population impacts people’s behavior toward that population. In this context,
certain categories of facial display (e.g. sad or fearful displays) seem to elicit a more
compassionate response. When people’s expectations are violated such that an
undervalued disease population is portrayed more compassionately than a valued disease
population, the usual pattern of preferences is disrupted. People who see a compassionate
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portrayal o f AIDS patients are less likely to assign the worst option in each frame to them
than are people who see no image or an uncompassionate portrayal of an AIDS patient.
This result suggests that it is possible to use facial affect in visual portrayals to influence
how people respond to the people portrayed. It also suggests that while the modality of
message elements (i.e., visual versus no visual portrayal) influences preferences, the
nature of the visual representation (i.e., emotionally inconsistent versus consistent, and
negative (sad) versus positive) must be considered as well.
There were also suggestions that together, frames and visual portrayal may affect
disease-specific perceptions o f responsibility by interacting to predict responsibility
judgments, at least for the undervalued disease population. When portrayals of AIDS
patients elicited a more compassionate response, there was a non-significant trend toward
lower perceptions of responsibility in the positive and higher perceptions o f responsibility
in the negative frame. Meanwhile, the opposite patterns occurs when portrayals o f AIDS
patients elicit a less compassionate response or are not represented visually. Thus,
attributions of responsibility appear to be an important element of comparative judgments
of disease populations for two reasons. First, when differences in perceptions of
responsibility exist between the two populations, as established by this study and Levin
and Chapman (1993), people are significantly more likely to assign the worst option in
each frame to the population perceived as more responsible. When that population is
portrayed compassionately, however, the frame and portrayal seem to interact to produce
differences in responsibility ratings such that this pattern may be undermined.
The contributions of each study will now be discussed in turn.
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Theoretical and Practical Contributions of the Three Studies
Experiment One: Compassion Scale Development
A major contribution o f the first study was to create a new compassion scale that
reliably measures people’s emotional response to both stories and images. While previous
research had focused on measuring individual differences in personal empathy (e.g.
Tamborini, Salomonson, & Batik, 1993; Davis, 1983; Coke et al., 1978), this project
required a means for measuring people’s emotional (i.e. compassionate) response to
various stimuli. The new compassion scale produced predicted patterns of significant
differences in compassion ratings for three out of four disease scenarios tested (and later
for 35 pairs of images that were matched both demographically and by image
characteristics). It also provided a means to show that a priori differences in emotional
evaluations of the two disease population exist: People gave significantly higher
compassion ratings to leukemia than AIDS patients after reading factual descriptions of
both diseases. Furthermore, the four-adjective-item scale is easy to use and minimizes the
threat of subject fatigue (subjects used it to rate 50 items in the second experiment).
Another contribution o f the study was identifying message features that will or
will not elicit compassion. In particular, the notion that feelings o f compassion arises
from three outcome factors —seriousness of suffering, perceived similarity, and
attribution of personal responsibility (Nussbaum, 1996) - was systematically tested. The
results suggested that attributions of responsibility in particular seem to have the most
influence on compassion ratings. In three out of four disease scenarios tested, the
predicted pattern emerged: People gave higher compassion ratings when patients were
portrayed as less responsible, and lower compassion ratings when they were portrayed as
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more responsible for their condition. Furthermore, although seriousness of suffering was
not manipulated, subjects perceived as more serious the suffering o f disease victims
whom they view as highly similar to themselves and not responsible for their condition.
Judgments of blame seem to have an important influence on people’s response
toward others. In this instance, these perceptions seem to influence people’s emotional
evaluations of the disease population. These pre-existing evaluations may in turn affect
how people respond to messages about these populations. Future research is needed to
explore the ramifications of these judgments for message design, and the factors that
influence perceptions of responsibility.
Experiment Two: Facial Affect and Compassionate Response. Scale Validation
A major contribution of the second study was to increase our understanding of
how to represent compassion visually via facial affect. Although a systematic exploration
of the specific facial characteristics that elicit compassion was beyond the scope of this
study, the following patterns seemed to emerge: Negative facial displays of sadness or
fear tended to elicit higher compassion ratings. Negative angry displays elicited lower
compassion ratings, while positive (e.g. happy, smiling) displays elicited mixed ratings.
In addition, women and children seemed to receive higher compassion ratings overall
than men. These findings were bolstered by comments in the de-briefing, where subjects
reported stronger feelings toward children and people with sad or fearful displays.
Comments toward positive facial displays were mixed with some citing bravery as reason
for feeling more compassion, while others felt that the positive response was
inappropriate or unrealistic. Further studies could explore these findings using facial
display coding schemes developed by Ekman (1972; see also Ekman & Friesen, 1975).
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The second study also validated the compassion scale by demonstrating that
significant differences in compassion ratings emerged as a function of facial display of
emotion. Thus the compassion scale produced significant differences in ratings for both
visual and verbal stimuli.
Main Experiment: Influencing preferences via emotional consistency o f visual
portrayal
While the differences were not significant, the main study replicated previous
patterns of policy preferences where people tended to assign the worst option in each
frame to the undervalued disease population. It also demonstrated that frames and
emotional consistency of visual portrayal are consequential to decision-making in a
public health context by undermining this previously established pattern: Emotionally
inconsistent images influence people’s preferences. By portraying AIDS patients more
compassionately than leukemia patients, this study successfully undermined the pattern
of assigning the worst option in each frame to people with AIDS. People were
significantly less likely to assign this option when they saw a compassionate portrayal,
compared to when they saw an uncompassionate portrayal or no image.
It also made progress in the search for mechanisms for these effects by testing two
rival mediating hypotheses: compassion and attributions of responsibility. Although
neither variable was found to act as a sole mediator in the relationship between frames
and decision-making, perceptions of responsibility seem to matter. For example, if any of
these measures are acting as a mediator at all, it would be AIDS responsibility ratings,
albeit weakly. The data suggested a trend whereby framing and attributions of
responsibility interact to produce higher AIDS responsibility ratings in the positive frame
161

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

and lower AIDS responsibility ratings in the negative frame for the consistent and control
conditions and vice versa in the inconsistent condition. The data also show that
responsibility ratings have an indirect effect on preferences.
W e will now take a critical view of the main study to explain its mixed findings
and to suggest areas for improvement.
Explanations for Mixed Results
Overall, there are several possibilities for the study’s mixed findings. A primary
concern throughout was that the sample for this study was too small to detect some
effects (e.g. between the emotionally consistent visual portrayal and the control), and to
establish the success of the compassion and responsibility manipulations, the majority of
which were in the predicted direction. Levin and Chapman’s (1993) original study
detected an effect with 187 subjects per cell, while this study had 50 subjects per cell.
Additional rounds of data collection may help to resolve this issue, however, the
resources and time necessary to accomplish this were beyond the scope of this
dissertation project.
Another possibility for these m ixed results is the public health context o f the
decision-making task used for this study. The dissertation study deliberately located the
problem in the public health domain to explore its consequences for policy and public
health issues. Nonetheless, Damasio’s (1994) notion that emotion may be a mechanism
for framing effects specifically referred to a study by McNeil, Pauker, Sox, & Tversky
(1982) that examined the relationship between frames and decision-making in a private
health context. In this study, subjects expressed their preference for one of two options
(surgery or chemotherapy) to treat their own hypothetical cancer. In contrast to a public
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health study that asks subjects to make judgments about others, subjects in a private
health study make decisions relevant to self. This distinction may have crucial
consequences. Several lines of research have demonstrated what m ight be broadly termed
a “self-other” bias in judgments. For instance, studies asking people to predict the
likelihood o f a bad outcome for themselves and others from negative events such as a
mugging, divorce, and disease have shown an “optimism bias:” people tend to predict
better outcomes for themselves than others (e.g. Perloff & Fetzer, 1986; Zakay, 1983).
Similarly, people predict more positive outcomes for themselves than others such as
longer life spans, larger incomes, and better health (e.g. Sternberg, 1969; Synder, 1978;
and Larwood, 1978). These studies suggest that important differences exist in people’s
judgments related to self and others, which may also have consequences for studies of the
role o f emotion in decision-making. For instance, it seems probable that emotion would
be easier to elicit and manipulate for decisions that are personally relevant to subjects
than judgments about others. This idea could be explored in future studies.
Suggestions for Improvement
Future research could also improve the current study’s design. For example, in the
image selection process described in the second experiment, images received individual
compassion ratings but not comparative compassion ratings. Once compassion ratings for
individual images were established, another round of testing that directly compared
images to each other in the context of the decision problem would have more closely
replicated the task required of subjects in the main experiment. The main study required
subjects to make comparative evaluations and choices between the two disease
populations. In addition, another round of pre-testing could have established
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responsibility ratings for each image selected, especially in a comparative evaluation, to
ensure varying levels o f attributions of responsibility for each image. Finally, the
interaction of frames and consistency on AIDS responsibility ratings suggests that further
work could be done to understand the relationships among these variables, and their
implications for judgments.
Areas for Further Research
An area that seems to merit further exploration is the role of consistency in
decision-making. Subjects in this study may have responded to the inconsistency of an
emotional portrayal of AIDS patients as more compassionate than leukemia patients. The
inconsistency may have arisen from a conflict between the emotional visual portrayal and
people’s pre-existing feelings or attitudes about people with AIDS and leukemia,
especially in a comparative evaluation of the two populations. On the other hand, perhaps
the inconsistency arose from differences in the facial displays of two seriously ill people,
one of which was happy and the other sad. Clearly, the nature of this inconsistency needs
to be understood because a body of evidence supports the notion that consistency is an
important psychological element in interpersonal and social contexts (Fiske & Taylor,
1991). Additional studies could explore the extent to which consistency may mediate or
influence decision-making, and what elements of a message create inconsistency. This
study also used inconsistency in a public health context. An important contribution could
be made by investigating the impact of inconsistency on decision-making at an individual
level.
In general, subsequent studies are also needed to understand the mechanisms for
the effects found here. Perhaps a way to think about these effects would be in terms of an
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expectancy violation. The literature could be explored to determine ways to understand
the nature of this violation. In addition, some of the other biases inherent in judgments
such as the “self-other” and “optimism” biases may be useful in this context.
Furthermore, the role of emotion in decision-making still needs further
exploration. For example, an alternative hypothesis to the notion that inconsistency of
emotional portrayal is influencing preferences is that people are responding to the
negative emotion (sadness) in the visual portrayals, and are more likely to assign the best
option to the patient who looks sad. In addition, although this study was not able to
demonstrate a direct link between compassionate response and preferences, some studies
suggest that emotional response is a complex process that may involve several emotions
simultaneously. For example Dillard et al. (1996) have shown that emotional messages
can elicit a variety of emotional responses. They found that fear-based PSAs also elicited
surprise and sadness, and that these emotions also influenced message acceptance. The
emotions that compassionate messages may also elicit (e.g. sadness, fear, and interest)
and their influence needs to be understood.
Finally, while this study used discrete emotions, other studies have conceptualized
and measured emotion from a valence/ intensity perspective (e.g. Luce, 1998), an
approach which may prove useful in this context.
Summary
In sum, by exploring the extent to which compassionate visual portrayals
influence preferences, this study made both theoretical and practical contributions.
Through a series of studies, it extended framing research by offering insight into the
importance of frames, emotional consistency of visual portrayal and disease population
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characteristics for decision-making. It also made progress toward understanding the
mechanisms underlying framing effects. In addition, it clarified the components of a
compassionate emotional response, and provided a scale to measure compassionate
response. The study also pointed to some interesting directions for understanding how
facial display o f emotion elicits compassion. It also provided some evidence that the
modality o f message elements as well as the nature of visual characterizations matter.
Finally, it contributed to our understanding o f how each of the elements or levels of a
message operates in activating certain evaluations, as well as how those evaluations work
together to influence preferences.
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APPENDIX A: EXPERIMENTAL SURVEYS
APPENDIX A l:
Pretest One Survey. Version 1A

Study One:
Perceptions o f Diseases

Please do not turn the page until instructed to do
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This study examines people’s perceptions and attitudes about certain diseases. The
diseases cited in this study occur both in the United States and around the world.
The survey you are about to complete contains a series o f questions that w ill ask you
about your feelings and opinions about these diseases. In order to properly complete
the survey:
•
•
•
•

Please answer ALL the questions asked in this survey.
Please give HONEST answers about what you think.
Please DO NOT give answers you think we want.
Please DO NOT go back and change your answers.

M ost people will not be absolutely sure about some o f the answers. W hen this
happens to you, ju st give your best attem pt to answer the question.
Finally, it’s important for you to know that all your answers are both confidential
and anonymous. The survey does not contain any identifying m arks, and the
inform ation you provide w ill be used for statistical analysis only. W hen you have
completed both portions o f the survey, you will place it in a blank envelope, and
drop it in a box provided by the researcher.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP!
(PLEASE BEGIN)
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•
•

Leukemia is a m alignant cancer of the bone m iarrow and blood that is
characterized by the uncontrolled growth o f b>lood cells.
AIDS (acquired immune deficiency syndrome)) is a viral disease caused by the
human im m unodeficiency virus (HIV) that im jpairs the human Im m une system .

You will now read a series o f questions and statemaents about AIDS and leukem ia.
Please read each statem ent and check the responsae that best describes your attitude
or opinion.

W hich do you think is more numerous in the U n ited States, persons with AIDS or
persons with leukem ia? (check one)
There are many more persons with AIDS than persons with leukemia
There are slightly more persons with AIDS than persons with leukemia
There are about the same number of persons with A ID S as persons with leukemia
There are slightly more persons with leukemia tham persons with AIDS
There are many more persons with leukemia than [persons with AIDS

How do AIDS and leukem ia compare in terms o f t lie ages o f people with each
disease? (check one)
Persons with AIDS tend to be much younger
Persons with AIDS tend to be slightly younger
Persons with AIDS and persons with leukemia tencd to be about the same age
Persons with leukemia tend to be slightly younger
Persons with leukemia tend to be much younger

How do AIDS and leukem ia compare in terms o f lijfe expectancy after contracting
the disease? (check one)
Persons with AIDS have a much longer life expectancy
Persons with AIDS have a slighdy longer life expectancy
Persons with AIDS and persons with leukemia havoe about the same life expectancy
Persons with leukemia have a slightly longer life expectancy
Persons with leukemia have a much longer life expectancy

Please go on to the next [page...
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H ow do AIDS and leukemia compare in term s o f quality o f life after contracting the
disease? (check one)
Persons with AIDS have a much better quality of life
Persons with AIDS have a slightly better quality o f life
Persons with ADDS and persons with leukemia have about the same quality o f life
Persons with leukemia have a slightly better quality of life
Persons with leukemia have a much better quality o f life

How do AIDS and leukemia com pare in terms o f likelihood of infecting others'!
(check one)
Persons with AIDS have a much greater likelihood o f infecting others
Persons with AIDS have a slightly greater likelihood of infecting others
Persons with AIDS and persons with leukemia have about the same likelihood of
infecting others
Persons with leukemia have a slightly greater likelihood o f infecting others
Persons with leukemia have a much greater likelihood of infecting others

How do AIDS and leukemia compare in terms o f personal responsibility for

contracting the disease? (check one)
Persons with AIDS bear a much greater responsibility for contracting the disease
Persons with AIDS bear a slightly greater responsibility for contracting the disease
Persons with AIDS and persons with leukemia bear about the same responsibility for
contracting the disease
Persons with leukemia bear a slightly greater responsibility for contracting the disease
Persons with leukemia bear a much greater likelihood responsibility for contracting
the disease

How do AIDS and leukemia compare in term s o f the likelihood that a cure will be
found in the next 25years! (check one)
There is
There is
There is
There is
There is

a much greater chance that a cure will be found for AIDS
a slightly greater chance that a cure will be found for AIDS
a about the same chance that a cure will be found for AIDS and leukemia
a slightly greater chance that a cure will be found for leukemia
a much greater chance that a cure will be found for leukemia
Please go on to the next page...
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How do persons who contract AIDS and leukemia com pare in terms o f their
similarity to you ? (check one)
Persons with AIDS are much more similar to me than persons with leukemia
Persons with AIDS are slightly more similar to me than persons with leukemia
Persons with AIDS and persons with leukemia are about equally similar to me
Persons with leukemia are slightly more similar to me than persons with AIDS
Persons with leukemia are much more similar to me than persons with AIDS

Please go on to the next page...
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In your opinion, what are the most common causes of AIDS? Please list as many
causes as you can.

Please go on to the next page...
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In your opinion, what are the m ost common causes o f leukem ia? Please list as many
causes as you can.

Please go on to the next page...
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U sing the seven-point scale below, please circle the num ber that best describes how
m uch you agree with each statement:

In general, a person with AIDS is personally responsible, through his or her behavior, for
contracting the disease:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Agree strongly
Disagree strongly

In general, a person with leukemia is personally, through his or her behavior, responsible
for contracting the disease:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Agree strongly
Disagree strongly

Please go on to the next page.
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Please read the follow ing paragraph about people with leukemia:

People with leukemia have a m alignant cancer o f the bone marrow and blood
that is characterized by the uncontrolled growth o f blood cells. This form o f cancer
results from an acquired (not inherited) genetic injury to DNA o f a single cell. The
four most common types of leukemia are: acute or chronic myelogenous, and acute
or chronic lym phocytic (myelogenous and lym phocytic refer to the cell type
involved). Acute leukemias progress rapidly and result in an accumulation of
immature, functionless marrow and blood cells. Often, marrow can no longer
produce sufficient normal red and white blood cells and platelets. Virtually all
people with leukem ia also develop anemia, a deficiency o f red blood cells.
M eanwhile, a lack o f normal white cells im pairs people’s ability to fight infections.
A platelet shortage results in bruising and easy bleeding. Chronic leukem ia, in
contrast, progresses more slowly and perm its the creation o f greater am ounts o f
mature, functional cells. The signs o f leukem ia include easy bruising or bleeding
(platelet deficiency), paleness or easy fatigue (anem ia), and recurrent m inor
infections or poor healing o f minor cuts (im paired w hite cell function). These
symptoms are not leukemia-specific, however, and its diagnosis requires specific
blood tests and an examination o f blood and marrow cells.

Please go on to the next page...
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Using the seven-point scale below, please circle the num ber that best describes how
much each word captures the way you felt w hile reading the paragraph about
people with leukem ia.

SYMPATHETIC
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

INTERESTED
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

MOVED
1
Not at all

6

7
Very much

COMPASSIONATE
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

LIKED THE PERSON
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

EMPATHIC
1
Not at all

2

6

7
Very much

SURPRISED
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

Please go on to the next page...
176

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

COMMISERATED W ITH THE PERSON
1
2
3
4
Not at all

6

7
Very much

2

6

7
Very much

DISGUSTED
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

SOFTHEARTED
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

SORROWFUL
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

GUILTY
1
Not at all

2

6

7
Very much

PITYING
1
Not at all

2

6

7
Very much

ANGRY
1
Not at all

2

6

7
Very much

MERCIFUL
1
Not at all

5

Please go on to the next page...
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IDENTIFIED W ITH TH E PERSON
1
2
3
Not at all

4

5

6

7
Very much

HAPPY
1
Not at all

6

7
Very much

TENDER FEELINGS TOWARD THE PERSON
1
2
3
4
Not at all

6

7
Very much

SAD
1
Not at all

6

7
Very much

KINDLY
1
Not at all

6

7
Very much

AFRAID
1
Not at all

6

7
Very much

CONCERNED
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

Please go on to the next page...
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Please read the follow ing paragraph about people with AIDS:

People with AIDS (acquired immune deficiency syndrom e) have a viral
disease caused by the hum an immunodeficiency virus (HIV) that im pairs the human
immune system and leaves them vulnerable to a variety o f infections that would
ordinarily be suppressed. A retrovirus, HIV’s genetic m aterial is com prised of RNA,
which enables it to integrate with and take over the DNA (genetic m aterial) of
infected cells. HIV prim arily damages the immune system by infecting and
destroying helper T cells, which are critical to orchestrating the Immune system ’s
different defenses. It also reduces killer T cells, which directly find and kills
microorganisms in the bloodstream . In addition to white blood cells, HIV can infect
brain immune and system cells. The disease has a long incubation period o f
approximately eight years before symptoms appear, so initially people infected with
HIV look and feel perfectly healthy. But after a few years, m any people develop
ARC (AIDS-related com plex), which includes fever, fatigue, weakness, diarrhea,
malaise, weight loss, abnorm ally low numbers of helper T cells, and generalized
lymph node swelling. Frequently ARC then develops into the m ore serious AIDS
syndrome. As the infected system deteriorates, people tend to develop many
different recurrent or chronic opportunistic infections that produce lethal diseases.
The most frequently occurring infections include strains of pneum onia, meningitis,
and toxoplasmosis o f the brain.
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Using the seven-point scale below, please circle the number that best describes how
much each word captures the way you felt w h ile reading the paragraph about
people w ith AIDS.

SYMPATHETIC
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

INTERESTED
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

MOVED
1
Not at all

6

7
Very much

COMPASSIONATE
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

LIKED THE PERSON
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

EMPATHIC
1
Not at all

2

6

7
Very much

SURPRISED
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much
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COMMISERATED WITH THE PERSON
1
2
3
4
Not at all

6

7
Very much

MERCIFUL
1
Not at all

2

6

7
Very much

DISGUSTED
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

SOFTHEARTED
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

6

7
Very much

GUILTY
1
Not at all

6

7
Very much

PITYING
1
Not at all

6

7
Very much

ANGRY
1
Not at all

6

7
Very much

SORROWFUL
Not at all

Please go on to the next page.,
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IDENTIFIED W ITH THE PERSON
1
2
3
Not at all

4

5

6

7
Very much

HAPPY
1
Not at all

6

7
Very much

TENDER FEELINGS TOWARD THE PERSON
1
2
3
4
Not at all

6

7
Very much

SAD
1
Not at all

6

7
Very much

KINDLY
1
Not at all

2

6

7
Very much

AFRAID
1
Not at all

2

6

7
Very much

CONCERNED
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

Please go on to the next page...
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PLEASE STOP

Please raise your hand if you have any questions at this point,
otherw ise please go on to the next page...
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The next section o f the survey contains a series o f questions that ask you
about your feelings and opinions about a number o f stories. These stories describe
people who have a variety o f diseases and conditions. W e are interested in your
reactions and attitudes toward these stories. In order to com plete the survey
properly:
•
•
•
•

Please answ er ALL the questions asked in this survey.
Please give HONEST answers about what you think.
Please DO NOT give answers you think we want.
Please DO NOT go back and change your answers.

M ost people w ill not be absolutely sure about some o f the answ ers. W hen this
happens to you, ju st give your best attem pt to answer the question.
Finally, it’s im portant for you to know that all your answers are both confidential
and anonymous. The survey does not contain any identifying m arks, and the
inform ation you provide w ill be used for statistical analysis only. W hen you have
completed both portions o f the survey, you w ill place it in a blank envelope, and
drop it in a box provided by the researcher.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP!
(PLEASE BEGIN)
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la. Earlier this year, 20-year-old Jana unexpectedly tested positive for AIDS.
Initially, her doctors were puzzled because of her low-risk status. For example, Jana
had never had a blood transfusion. She’d also been dating Sean, her high school
sweetheart, for over six years. Only after Sean also tested positive, however, did he
finally confess that during a Spring break trip to Florida, he’d had an unprotected
one-night stand with another woman. That woman was tracked down, tested, and
also found to be HIV-positive. Jana took a few months off from school to consider
her treatment options and adjust to the high levels of medications she is now taking
daily. Although she wants to return to school in the fall, she is afraid to tell people
about her condition. Despite the support she receives from her friends and family,
Jana often feels depressed and isolated.

Please go on to the next page...
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U sing the seven-point scale below, please circle the number that best describes how
much each word captures the way you felt toward the person depicted in Story 1.

SYMPATHETIC
1
2
Not at all

3

4

5

6

7
Very much

INTERESTED
1
2
Not at all

3

4

5

6

7
Very much

MOVED
1
Not at all

3

4

5

6

7
Very much

COMPASSIONATE
1
2
Not at all

3

4

5

6

7
Very much

LIKED THE PERSON
1
2
Not at all

3

4

5

6

7
Very much

EMPATHIC
1
Not at all

2

3

4

5

6

7
Very much

SURPRISED
1
2
Not at all

3

4

5

6

7
Very much

6

7
Very much

2

COMMISERATED WITH THE PERSON
1
2
3
4
5
Not at all
Please go on to the next page...
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MERCIFUL
I
N ot at all

2

6

7
Very much

DISGUSTED
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

SOFTHEARTED
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

SORROWFUL
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

GUILTY
1
Not at all

6

7
Very much

PITYING
1
Not at all

6

7
Very much

ANGRY
1
Not at all

6

7
Very much

IDENTIFIED WITH THE PERSON
1
2
3
Not at all

6

7
Very much

Please go on to the next page.
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HAPPY
1
2
Not at all

3

4

6

7
Very much

TENDER FEELINGS TOWARD THE PERSON
1
2
3
4
Not at all

6

7
Very much

SAD
1
Not at all

6

7
Very much

KINDLY
1
Not at all

6

7
Very much

AFRAID
1
N ot at all

6

7
Very much

CONCERNED
1
2
N ot at all

6

7
Very much

Please go on to the next page...
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U sing the seven-point scales below, please circle the num ber that best describes your
opinion about the person portrayed in Story 1:

How similar to you do you find the person in Story 1?
1
2
3
4
Very similar
to me

5

How serious do you consider the suffering of the person in Story 1?
1
2
3
4
5
Not at all
serious

6
7
Not at all similar
to me

6
7
Very serious

To what extent to you feel the person in Story 1 is responsible for his or her situation?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Person is not
Person is totally
at all responsible
responsible

Please go on to the next page...
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2b. Tom, a personable 23-year-old, had always had an active social life. In general,
he liked to meet new people, and made friends easily. He also preferred to date
several women casually, rather than one person exclusively. One winter, Tom
came down with a flu-like illness that included a fever and sw ollen glands. At the
same time, Tom noticed that he had several blister-like lesions on his inner thigh.
He mentioned the lesions in passing to his doctor during his next physical, and
was told that he had probably contracted herpes. Tom learned that herpes could
be spread by skin-to-skin contact, including kissing or touching an infected
person with an open sore, and having sexual intercourse w ith an infected person.
He also learned that herpes sets up a lifelong presence in the body, and that he
could expect to have outbreaks o f the disease at least once a year. An itching,
tingling or painful feeling in the area where the lesions tend to recur often
precedes these outbreaks.

Please go on to the next page...
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U sing the seven-point scale below, please circle th e num ber that best describes how
much each word captures the way you felt tow ard the person depicted in Story 2.

SYMPATHETIC
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

INTERESTED
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

MOVED
1
Not at all

6

7
Very much

COMPASSIONATE
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

LIKED THE PERSON
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

EMPATHIC
1
Not at all

2

6

7
Very much

SURPRISED
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

2

Please go on to the nejtt page...
191

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

COMMI SERATED WITH THE PERSON
1
2
3
4
Not at all

5

6

7
Very much

2

6

7
Very much

DISGUSTED
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

SOFTHEARTED
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

SORROWFUL
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

GUILTY
1
Not at all

2

6

7
Very much

PITYING
1
Not at all

2

6

7
Very much

ANGRY
1
Not at all

2

6

7
Very much

MERCIFUL
1
Not at all

Please go on to the next page...
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IDENTIFIED WITH THE PERSON
1
2
3
Not at all

4

HAPPY
1
2
Not at all

4

6

7
Very much

6

7
Very much

TENDER FEELINGS TOWARD THE PERSON
1
2
3
4
Not at all

6

7
Very much

SAD
1
Not at all

6

7
Very much

3

5

KINDLY
1
Not at all

2

6

7
Very much

AFRAID
1
Not at all

2

6

7
Very much

CONCERNED
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

Please go on to the next page...
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Using the seven-point scales below, please circle the number that best describes your
opinion about the person portrayed in Story 2:

How similar to you do you find the person in Story 2?
1
2
3
4
7
Very similar
all similar
to me

5

How serious do you consider the suffering of the person in Story 2?
1
2
3
4
5
7
Not at all
serious
serious

6
Not at
to me

6
Very

To what extent to you feel the person in Story 2 is responsible for his or her situation?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Person is not
Person
is totally
at all responsible
responsible

Please go on to the next page...
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3c. An exceptional athlete, D an had his first swim m ing lesson at the age o f 3,
and as a young teen worked every summer as a lifeguard at the local pool in
his neighborhood. After setting several high school records for backstroke,
Dan w ent on to win a sw im m ing scholarship at a prestigious Eastern
university. Despite his experience and skill, however, one summer night
before his 40th birthday D an was seriously injured. W hile horsing around
trying to impress their wives at a friend’s pool party, his friends threw Dan
into the shallow end. He slam m ed headfirst into the bottom . Instantly he
knew that something was terribly wrong. Although fully conscious, he could
not m ove his arms or legs. The laughter o f his friends turned to screams
when he did not re-surface. T hey dove in and saved him , but damaged his
broken neck further when rem oving him from the pool. D an is now a
perm anently wheel-chair-bound paraplegic.

Please go on to the next page...
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U sing the seven-point scale below, please circle the number that best describes how
much each word captures the way you felt toward the person depicted in Story 3.

SYMPATHETIC
1
2
Not at all

3

4

5

6

7
Very much

INTERESTED
1
2
Not at all

3

4

5

6

7
Very much

MOVED
1
Not at all

3

4

5

6

7
Very much

COMPASSIONATE
1
2
Not at all

3

4

5

6

7
Very much

LIKED THE PERSON
1
2
Not at all

3

4

5

6

7
Very much

EMPATHIC
1
Not at all

2

3

4

5

6

7
Very much

SURPRISED
1
2
Not at all

3

4

5

6

7
Very much

2

Please go on to the next page...
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COMMISERATED WITH THE PERSON
1
2
3
4
Not at all

6

7
Very much

2

6

7
Very much

DISGUSTED
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

SOFTHEARTED
I
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

SORROWFUL
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

GUILTY
1
Not at all

2

6

7
Very much

PITYING
1
Not at all

2

6

7
Very much

ANGRY
1
Not at all

2

6

7
Very much

MERCIFUL
1
Not at all

5

Please go on to the next page...
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IDENTIFIED WITH THE PERSON
1
2
3
N ot at all

4

5

6

7
Very much

HAPPY
1
Not at all

6

7
Very much

TENDER FEELINGS TOWARD THE PERSON
1
2
3
4
Not at all

6

7
Very much

SAD
1
Not at all

2

6

7
Very much

KINDLY
1
Not at all

2

6

7
Very much

AFRAID
1
Not at all

2

6

7
Very much

CONCERNED
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

Please go on to the next page...
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U sing the seven-point scales below, please circle the num ber that best describes your
opinion about the person portrayed in Story 3:

How similar to you do you find the person in Story 3?
1
2
3
4
7
Very similar
all sim ilar
to m e

5

How serious do you consider the suffering of the person in Story 3?
1
2
3
4
5
7
Not a t all
serious
serious

6
Not at
to me

6
Very

To w hat extent to you feel the person in Story 3 is responsible for his or her situation?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Person is not
Person
is totally
at all responsible
responsible

Please go on to the next page...
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4d. 39-year-old Bernadette lives in an East Coast city, where she works at a private
insurance agency. Tired o f her current housing, which she considered drab and
uninviting, Bernadette decided to find another, more upscale, place to live. After
looking at m any buildings relatively close to work, she found a great deal: a
bargain-priced loft one-bedroom in a beautiful, older apartment com plex that used
to be a garm ent factory. An added plus was the building’s location near a manm ade pond, around which Bernadette could take her daily m orning run. But
Bernadette also knew that local residents thought that the pond w as contaminated
w ith the carcinogen (cancer-causing agent) benzene from the building’s factory
days. A lthough Bernadette knew about the benzene, the benefits o f the apartments
far outw eighed its potential health risks. A fter living in her new apartm ent for 13
m onths, however, Bernadette began to feel constantly fatigued, started to bruise
easily, and grew increasingly pale. A fter testing positive for anem ia, a deficiency of
red blood cells, Bernadette started taking iron. W hen her condition did not improve,
further tests revealed that she had leukem ia, a cancer that results from an acquired
(not inherited) genetic injury to a single cell’s DNA.

Please go on to the next page...
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Using the seven-point scale below, please circle the number that best describes how
much each word captures the way you felt toward the person depicted in Story 4.

SYMPATHETIC
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

INTERESTED
I
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

MOVED
1
Not at all

6

7
Very much

COMPASSIONATE
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

LIKED THE PERSON
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

EMPATfflC
1
Not at all

2

6

7
Very much

SURPRISED
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

Please go on to the next page.
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COMMISERATED W ITH THE PERSON
1
2
3
4
Not at all

5

6

7
Very much

2

6

7
Very much

DISGUSTED
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

SOFTHEARTED
I
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

SORROWFUL
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

GUILTY
1
Not at all

2

6

7
Very much

PITYING
1
Not at all

2

6

7
Very much

ANGRY
I
Not at all

2

6

7
Very much

MERCIFUL
1
Not at all

Please go on to the next psage...
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IDENTIFIED WITH THE PERSON
1
2
3
Not at all

4

HAPPY
1
2
Not at all

4

6

7
Very much

6

7
Very much

TENDER FEELINGS TOWARD THE PERSON
1
2
3
4
Not at all

6

7
Very much

SAD
1
Not at all

6

7
Very much

3

5

KINDLY
1
Not at all

2

6

7
Very much

AFRAID
1
Not at all

2

6

7
Very much

CONCERNED
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

Please go on to the next page...
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Using the seven-point scales below , please circle the num ber that best describes your
opinion about the person portrayed in Story 4:

How similar to you do you find the person in Story 4?
1
2
3
4
7
Very similar
all similar
to me

5

How serious do you consider the suffering of the person in Story 4?
1
2
3
4
5
7
Not at all
serious
serious

6
Not at
to me

6
Very

To what extent to you feel the person in Story 4 is responsible for his or her situation?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Person is not
Person
is totally
at all responsible
responsible

Please go on to the next page...
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Using the seven-point scale below, please circle the number that best describes your
opinion about the follow ing statements:

I consider myself to be at risk to get HIV/AIDS:
1
2
3
4
I am not
at all at risk

I consider myself to be at risk to get leukemia:
1
2
3
4
I am not
at all at risk

5

6

7
I am very
much at risk

5

6

7
I am very
much at risk

Please go on to the next page...

205

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

U sing the seven-point scale below, please circle the num ber that best describes your
opinion about the follow ing statem ents:

I know a lot about AIDS:
1
2
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7
Agree

4

5

6

7
Agree

I am very familiar with ways to prevent AIDS:
1
2
3
4
Disagree

5

6

7
Agree

I know more than most about AIDS:
1
2
3
Disagree

Please go on to the next page...
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Using the seven-point scale below, please circle the number that best describes your
opinion about the following statements:

I know a lot about leukemia:
1
2
3
Disagree

4

5

6

7
Agree

I know more than most about leukemia:
1
2
3
Disagree

4

5

6

7
Agree

5

6

7
Agree

I am very familiar with ways to prevent leukemia:
1
2
3
4
Disagree

Please go on to the next page...
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Do you know or have you ever known anyone who has AIDS? Please check as many
answers as apply to you:
I have never known anyone who has o r had AIDS
Yes, a member of my family has or had AIDS
Yes, my partner has or had AIDS
Yes, a friend or friends has or had AIDS
Yes, I have AIDS
Yes, other (please describe)______________________________________________

Do you know or have you ever known anyone who has leukemia? Please check as
many answers as apply to you:
I have never known anyone who has or had leukemia
Yes, a member of my family has or had leukemia
Yes, my partner has or had leukemia
Yes, a friend or friends has or had leukemia
Yes, I have or had leukemia
Yes, other (please describe)______________________________________________

Please go on to the next page...
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Please place an ‘x ’ in the box, or write in the follow ing information about yourself.
These questions are for classification purposes only.

1. Gender:

Male [

]

Fem ale[

2. Age:

_________

3. Year in School:

Freshman

[

]

Sophomore

[

]

Junior

[

]

Senior

[

]

[

]

African-American

[

]

Asian-American

[

]

Hispanic

[

]

]

O th e r____

4. Major(s):

5. Race:

__________

Caucasian

O th e r_____________

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIM E AND EFFORT!!!
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APPENDIX A2:
Experiment Two Survey
Pre-test Two: Condition One (AIDS), Condition Two (Leukemia)
Introduction
1. Thank you very much for participating in this study.
Here are three easy guidelines for answering the questions in this electronic survey:
1. Simply use the m ouse to move the arrow around on the screen until it touches the box
next to the answer you want. Use the mouse again to click on the box you chose.
2. If you make a mistake while answering a question, you can click the “Go Back” button
that appears on the bottom left of the computer screen. If that button does not appear on
the screen, it means that option is not available.
3. As you enter your answers, the survey usually proceeds automatically. The exception
is when you want to move off a page that has "Continue" in the bottom right com er like
you see in this screen. When that happens, move the arrow until it touches the word
"Continue," and then click on it. Please try that now.
2. Another type of question will ask you to type in your answer using the keyboard. L et’s
try one now. In the box below, please type "Hello" (without the quotation marks), then
press ENTER.
AIDS/leukemia
1. You will now see a series of images of people with AIDS and leukemia, and answer
some questions about those images. Each image is labeled to identify the person as either
an AIDS or leukemia victim. When responding to questions about the images, please take
note of whether the person is identified as having AIDS or leukemia. In addition, please
note that you will see each image four times.
Before you begin, this is a good time to ask any questions you may have about using the
computer, or the purpose of the survey. Otherwise, if you are ready, click on "Continue"
at the bottom right com er of the screen to start.
Images 1- ? (random ized)
2. Using the seven-point scale below, please click on the number that best describes how
much this picture makes you feel the following emotion:
Randomized:
a. sorrowful
b. compassionate
c. moved
d. tender feelings toward the person.

210

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Perspective-taking
We will now ask for your opinion about a series of statements and questions.
Using the seven-point scales below, please circle the number that best describes how
much you agree with each statement: (l=Disagree strongly, 7=Agree strongly; A ll
statements are randomized). Items marked with * were reverse coded for analyses.
1. Before I criticize somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel in their place (imagi):
2. If I’m sure I’m right about something, I don’t waste much time listening to other
people’s arguments (waste)*
3. I believe there are two sides to every question and I try to look at both of them
(twosi):
4. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the other person’s point of view (pov)*
5. I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make a decision (side):
6. When I am upset at someone, I usually try to put m yself in his or her “shoes” for
awhile (shoes):
7. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective toward them
(protect):
8. When I see someone treated unfairly, I sometimes don’t feel much pity for them
(unfair)*
9. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me (tender):
10.1 would describe m yself as a pretty softhearted person (soft):
11. Other people’s misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal (disturb)*
12.1 am often touched by the things I see happen (touch):
Risk/knowledge
1. Using the seven-point scales below, please circle the number that best describes your
opinion about people with leukemia: (1= not all, 7= very)
How similar to you do you find people with leukemia?
How serious do you consider the suffering of people with leukemia?
To what extent do you feel people with leukemia are responsible for their condition?
2. Using the seven-point scale below, please circle the number that best describes your
opinion about the following statements: (1= not all, 7= very)
I consider myself to be at risk to get HIV/AIDS:
I consider myself to be at risk to get leukemia:
3. Using the seven-point scale below, please circle the number that best describes your
opinion about the following statements:
I know a lot about AIDS:
I know more than m ost about AIDS:
I am very familiar with ways to prevent AIDS:
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4. Using the seven-point scale below, please circle the number that best describes your
opinion about the following statements:
I know a lot about leukemia:
I know more than most about leukemia:
I am very familiar with ways to prevent leukemia:
5. Do you know or have you ever known anyone who has AIDS [leukemia]? Please
check as many answers as apply to you. When you are done, click on "Continue" at the
bottom right of the screen:
I have never known anyone who has or had AIDS [leukemia]
Yes, a member of my family has or had AIDS [leukemia]
Yes, my partner has or had AIDS [leukemia]
Yes, a friend or friends has or had AIDS [leukemia]
Yes, I have AIDS [leukemia]
Yes, other (please describe)___________________________________________

Demographics
The last part of the survey asks for some following information about you. These
questions are used for classification purposes only.
1. Are you: Male [
]
Female [
]

2. What is your age?
3. What is your current year in school?
Freshman

[

]

Sophomore

[

]

Junior

[

]

Senior

[

]

Other
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4. What is your major?

5. Which of the following categories b est describes your racial background? Would you
say that you are:
White or Caucasian
[
]
Black or African-American

[

]

Asian or Asian-American

[

]

Hispanic, LatinoCa)

[

]

O th e r ______________

6. Congratulations, you've completed th e survey. Please click on "Continue" to log out.

THANK YOU VERY M U C H F O R YOUR T IM E A N D E FFO R T !!!
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APPENDIX A3:
Main Experiment Survey
Introduction
First, thank you very much for participating in this study, your contribution is important.
Please take as much time as you need to complete the survey. Remember that there are no
right answers, ju st respond thoughtfully and carefully to all questions.
Here are three easy guidelines for answering the questions in this electronic survey:
1. Simply use the mouse to move the arrow around on the screen until it touches the box
next to the answer you want. Use the mouse again to click on the box you chose.
2. If you make a mistake while answering a question or need to review information, you
can click the "Go Back" button that appears on the bottom left o f the computer screen. If
that button does not appear on the screen, it means that option is not available.
3. As you enter your answers, the survey usually proceeds automatically. The exception
is when you want to move off a page that has "Continue" in the bottom right comer like
you see in this screen. When that happens, move the arrow until it touches the word
"Continue," and then click on it. Please try that now.
Before you begin, this is a good time to ask any questions you may have about using the
computer, or the purpose of the survey. Otherwise, if you are ready, click on "Continue"
at the bottom right comer of the screen to start.
The next 3 screens will present you with a decision problem. A t the second screen, you
may want to write down or make a mental note of your response.
Decision Problem: Version 1 (Control, no images): Version 2. (inconsistent) Version 3
(consistent)
Assume that a research hospital has 60 leukemia patients and 60 AIDS patients. Two new
programs, Program A and Program B, have been developed to treat these diseases. Each
of these programs will affect patients with both of these blood-related diseases. Assume
that exact scientific estimates of the effects of the two programs on the patient groups are
as described on the next screen. Assume also that the effect of treatment on any one
patient will be all-or-none: Either they will die, or they will be returned to the quality of
life they experienced before contracting the disease.
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Condition 1: Positive
la . Positive, order 1 (posordl)1
Leukemia patients
AIDS patients
If Program A
There is a 1/3 probability that all 60 20 AIDS patients will be saved,
is adopted
of the leukemia patients will be saved
and a 2/3 probability that 0 will be saved.
If Program B
is adopted

20 leukemia patients will be saved.

lb . Positive, order 2 (A & B switched) (posord2)
Leukemia patients
If Program A
20 leukemia patients will be saved,
is adopted

If Program B
is adopted

There is a 1/3 probability that all
60 of the AIDS patients will be
saved and a 2/3 probability that 0
will be saved.
AIDS patients
There is a 1/3 probability that all
60 of the AIDS patients will be
saved and a 2/3 probability that 0
will be saved.

There is a 1/3 probability that all 60 20 AIDS patients will be saved,
of the leukemia patients will be saved
and a 2/3 probability that 0 will be saved.

lc . Positive, order 3 (order 1, leukemia and AIDS switched) (posord3)
AIDS patients
Leukemia patients
If Program A
20 AIDS patients will be saved.
There is a 1/3 probability that
is adopted
all 60 of the leukemia patients
will be saved and a 2/3
probability that 0 will be
saved.
If Program B
is adopted

There is a 1/3 probability that all
60 of the AIDS patients will be
saved and a 2/3 probability that 0
will be saved.

20 leukemia patients will be
saved.

Id. Positive, order 4 (order 1, leukemia and AIDS switched, A & B switched)
(posord4)
AIDS patients
Leukemia patients
If Program A
There is a 1/3 probability that all
20 leukemia patients will be
is adopted
60 of the AIDS patients will be
saved.
saved and a 2/3 probability that 0
will be saved.
If Program B
is adopted

20 AIDS patients will be saved.

There is a 1/3 probability that
all 60 of the leukemia patients
will be saved and a 2/3
probability that 0 will be
saved.
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Condition 2: Negative

.

2a Negative, order 1 (negordl)
Leukemia patients
If Program A
There is a 1/3 probability that all no
is adopted
leukemia patients will die and a 2/3
probability that all 60 will die.
If Program B
adopted

40 leukemia patients will die.

2b. Negative, order 2 (A & B switched) (negord2)
Leukemia patients
If Program A
40 leukemia patients will die.
is adopted

If Program B
is adopted

There is a 1/3 probability that no
leukemia patients will die and a
2/3 probability that all 60 will die.

AIDS patients
40 AIDS patients will die.

There is a 1/3 probability is
that no AIDS patients will
die and a 2/3 probability
that all 60 will die.
AIDS patients
There is a 1/3 probability that
no AIDS patients will die and
a 2/3 probability that all 60
will die.
40 AIDS patients will die.

2c. Negative, order 3 (order 1, leukemia and AIDS switched) (negord3)
AIDS patients
Leukemia patients
If Program A
40 AIDS patients will die.
There is a 1/3 probability that
is adopted
no leukemia patients will die
and a 2/3 probability that all
60 will die.
If Program B
is adopted

There is a 1/3 probability that no
AIDS patients will die and a 2/3
probability that all 60 will die.

40 leukemia patients will die.

2d. Negative, order 4 (order 1, leukemia and AIDS switched, A & B switched)
(negord4)
AIDS patients
Leukemia patients
If Program A
There is a 1/3 probability that no
40 leukemia patients will die.
is adopted
AIDS patients will die and a 2/3
probability that all 60 will die.
If Program B
is adopted

40 AIDS patients will die.

There is a 1/3 probability that
no leukemia patients will die
and a 2/3 probability that all
60 will die.
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Please indicate which program you would choose by clicking on the box next to program
A (choicel) or program B (choice2).
Compassion Scale
We will now ask for your opinion about a series of statements and questions.
Using the seven-point scale below (1= not at all, 7 = very much), please click on the
number that best describes how much you feel the following emotion toward people with
AIDS [leukemia]:
Randomized
a. Sorrowful (aidsor, leusor)
b. Compassionate (aidcomp, leucomp)
c. M oved (aidmov, leumov)
d. tender feelings toward the person, (aidtend, leutend)
Perspective-taking
Using the seven-point scales below, please circle the number that best describes how
much you agree with each statement: (l=Disagree strongly, 7=Agree strongly; A ll
statem ents are randomized). Items marked with * must be reverse coded for analyses.
1. Before I criticize somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel in their place (imagi):
2. If I’m sure I’m right about something, I don’t waste much time listening to other
people’s arguments (waste)*
3. I believe there are two sides to every question and I try to look at both o f them
(twosi):
4. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the other person’s point of view (pov)*
5. I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make a decision (side):
6. When I am upset at someone, I usually try to put myself in his or her “shoes” for
awhile (shoes):
7. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind o f protective toward them
(protect):
8. When I see someone treated unfairly, I sometimes don’t feel much pity for them
(unfair)*
9. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me (tender):
1 0 .1 would describe myself as a pretty softhearted person (soft):
11. Other people’s misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal (disturb)*
1 2 .1 am often touched by the things I see happen (touch):
Risk/knowledge
1. Using the seven-point scales below, please circle the number that best describes your
opinion about people with leukemia [AIDS]: (1= not all, 7= very)
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How similar to you do you find people with leukemia [AIDS]? (aidssim, leusim)
How serious do you consider the suffering o f people with leukemia [AIDS]? (aidsser,
leuser)
To what extent do you feel people with leukemia [AIDS] are responsible for their
condition? (aidsres, leures)
2. Using the seven-point scale below, please circle the number that best describes your
opinion about the following statements: (1= not all, 7= very)
I consider myself to be at risk to get HIV/AIDS: (aidrisk)
I consider myself to be at risk to get leukemia: (leurisk)
3. Using the seven-point scale below, please circle the number that best describes your
opinion about the following statements:
I know a lot about AIDS: (knoaidl)
I know more than most about AIDS: (knoaid2)
I am very familiar with ways to prevent AIDS: (knoaid3)
4. Using the seven-point scale below, please circle the number that best describes your
opinion about the following statements:
I know a lot about leukemia: (knoleul)
I know more than most about leukemia: (knoleu2)
I am very familiar with ways to prevent leukemia: (knoleu3)
5. Do you know or have you ever known anyone who has AIDS [leukemia]? Please
check as many answers as apply to you. When you are done, click on "Continue" at the
bottom right o f the screen:
I have never known anyone who has or had AIDS [leukemia] (evaid_01,
evleu_01)
Yes, a member of my family has or had AIDS [leukemia] (evaid_02, evleu_02)
Yes, my partner has or had AIDS [leukemia] (evaid_03, evleu_03)
Yes, a friend or friends has or had AIDS [leukemia] (evaid_04, evleu_04)
Yes, I have AIDS [leukemia] (evaid_05, evleu_05)
Yes, other (please describe)____________________________________________
(evaid_06, evleu_06)
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[Decision Problem: Presented again with different images for Version 2 (inconsistent).
Version 3 (consistent)]
Please indicate which program you would choose by clicking on the box next to program
A (choicl2) or program B (choic22).
Demographics
The last part o f the survey asks for some following information about you. These
questions are used for classification purposes only.
1. Are you:
Male [
]
Female [
] (sex)
2. What is your age? (age)

3. What is your current year in school? (year)
Freshman
[
Sophomore
[
Junior
[
Senior
[
O th e r______________

]
]
]
]

4. What is your major? (major)
5. Which o f the following categories best describes
say that you are:
(race)
White or Caucasian
Black or African-American
Asian or Asian-American
Hispanic, Latino(a)
O th e r______________

your racial background? Would you
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]

Congratulations, you've completed the survey. Please click on "Continue" to log out.
TH A N K YOU VERY M U CH FO R Y O UR TIM E AND EFFO RT!!!
1Variable names are in parentheses.
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APPENDIX B:
Perceptions of ATDS and Leukemia:
Questionnaire and Response Distributions for Experiment One
Which do you think is more numerous in
the United States, persons with AIDS or
persons with leukemia?

How do AIDS and leukemia compare in terms
o f quality o f life after contracting the disease?
2 Persons with AIDS have a much better
quality o f life
30 Persons with AIDS have a slightly better
quality o f life
49 Persons with AIDS and persons with
leukemia have about the same quality o f life
17 Persons with leukemia have a slightly better
quality o f life
6 Persons with leukemia have a much better
quality of life
(Mean = 2.95)

23 There are many more persons with AIDS than
persons with leukemia
24 There are slightly more persons with AIDS
than persons with leukemia
9 There are about the same number of persons
with AIDS as persons with leukemia
23 There are slightly more persons with
leukemia than persons with AIDS
25 There are many more persons with leukemia
than persons with AIDS
(Mean = 3.03)

How do AIDS and leukemia compare in terms
o f likelihood o f infecting others’!
97 Persons with AIDS have a much greater
likelihood o f infecting others
5 Persons with AIDS have a slightly greater
likelihood o f infecting others
2 Persons with AIDS and persons with
leukemia have about the same likelihood of
infecting others
0 Persons with leukemia have a slightly greater
likelihood o f infecting others
0 Persons with leukemia have a much greater
likelihood o f infecting others
(Mean = 1.09)

How do AIDS and leukemia compare in terms
of the ages o f people with each disease?
7 Persons with AIDS tend to be much younger
14 Persons with AIDS tend to be slightly
younger
33 Persons with AIDS and persons with
leukemia tend to be about the same age
38 Persons with leukemia tend to be slightly
younger
12 Persons with leukemia tend to be much
younger
(Mean = 3.33)
How do AIDS and leukemia compare in terms
o f life expectancy after contracting the
disease?
6 Persons with AIDS have a much longer life
expectancy
32 Persons with AIDS have a slightly longer life
expectancy
30 Persons with AIDS and persons with
leukemia have about the same life expectancy
24 Persons with leukemia have a slightly longer
life expectancy
12 Persons with leukemia have a much longer
life expectancy
(Mean = 3.04)

How do AIDS and leukemia compare in terms
o f personal responsibility for contracting the
disease?
76 Persons with AIDS bear a much greater
responsibility for contracting the disease
20 Persons with AIDS bear a slightly greater
responsibility for contracting the disease
6 Persons with AIDS and persons with
leukemia bear about the same responsibility for
contracting the disease
JL Persons with leukemia bear a slightly greater
responsibility for contracting the disease
1 Persons with leukemia bear a much greater
likelihood responsibility for contracting the
disease
(Mean = 1.38)
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How do AIDS and leukemia compare in terms
o f the likelihood that a cure will be found in the
next 25 years?
7 There is a much greater chance that a cure
will be found for AIDS
18 There is a slightly greater chance that a cure
will be found for AIDS
52 There is a about the same chance that a cure
will be found for AIDS and leukemia
19 There is a slightly greater chance that a cure
will be found for leukemia
£ There is a much greater chance that a cure
will be found for leukemia
(Mean = 3.03)
How do persons who contract AIDS and
leukemia compare in terms o f their similarity
to you ?
1 Persons with AIDS are much more similar to
me than persons with leukemia
8 Persons with AIDS are slightly more similar
to me than persons with leukemia
65 Persons with AIDS and persons with
leukemia are about equally similar to me
17 Persons with leukemia are slightly more
similar to me than persons with AIDS
12 Persons with leukemia are much more
similar to me than persons with AIDS
(Mean = 3.30)
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APPENDIX C:
Story Scenarios for Experiment One
AIDS
la. Earlier this year, 20-year-old Jana unexpectedly tested positive for AIDS.
Initially, her doctors were puzzled because of her low-risk status. For example,
Jana had never had a blood transfusion. She’d also been dating Sean, her high
school sweetheart, for over six years. Only after Sean also tested positive,
however, did he finally confess that during a Spring break trip to Florida, he’d had
an unprotected one-night stand with another woman. That woman was tracked
down, tested, and also found to be HIV-positive. Jana took a few months off from
school to consider her treatment options and adjust to the high levels of
medications she is now taking daily. Although she wants to return to school in the
fall, she is afraid to tell people about her condition. Despite the support she
receives from her friends and family, Jana often feels depressed and isolated.
(S.N)1
lb. Earlier this year, 20-year-old Jana unexpectedly tested positive for AIDS.
Initially, her doctors were puzzled because of her low-risk status. For example,
Jana had never had a blood transfusion. She’d also been dating Sean, her high
school sweetheart, for over six years. Only after Sean also tested positive,
however, did Jana finally confess that during a Spring break trip to Florida, she’d
had an unprotected one-night stand with another man. That man was tracked
down, tested, and also found to be HIV-positive. Jana took a few months from
school off to consider her treatment options and adjust to the high levels of
medications she is now taking daily. Although she wants to return to school in the
fall, she is afraid to tell people about her condition. Despite the support she
receives from her friends and family, Jana often feels depressed and isolated.
(S,Y)
lc. Earlier this year, 43-year-old Jana unexpectedly tested positive for AIDS.
Initially, her doctors were puzzled because of her low-risk status. For example,
Jana had never had a blood transfusion. She’d also been married to Sean, her high
school sweetheart, for over sixteen years. Only after Sean also tested positive,
however, did he finally confess that during a business trip to Florida, he’d had an
unprotected one-night stand with another woman. That woman was tracked down,
tested, and also found to be HIV-positive. Jana took a few months off from work
to consider her treatment options and adjust to the high levels of medications she
is now taking daily. Although she wants to return to work in the fall, she is afraid
to tell people about her condition. Despite the support she receives from her
friends and family, Jana often feels depressed and isolated. (NS, N)

222

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Id. Earlier this year, 43-year-old Jana unexpectedly tested positive for AIDS.
Initially, her doctors were puzzled because of her low-risk status. For example,
Jana had never had a blood transfusion. She’d also been married to Sean, her high
school sweetheart, for over sixteen years. Only after Sean also tested positive,
however, did Jana finally confess that during a business trip to Florida, she’d had
an unprotected one-night stand with another man. That man was tracked down,
tested, and also found to be HIV-positive. Jana took a few months off from work
to consider her treatment options and adjust to the high levels o f medications she
is now taking daily. Although she wants to return to work in the fall, she is afraid
to tell people about her condition. Despite the support she receives from her
friends and family, Jana often feels depressed and isolated. (NS,Y)
STD (HP V)
2a. John, a college junior at an East Coast university, didn’t give too much
thought to the small, painful bumps that had appeared in his genital area. He tried
a couple over-the-counter medications, but they did not go away. One day, on his
way to class, a nurse from the university health service handed him a pamphlet on
sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). To his horror, he realized that those small
bumps matched the symptoms described for genital warts. He went to the clinic,
and his test for the disease came back positive. John immediately informed
Marcia, the woman whom he was dating seriously. She was also tested, and
diagnosed with genital warts. Eventually Marcia confessed that she knew she had
contracted the warts from a previous relationship, but thought that she was in
remission. John is currently undergoing a painful treatment for the warts, which
nvolves freezing them off with liquid nitrogen. (S,N)
2b. John, a college junior at an East Coast university, didn’t give too much
thought to the small, painful bumps that had appeared in his genital area. He tried
a couple over-the-counter medications, but they did not go away. One day, on his
way to class, a nurse from the university health service handed him a pamphlet on
sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). To his horror, he realized that those small
bumps matched the symptoms described for genital warts. He went to the clinic,
and his test for the disease came back positive. John immediately informed
Marcia, the woman whom he was dating seriously. She was also tested, and
diagnosed with genital warts. Eventually John confessed that he had had unsafe
sex in a previous relationship with a woman who had the warts, but thought that
she was in remission. John is currently undergoing a painful treatment for the
warts, which involves freezing them off with liquid nitrogen. (S,Y)
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2c. John, a college professor at an East Coast university, didn’t give too much
thought to the small, painful bumps that had appeared in his genital area. He tried
a couple over-the-counter medications, but th ey did not go away. One day, on his
way to teach class, he was handed a pamphlet on sexually transmitted diseases
(STDs) by a nurse from the university health s:ervice. To his horror, he realized
that those small bumps matched the sym ptoms described for genital warts. He
went to the clinic, and his test for the disease cam e back positive. John
immediately informed Marcia, the woman w hom he was dating seriously. She
was also tested, and diagnosed with genital w arts. Eventually John confessed that
he had had unsafe sex in a previous relationship with a woman who had the warts,
but thought that she was in remission. John is currently undergoing a painful
treatment for the warts, which involves freezing them off with liquid nitrogen.
(S,N)
2d. John, a college professor at an East Coast university, didn’t give too much
thought to the small, painful bumps that had appeared in his genital area. He tried
a couple over-the-counter medications, but th ey did not go away. One day, on his
way to teach class, he was handed a pamphlet o n sexually transmitted diseases
(STDs) by a nurse from the university health service. To his horror, he realized
that those small bumps matched the symptoms described for genital warts. He
went to the clinic, and his test for the disease cam e back positive. John
immediately informed Marcia, the woman w hom he was dating seriously. She
was also tested, and diagnosed with genital w arts. Eventually John confessed that
he had had unsafe sex in a previous relationship with a woman who had the warts,
but thought that she was in remission. John is currently undergoing a painful
treatment for the warts, which involves freezing them off with liquid nitrogen.
(S,Y)
Cancer
3a. Mara had just turned twenty-one when she becam e very ill. She started
coughing up blood, and felt sharp pains w henever she took a deep breath.
Initially, doctors thought that she had pneumonia and treated her with antibiotics.
Her symptoms continued to worsen, however, a n d Mara was eventually
hospitalized. During her hospital stay, tests an d x-rays revealed that she had lung
cancer. The diagnosis came as a complete shock. No one in her fam ily had ever
had the disease, and she had never been warned, that she was at risk. M ara was
non-smoker. Furthermore, she had always led a healthy lifestyle, eating well and
exercising regularly. After an operation, doctors started Mara on a heavy
chemotherapy regimen. She takes an oral treatm ent daily, and reports to the
hospital monthly for radiation treatment. H er prognosis for surviving the next year
is about 40-60. (S,N)
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3b. Mara had ju st turned twenty-one when she became very ill. She started
coughing up blood, and felt sharp pains whenever she took a deep breath.
Initially, doctors thought that she had pneumonia and treated her with antibiotics.
Her symptoms continued to worsen, however, and Mara was eventually
hospitalized. During her hospital stay, tests and x-rays revealed that she had lung
cancer. The diagnosis did not come as a complete shock. One person in her family
had also had the disease, and she had always been warned that she was at risk.
Mara was a heavy smoker. Furthermore, she had always led an unhealthy
lifestyle, eating poorly and exercising rarely. After an operation, doctors started
Mara on a heavy chemotherapy regimen. She takes an oral treatment daily, and
reports to the hospital monthly for radiation treatment. Her prognosis for
surviving the next year is about 40-60. (S,Y)
3c. Mara had ju st turned forty-one when she became very ill. She started
coughing up blood, and felt sharp pains whenever she took a deep breath.
Initially, doctors thought that she had pneumonia and treated her with antibiotics.
Her symptoms continued to worsen, however, and Mara was eventually
hospitalized. During her hospital stay, tests and x-rays revealed that she had lung
cancer. The diagnosis came as a complete shock. No one in her family had ever
had the disease, and she had never been warned that she was at risk. M ara was
non-smoker. Furthermore, she had always led a healthy lifestyle, eating well and
exercising regularly. After an operation, doctors started Mara on a heavy
chemotherapy regimen. She takes an oral treatment daily, and reports to the
hospital monthly for radiation treatment. Her prognosis for surviving the next year
is about 40-60. (NS,N)
3d. Mara had just turned forty-one when she became very ill. She started
coughing up blood, and felt sharp pains whenever she took a deep breath.
Initially, doctors thought that she had pneumonia and treated her with antibiotics.
Her symptoms continued to worsen, however, and Mara was eventually
hospitalized. During her hospital stay, tests and x-rays revealed that she had lung
cancer. The diagnosis did not come as a complete shock. One person in her family
had also had the disease, and she had always been warned that she was at risk.
Mara was a heavy smoker. Furthermore, she had always led an unhealthy
lifestyle, eating poorly and exercising rarely. After an operation, doctors started
Mara on a heavy chemotherapy regimen. She takes an oral treatment daily, and
reports to the hospital monthly for radiation treatment. Her prognosis for
surviving the next year is about 40-60. (NS,Y)
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Herpes
4a. Tom, a personable 23-year-old, had always had an active social life. In general, he
liked to m eet new people, and made friends easily. He also preferred to date one
woman exclusively, rather than several people casually. One winter, Tom came
down with a flu-like illness that included a fever and swollen glands. At the same
time, Tom noticed that he had several blister-like lesions on his inner thigh. He
mentioned the lesions in passing to his doctor during his next physical, and was
told that he had probably contracted herpes. Tom learned that herpes could be
spread by skin-to-skin contact, including kissing or touching an infected person
with an open sore, and having sexual intercourse with an infected person. He also
learned that herpes sets up a lifelong presence in the body, and that he could
expect to have outbreaks o f the disease at least once a year. An itching, tingling or
painful feeling in the area where the lesions tend to recur often precedes these
outbreaks. (S,N)
4b. Tom, a personable 23-year-old, had always had an active social life. In general, he
liked to meet new people, and made friends easily. He also preferred to date
several women casually, rather than one person exclusively. One winter, Tom
came down with a flu-like illness that included a fever and swollen glands. At the
same time, Tom noticed that he had several blister-like lesions on his inner thigh.
He mentioned the lesions in passing to his doctor during his next physical, and
was told that he had probably contracted herpes. Tom learned that herpes could be
spread by skin-to-skin contact, including kissing or touching an infected person
with an open sore, and having sexual intercourse with an infected person. He also
learned that herpes sets up a lifelong presence in the body, and that he could
expect to have outbreaks o f the disease at least once a year. An itching, tingling or
painful feeling in the area where the lesions tend to recur often precedes these
outbreaks. (S,Y)
4c. Tom, a personable 37-year-old, had always had an active social life. In general, he
liked to meet new people, and made friends easily. He also preferred to date one
woman exclusively, rather than several people casually. One winter, Tom came
down with a flu-like illness that included a fever and swollen glands. At the same
time, Tom noticed that he had several blister-like lesions on his inner thigh. He
mentioned the lesions in passing to his doctor during his next physical, and was
told that he had probably contracted herpes. Tom learned that herpes could be
spread by skin-to-skin contact, including kissing or touching an infected person
with an open sore, and having sexual intercourse with an infected person. He also
learned that herpes sets up a lifelong presence in the body, and that he could
expect to have outbreaks of the disease at least once a year. An itching, tingling or
painful feeling in the area where the lesions tend to recur often precedes these
outbreaks. (NS, N)
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4d. Tom, a personable 37-year-old, had always had an active social life. In general, he
liked to meet new people, and made friends easily. He also preferred to date
several women casually, rather than one person exclusively. One winter, Tom
came down with a flu-like illness that included a fever and swollen glands. At the
same time, Tom noticed that he had several blister-like lesions on his inner thigh.
He mentioned the lesions in passing to his doctor during his next physical, and
was told that he had probably contracted herpes. Tom learned that herpes could be
spread by skin-to-skin contact, including kissing or touching an infected person
with an open sore, and having sexual intercourse with an infected person. He also
learned that herpes sets up a lifelong presence in the body, and that he could
expect to have outbreaks of the disease at least once a year. An itching, tingling or
painful feeling in the area where the lesions tend to recur often precedes these
outbreaks. (NS,Y)
Paraplegic
5a. An exceptional athlete, Dan had his first swimming lesson at the age of 3, and
as a young teen worked every summer as a lifeguard at the local pool in his
neighborhood. After setting several high school records for backstroke, Dan went
on to win a swimming scholarship at a prestigious Eastern university. Despite his
experience and skill, however, one summer night before his sophomore year Dan
was seriously injured. While horsing around trying to impress their girlfriends at a
friend’s pool party, his friends threw Dan into the shallow end. He slammed
headfirst into the bottom. Instantly he knew that something was terribly wrong.
Although fully conscious, he could not move his arms or legs. The laughter of his
friends turned to screams when he did not re-surface. They dove in and saved
him, but damaged his broken neck further when removing him from the pool. Dan
is now a permanently wheel-chair-bound paraplegic. (S, N)
5b. An exceptional athlete, Dan had his first swimming lesson at the age of 3, and
as a young teen worked every summer as a lifeguard at the local pool in his
neighborhood. After setting several high school records for backstroke, Dan went
on to win a swimming scholarship at a prestigious Eastern university. Despite his
experience and skill, however, one summer night before his sophomore year Dan
was seriously injured. While horsing around trying to impress his girlfriend at a
friend’s pool party, Dan dove into the shallow end. He slammed headfirst into the
bottom. Instantly he knew that something was terribly wrong. Although fully
conscious, he could not move his arms or legs. The laughter of his friends turned
to screams when he did not re-surface. They dove in and saved him, but damaged
his broken neck further when removing him from the pool. Dan is now a
permanently wheel-chair-bound paraplegic. (S, Y)
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5c. An exceptional athlete, Dan had his first swimming lesson at the age o f 3, and
as a young teen worked every summer as a lifeguard at the local pool in his
neighborhood. After setting several high school records for backstroke, Dan went
on to win a swimming scholarship at a prestigious Eastern university. Despite his
experience and skill, however, one summer night before his 40th birthday Dan was
seriously injured. While horsing around trying to impress their wives at a friend’s
pool party, his friends threw Dan into the shallow end. He slammed headfirst into
the bottom. Instantly he knew that something was terribly wrong. Although fully
conscious, he could not move his arms or legs. The laughter of his friends turned
to screams when he did not re-surface. They dove in and saved him, but damaged
his broken neck further when removing him from the pool. Dan is now a
permanently wheel-chair-bound paraplegic. (NS, N)
5d. An exceptional athlete, Dan had his first swimming lesson at the age of 3, and
as a young teen worked every summer as a lifeguard at the local pool in his
neighborhood. After setting several high school records for backstroke, Dan
went on to win a swimming scholarship at a prestigious Eastern university.
Despite his experience and skill, however one summer night before his 40th
birthday, Dan was seriously injured. While horsing around trying to impress his
wife at a friend’s pool party, Dan dove into the shallow end. He slammed
headfirst into the bottom. Instantly he knew that something was terribly wrong.
Although fully conscious, he could not move his arms or legs. The laughter of his
friends turned to screams when he did not re-surface. They dove in and saved
him, but damaged his broken neck further when removing him from the pool.
Dan is now a permanently wheel-chair-bound paraplegic. (NS, Y)
Leukemia
6a. 19-year-old Bemie lives in an East Coast city, where he studies at a private
university. Tired of his current housing, which he considered drab and uninviting,
Bemie decided to find another, more upscale, place to live. After looking at many
buildings relatively close to campus, he found a great deal: a bargain-priced loft
one-bedroom in a beautiful, older apartment complex that used to be a garment
factory. An added plus was the building’s location near a man-made pond, around
which Bemie could take his daily morning run. But unbeknownst to Bemie, local
residents thought that the pond was contaminated with the carcinogen (cancercausing agent) benzene from the building’s factory days. Had Bemie known about
the benzene, the potential health risks would have far outweighed the apartment’s
benefits. After living in his new apartment for 13 months, Bemie began to feel
constantly fatigued, started to bruise easily, and grew increasingly pale. After
testing positive for anemia, a deficiency o f red blood cells, Bemie started taking
iron. W hen his condition did not improve, further tests revealed that he had
leukemia, a cancer that results from an acquired (not inherited) genetic injury to a
single cell’s DNA.
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6b. 19-year-old Bemie lives in an East Coast city, where he studies at a private
university. Tired of his current housing, which he considered drab and uninviting,
Bemie decided to find another, more upscale, place to live. After looking at many
buildings relatively close to campus, he found a great deal: a bargain-priced loft
one-bedroom in a beautiful, older apartment complex that used to be a garment
factory. An added plus was the building’s location near a man-made pond, around
which Bemie could take his daily morning run. But Bemie also knew that local
residents thought that the pond was contaminated with the carcinogen (cancercausing agent) benzene from the building’s factory days. Although Bemie knew
about the benzene, the benefits of the apartments far outweighed its potential
health risks. After living in his new apartment for 13 months, however, Bemie
began to feel constantly fatigued, started to bruise easily, and grew increasingly
pale. After testing positive for anemia, a deficiency of red blood cells, Bemie
started taking iron. When his condition did not improve, further tests revealed that
he had leukemia, a cancer that results from an acquired (not inherited) genetic
injury to a single cell’s DNA.
6c. 37-year-old Bemie lives in an East Coast city, where he works at a lucrative
car dealership. Tired of his current housing, which he considered drab and
uninviting, Bemie decided to find another, more upscale, place to live. After
looking at many buildings relatively close to work, he found a great deal: a
bargain-priced loft one-bedroom in a beautiful, older apartment complex that used
to be a garment factory. An added plus was the building’s location near a manmade pond, around which Bemie could take his daily morning run. But
unbeknownst to Bemie, local residents thought that the pond was contaminated
with the carcinogen (cancer-causing agent) benzene from the building’s factory
days. Had Bemie known about the benzene, the potential health risks would have
far outweighed the apartment’s benefits. After living in his new apartment for 13
months, Bemie began to feel constantly fatigued, started to bruise easily, and
grew increasingly pale. After testing positive for anemia, a deficiency of red
blood cells, Bemie started taking iron. When his condition did not improve,
further tests revealed that he had leukemia, a cancer that results from an acquired
(not inherited) genetic injury to a single cell’s DNA.
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6d. 37-year-old Bemie lives in an East Coast city, where he works at a lucrative
car dealership. Tired of his current housing, which he considered drab and
uninviting, Bemie decided to find another, more upscale, place to live. After
looking at many buildings relatively close to work, he found a great deal: a
bargain-priced loft one-bedroom in a beautiful, older apartment complex that used
to be a garment factory. An added plus was the building’s location near a manmade pond, around which Bemie could take his daily morning run. But Bemie
also knew that local residents thought that the pond was contaminated with the
carcinogen (cancer-causing agent) benzene from the building’s factory days.
Although Bemie knew about the benzene, the benefits o f the apartments far
outweighed its potential health risks. After living in his new apartment for 13
months, however, Bemie began to feel constantly fatigued, started to bruise
easily, and grew increasingly pale. After testing positive for anemia, a deficiency
of red blood cells, Bemie started taking iron. When his condition did not improve,
further tests revealed that he had leukemia, a cancer that results from an acquired
(not inherited) genetic injury to a single cell’s DNA.

1Scenario manipulations and symbols: seriousness of suffering (not manipulated, same for all), similarity
(S = similar, NS = not similar), personal responsibility (Y = personally responsible, N = not responsible).
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Appendix D:
Images for Main Experiment. Inconsistent and Consistent Conditions
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Visual Portrayal o f Disease Populations: Emotionally Inconsistent Condition
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Visual Portrayal o f Disease Populations: Emotionally Consistent Condition
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